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SUM31ARY OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis pursued three objectives: (1) to identify policies and practices which are 
related to the retention of professionals and managers with critical skills; (2) to 
document why and how these policies and practices have changed in relation to the 
business strategy; and (3) to assess whether the organisation's skill supply patterns 
constitute a strategy, that is, explicit, consistent and coordinated efforts supporting 
the business strategy. Guided by a contextual theoretical framework and 
methodology, the researcher undertook a pilot stuay of two Canadian high technology 
firms, and followed with three case studies of large UK-based high technology 
organisations with an R&D Division. 
The findings indicated the importance of hard benefits (compensation) as a necessary 
condition for recruitment and retention, and the complementary impact of twelve soft 
benefits Qob characteristics and other factors tied to the work, organisational and 
social environments) with special relevance for retention. Lifetime employment as a 
policy and as the dominant skills supply pattern proved to be resistant to change. 
The HRM context (comprising the history of the organisation, managerial and 
professional cultures, the personnel function, and workforce planning) was found to 
inhibit skill initiatives, but certain features became less negative over time. In 
particular, the cumulative effect of recruitment of new skills over several years 
altered the internal labour market such that many employees supported new ways of 
doing business. 
Skills were found to be solidly embedded in the work and social organisation, and 
high levels of energy were required to modify the organisation-wide skillbase. Both 
single lever and multiple lever SKISSs were identified. b1iddle managers proved to be 
potential key actors in obtaining skill advantages for the entire R&D Division. Top 
management paid attention to skill issues under extreme circumstances such as a 
shift from the public to private sector, and a change of mission. The thesis leads to a 
number of policy recommendations and avenues for future research. 
li 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The importance of knowledge and technology in economic activity has grown 
steadily in the industrialised countries since the Second World War. The pace of 
creation of new knowledge and its applications has increased dramatically and 
exponentially. As part of this general trend, organisations have recruited, in ever 
larger numbers, highly educated and specialised individuals, the so-called 
knowledge workers. Entire industries centred on technology have been created, 
such as electronics, computing and telecommunications, and recently have been 
merging into a larger information technology or IT industry. Knowledge workers 
represent a significant proportion of their workforce. In large organisations, entire 
divisions have been created specialising in research and development (R&D). 
Similarly, within the public sector wartime laboratories have been expanded to 
support the national defence industry. 
As markets have become international and competition has sharpened, technology 
has become a strategic weapon. Knowledge workers have become important 
throughout the economy as all industries are pursuing R&D and seeking 
technological applications to improve products and services for customers. 
Improvements in internal operations, notably manufacturing and work systems, 
are also sought with vigour. The demand for these workers, and managers of these 
workers, has stretched the labour markets since the 1970s, and skill shortages 
have become chronic. The literature has documented these environmental changes, 
but less attention has been given to how organisations have adapted their people 
management practices to achieve business goals. The strategic aspect of human 
resource management (HRM) beckons for investigation. 
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Presently there exists little empirical work on the recruitment of knowledge 
workers, and even less on their retention. That which exists has generally been too 
narrow in scope, divorcing the individual from the organisational context or 
treating the organisation as an indivisible whole. Most studies have been static in 
nature, examining the situation at one point in time through, for example, surveys 
and present-oriented interviews. Yet life as we all experience it remains a complex 
phenomenon which alters dynamically and which is influenced by the past. A 
change-oriented HRM study of knowledge workers would be timely. 
High technology organisations are intensive users of knowledge workers. Their 
products and services depend in large measure on the expertise and the 
innovativeness of their employees, and on the employees of their business 
partners, usually other high technology firms. These same knowledge workers 
constitute the labour pool for group leaders and first-line managers. The careful 
management of both workers and their managers in terms of recruitment, 
development, and retention can contribute to maintaining the firm's competitive 
advantage. In the last decade, the literature on HRM has become abundant, but 
only a small portion has covered the high technology organisation or the topic of 
skill -supply pattern. The extent to which these firms achieve strategic HRM 
remains an empirical question. What kind of skill supply patterns have evolved, 
and to what extent have they supported the changing business strategy? What 
were the retention mechanisms operating, and how were they used and modified to 
ensure the supply of key skills over time? 
The computing and telecommunications segments of the IT industry in England 
have a number of large firms such as IBM, Digital, and BT. All of them have 
extensive R&D facilities populated by large numbers of knowledge workers. 
Lifetime employment was offered with an attractive package of monetary and 
work-related rewards including the social and physical environments. However, 
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the 1980s and the 1990s have witnessed important industry changes. With rising 
competition among the large firms and the remarkable success of small 
entrepreneurial "niche" firms, the large firms have come to question the 
contribution of these knowledge workers. With the recession of 1990-1992, 
retrenchment became the industry norm. At the same time, the public sector was 
undergoing the Thatcher revolution of budget cutbacks, and was becoming more 
like the private sector. This current of change affected the defence industry and 
the R&D activity within government organisations. New ways of doing business 
were required, and expectations of employees were changing. How did this re- 
evaluation of the contribution of knowledge workers evolve in the private and 
public sectors, and how was it influenced by the environment? How did these 
organisations modify their skill supply policies and practices within this changing 
context? How did the various rewards act as retention mechanisms, and were 
changes in rewards appropriate to the business requirements? 
A CONTEXTUALIST APPROACH TO ORGANISATIONAL RESEARCH 
0 
In order to undertake a study that is broad in scope and that captures changing 
events and circumstances, a framework is needed that guides the researcher's 
efforts. Without a framework, such a complex study would be weighed down by the 
profusion of data, and the researcher would experience both exhaustion and 
bewilderment. The contextual approach facilitates the task at hand. This 
framework focuses on the content of change (WHAT), the process of change 
(HOW), and the context of change (MUM. It permits multi-level analysis by 
situating change within different contexts: the individual within the group or 
department, the group within the department, the department within the division, 
the division or function within the organisation, the organisation within the 
environment. This categorisation of contexts is neither definitive nor exhaustive, 
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but demonstrates the point. As an organisational study, our focus is intermediate, 
recognising the full spectrum of levels of analysis, but treating the micro and 
macro levels as information that clarifies and situates events and issues taking 
place at the focal level. A contextual study of skills supply strategy or SKISS can 
make a significant contribution to the academic knowledge base of strategic HRM. 
It will help fill the gap on the management of knowledge workers in high 
technology organisations, a preoccupation of the 1990s. 
RESEARCH OBJECTWES 
The purpose of this dissertation is that of theory building, not theory testing. The 
relative lack of empirical change-oriented work on strategic HRM and 
themanagement of knowledge workers creates a weak foundation upon which to 
test theory. At this stage of knowledge construction, it would be more appropriate 
to -adopt a research framework (contextualism), borrow key concepts from the 
strategic management literature (emergent, intended and deliberate strategies), 
and begin to create the longitudinal empirical foundation from which grounded 
change theory can be constructed. Future researchers then would be in a position 
to add to this foundation and begin testing the new theory. This researcher has 
assumed some risk in doing so in that his theoretical contribution remains 
uncertain because the nature of the phenomenon being studied (skill supply 
strategy) may prove to be elusive or fragmentary. 
As part of this Process, this researcher has redefined the research objectives in 
light of the data collected. With changes in the economic environment in the late 
1980s (ftom expansion to contraction), my focus on skills retention was broadened 
to skills supply strategy with retention mechanisms including release schemes and 
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operating along with recruitment and development activities. The dissertation 
consequently came to pursue four research objectives: 
to identify human resource management (hrm) policies and practices, and 
organisational characteristics which are related to the recruitment and 
retention of key groups of employees, namely professionals and managers, 
in large high technology organisations; 
to document why and how these organisations come to have such policies, 
practices and characteristics, their importance to the success of the 
business strategy, and the adjustments that took place with the changing 
business strategy; 
to assess the organisation's skill supply pattern and determine whether it 
constitutes a strategy (linkage with the business strategy, managerial intent, coherence of HRM elements, and consistent efforts over time); and 
to interpret these findings in light of the pertinent academic literature and 
construct a model to guide future research. 
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is organised into nine chapters that can be grouped into four 
sections. The first three chapters situate the reader. The general introduction 
(Chapter 1) is followed by a literature review on the key concepts of skills, skills 
supply strategy, retention and commitment, and hard and soft benefits (Chapter 
2). The next chapter discusses the research process and methodology, both as a 
craft and academic process, and presents the lessons gleaned from the pilot project 
(Chapter 3). The resulting classification of hard and soft benefits is applied, in a 
static manner, to the case material of this dissertation. 
The second section is composed of three data chapters, each one a case study of a 
large high technology organisation operating in England: IBM United Kingdom 
Holdings Limited or IBM-UK (Chapter 4); British Telecom, otherwise known as 
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BT plc (Chapter 5); and RSRE or Royal Signals Radar Establishment which 
became a division of the Defence Agency in 1992 (Chapter 6). The R&D division 
constitutes the main object of study in IBM and BT, while all of RSRE equates to 
the same unit. Each case reviews the history of the organisation and its 
environment, the changing business strategy and the organisational structure, and 
the management style and general culture. This sets the stage for the presentation 
of the skill supply pattern and the larger HRM context. Changes in hard and soft 
benefits are documented and explained. The case ends by examining whether the 
business strategy was supported by the skill supply pattern, and how the HRM 
culture facilitated or hindered the latter. 
The next section of the dissertation has two analytic chapters which compare and 
contrast the case studies. What were the skill supply patterns identified, and can 
any pattern pass the "test" for strategic HRM? What is the influence of embedded 
skills on SKISS (Chapter 7)? What features in the inner context of the 
organisation influenced the management of skill supply? How has the broader 
HRM context acted as a facilitator or obstacle to changes in skill supply patterns 
(Chapter 8)? 
The dissertation concludes with Chapter 9, a summary of the main conclusions 
and a discussion of issues raised. A revised model of SKISS is presented. The 
theoretical and empirical contributions to the academic field are noted. Finally, 
policy recommendations are made, and the outstanding research questions are 
described. 
In summary, this dissertation will argue that SKISS is a useful concept for 
studying the relationship between critical skills for business success and the 
business strategy. SIUSS disentangles the management of skills from the broader 
concept of HRM, and raises the question of receptivity of the HRM context to skill 
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supply initiatives. The empirical data base of the thesis will help to understand 
the nature of skills from the management perspective. It will document the process 
of change whereby a skills supply pattern comes about and is modified over time, 
and the impact of the organisational and wider context. A classification of hard 
and soft benefits, and packages of benefits for recruitment and retention purposes 
will be created. How these packages are modified over time and their retention 
impact will be analysed and situated within the overall skills supply pattern 
operating in the organisation. Finally, the thesis will evaluate the findings in light 
of the strategic management literature, and assess whether the skill supply 
patterns qualify as strategy. Policy recommendations for practicing managers will 
be offered. A model summarizing the findings will be presented as a guide for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
& THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the conceptual and theoretical foundations 
of the thesis. The chapter begins with a broad review of the literature on skills, and 
follows with the new concept of SIUSS within the evolving HRM and strategic 
literature. Next, the concept of skill is defined within the organisational context, 
expanded into the idea of a skillbase, and linked to the main concepts of SKISS and 
retention mechanisms. Thereafter, an organisational model of SKISS is elaborated 
and discussed in terms of ILMs and the flexible firm. The chapter ends with a focus 
on skill supply patterns in large organisations operating in the IT sector. A brief 
summary concludes the chapter. 
DEFINING SKILLS 
4, ý. - I 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines skill as expertness, practised ability, a 
facility in action. The complete Oxford Dictionary refers to skill as the ability to use 
one's knowledge effectively. Stated otherwise, frequent application of one's 
knowledge and ability leads to skill in the task at hand. Engineering skill has been 
defined as performance that integrates knowledge of resources and restraints 
(tools, techniques and situation), planning skills (interpreting requirements, 
generating and evaluating ideas, and choosing the best approach), and manual 
skills (Engineering Industry Training Board, 1980). With an interest in 
technological change, Rolfe (1990) defined technical skill in terms of two job 
dimensions: technical complexity and discretion. The first dimension refers to 
complexity of tasks (techniques and dexterity), knowledge (general and specific to 
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the job), and range and variety of tasks. The second includes decision-making and 
judgement over the process or product, control over the organisation of work, and 
supervision. Other professions share this emphasis on knowledge, problem-solving 
and design (Schon, 1983) with varying levels of manual skills required. Conceptual 
or intellectual skills play a large role in the sciences and in computer-related work 
where professionals manipulate conceptual representations. Gardner (1983) has 
identified six types of intellective competencies which combine to form patterns or 
skills: linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, and 
personal. 
Within an organisation, these technical skills are accompanied by interpersonal 
and managerial skills. Interpersonal skills are present in any human discourse and 
interaction: listening, expressing, explaining, sympathising, exchanging, helping 
and cooperating (Cohen et al., 1980). Hosking (1988) and Kotter (1982) emphasised 
the managerial skills of networking, negotiating and influencing others, and 
interpreting internal and external corporate events. Zuboff (1988) identified 
knowledge and intellective skills as additional requirements for middle managers 
dealing with analytical and routine activities. We conclude that technical, 
conceptual, interpersonal and managerial skills exist within any organisation. The 
proportion and types of specific skills required vary across professional and 
managerial positions in response to vertical and horizontal work organisation 
(Shenhar and Thamhain, 1994; Griffin, 1987; Boyatzis, 1982; Katz, 1974). 
A review of the HRM literature gives the impression that no consensus exists as to 
the best approach to the management of these skills. A variety of approaches exist 
which serve specific purposes. As a guide to trainin , the Engineering Board has 
identified skill components; building them up is presumed to facilitate the 
acquisition of skill. Similarly, the competency framework helps to identify 
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underlying job competencies which become training targets (Boyatzis, 1982). As 
part of the design of the work process, jobs may be fragmented, worker discretion 
minimized, and tasks reduced to simple repetitive movements and judgements. In 
this case skill becomes a residual requirement. Job design can also, lead to 
synergistic integration of the technology and the worker; skill requirements become 
an integral part of the work system (Walton and Susman, 1987). 
In order to achieve equitable compensation, job evaluation follows the reverse 
process of starting with an existing job and analysing it in terms of widely accepted 
job factors such as know-how, problem-solving, accountability, and working 
conditions (Milkovich et al., 1988). Staffin may be based on experience as 
-indicated by employment seniority, or on formal education and training 
demonstrated by the possession of professional qualifications. Skills are viewed as 
performance for a specific position. Can the candidate competently do the tasks 
that are required? Career management, on the other hand, tends to focus on both 
job performance and development of skills for future demanding jobs. Offering 
opportunities to acquire skills and developing existing skills in new situations are 
the priorities of this activity area. Thus within an organisation, there exists a 
variety of skill concepts each of which is applied to a specific HRM activity. 
There does not exist a widely accepted concept of skills which has broad application 
and which could be used to discuss the coordination and coherence of HRM 
activities within the organisation. Originally, the competency framework was 
offered for this purpose with regards to the managerial group (Boyatzis, 1982). A 
job competency was defined as an underlying characteristic (motive, trait, skill, 
aspect of one's self-image or social role, body of knowledge in use) of a person which 
results in effective performance in a job through specific actions while being 
consistent with policies, procedures, and conditions of the organizational 
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environment. Boyatzis believed that rigorous application of the competency 
framework throughout the organization would lead to an integrated HRM system. 
In the subsequent decade, several large firms have introduced the framework, 
primarily for management development purposes (e. g., Jackson, 1989, Dulewitz, 
1989; Cockerill, 1989). However, the competency model has led to a variety of 
meanings in organisations (Collin, 1989), and researchers have over-emphasised 
generalizability across work settings and organisations (Pye, 1988; Harrison and 
Stuart, 1993). The individual is treated as the basic unit, with less attention given 
to the changing job setting and organisational environment which are important for 
a strategic level of HRM analysis. The competency framework has not fulfilled its 
original strategic promise. This comes as no surprise when one considers that the 
model is anchored in job analysis, emphasises generic skills and tends to ignore 
specific skills, and requires relative stability in job demands and organizational 
environment to become cost effective. This researcher wishes to retain Boyatzis' 
(1982) broad view of skills which is compatible with organisational practices, but 
without the conceptual and methodological "baggage" associated with the 
competency framework. 
Winter (1987) complained that little language e3dsts to discuss the importance of 
skills in business strategy. In order to proceed in spite of this drawback, this 
dissertation puts more emphasis on how line managers view skills. They have the 
task of translating the business strategy into a working organisation and effective 
operations. In doing so, this research endeavour may make some contribution in 
creating the much needed skill language. 
The difficulty of creating a strategic language on sldlls may stem from the tacit or 
embedded nature of skills. Because skills are people-embodied, and because people 
operate within complex social, economic and technological settings, skills cannot be 
CILAPTER7WO CONCEP7VALFOUArDA77ONS&77]EORE77CALPERSPEC77VES 
PAGE 11 
divorced easily from the context in which they are expressed. The following sections 
review what is known about tacit skills. 
DEFINING TACIT SKILLS 
The term "tacit skill" was coined by Polanyi (1966) in his quest for understanding 
knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular. He argued that 
"knowing what" and "knowing how" are two aspects of the same event, and that 
intelligent action is anchored in the sentient body. The process of knowledge, of 
knowing more than we can tell, involves a relation of two components, one explicit 
and the other implicit. The meaning of the act (the distal component) is revealed 
through attending to the outside with the support of an implicit or tacit capability 
(the proximal component). Knowledge as problem-solving is an imaginative act by 
a committed and searching individual Indwelling" in tools as a bodily extension for 
the purpose of giving meaning to the environment. 
Polanyi believed that objective knowledge does not exist independently of the 
individual, that knowledge belongs to a person with a commitment to a particular 
view of things, but interacting with the environment. Knowledge appears 
holistically, in the same manner that foreground and background are inseparable 
in perception. Subjectivity and objectivity are simultaneously present, with the 
viewer attending to the object made possible by the presence of a background. Both 
perception and knowledge are learned and change over time. 
A precursor to Polanyi, Hayek (1945) recognised the importance of both systematic 
scientific and codified knowledge, and unorganised knowledge of particular 
circumstances of time and place. Embedded knowledge does not lend itself to 
systematization, yet it is involved in all jobs on the technical and social side. He 
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criticised the over-reliance on scientific knowledge in planning economic activity, 
and concluded that decision-making should be devolved to those persons closest to 
the field in order to tap this "tacit" knowledge. 
Schon (1987,1983) similarly criticised the bias towards technical scientific 
rationality in professional education while ignoring the more central role of artistry 
for skilful practice. Standard techniques could be applied to easily definable and 
familiar problems, but for situations of ambiguity, uncertainty and conflict, 
"reflection-in-action" was appropriate. Schon considered managers as professionals, 
argued that they test new interpretations by undertaking on-the-spot experiments, 
and do so by drawing on repertoires of cumulative organisational knowledge which 
they transform in the unique context before them, and thus contribute to the store 
of organisational knowledge. Schon believed that knowing-in-action or tacit skill is 
fundamental to skilful performance, and is the foundation upon which reflection-in- 
action takes place. Faced with the unexpected, our thinking serves to reshape what 
we are doing when we are doing it, questioning the implicit assumptions and way of 
framing the problem. 
Both Polanyi and Schon focus on the challenge of problems and the discovery of 
solutions, and emphasise action within a specific context. While recognizing group 
interactions, they present the relationship of coach/teacher and apprentice/student 
as the main vehicle for learning to take place. Commitment and emotional 
involvement in this relationship and in the pursuit of knowledge are essential 
ingredients. Dialogue and demonstration take place, and attempts are made to 
make explicit the process of mastering a problem in a unique context. Schon 
proposed that the best learning situation was one where the person was free to 
learn by doing in a low risk setting with access to coaches to initiate and guide 
them. 
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Badaracco (1991) presented embedded or tacit knowledge as a phenomenon at the 
individual, group, organisational and inter-organisational levels. He defined it as 
skill based on intimate familiarity with certain tools and materials in a context of 
particular social arrangements including norms, attitudes, information flows, and 
ways of making decisions. The core capability of a firm becomes the knowledge 
embedded in a dense web of social, economic, contractual and administrative 
relationships. Teams constitute unique entities with the pooling of individual 
complementary knowledge, and the development of group norms and subtle forces 
of interaction linked to ambitions, pressures, and personal relationships. On a 
broader scale, organisational capability resides in "the interstices of their routines, 
practices, cultures, and working relationships. " 
Other authors have tackled tacit skills at the organisational level by expanding the 
concept to that of firm-specific assets (Williamson, 1985; Clark and Staunton, 1989) 
and routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The latter argued that both tacit skills and 
organisational routines require continuous application to be maintained. Degrees of 
skill tacitness exist, and articulation is often possible but at a price. Symbolic 
communication takes time, and the rate of information transfer may be slower than 
performance of the skill. Possession of the skill may be accompanied by limited 
causal understanding, and the skill has a coherence (ie., holistic characteristic) 
which tends to be lost in expressing the parts. Finally the obstacles to articulation 
may be overcome by incurring high costs difficult to justify. However difficult it 
remains to use language to describe a skill, it can be done easily by describing the 
larger units of purposive behaviour. 
Nelson and Winter emphasised the tradeoff that e3dsts between capability and 
deliberate choice, where the former operates best when choice is suppressed. SIdlful 
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people perform quickly and effortlessly. Schon (1987,1983), on the other hand, 
argued that reflection-in-action was an essential part by which professionals dealt 
with novel problems. Knowing-in-action did suppress choice, but could be 
influenced by reflection. Nelson and Winters admitted that their theory applies 
mostly to stable firms, not R&D organisations where change is part of their 
economic activity. 
Dosi (1988) reviewed the empirical literature on innovation, and made ample use of 
the concepts of tacit skills and specific assets. He concluded that researchers use 
personal knowledge bases composed of explicittscientific and tacit knowledge that 
complement each other. There exists a variety of knowledge bases with varying 
degrees of tacitness depending on the procedures, competences and heuristics 
specific to each technology. Within each firm, the innovation process is cumulative 
with abilities and skills augmenting at the same time that public knowledge is 
accessed. However, the future options of the firm are constrained by its knowledge 
assets. Change in orientation can take place, for example, by hiring people and 
imitating other firms, but the process is long-term. 
TACIT AUNAGERIAL SKILLS 
According to Hosking (1988) and Kotter (1982),, managers exercising leadership 
operate within, and help to define, the organisational context. Action-oriented skills 
are fundamental: networking, negotiating with and influencing others, and 
interpreting internal and external corporate events. Hosking and Fineman (1990) 
divided leadership skills into two types: a generic or transferable ability to 
recognise the kind of problem or issue confronted and the practical knowledge of 
how to deal with it; and an issue-specific knowledge which is built up and mobilized 
through networking. Though we take exception with the presumption that practical 
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knowledge is easily transferable, the social context of networking remains tacit. 
Mangham (1986) emphasized that skilful emotional expression with colleagues and 
adversaries is a crucial dimension: knowing what personal feelings to express, 
inflate or fake, and what injuries to inflict, in order to impress their definition of 
the situation. We conclude that managers exercise tacit skills within a thick social 
context. 
Zuboff (1988) saw executive skills as embedded in individual action and 
characterised by sentient participation (feeling the situation and actors), 
contextuality, action-dependence, and personalism. While executive posts have 
retained their craft nature over the decades, middle managers were created to 
make best use of analytical and routine activities involving more explicit knowledge 
and intellective skills. At the same time, they needed to exercise communication 
and persuasion skills in dealing with superiors and subordinates. In practice, 
executive skills are widely present in management ranks but in different degrees. 
Both Pelikan (1989) and Eliasson (1990) have emphasized the tacit nature of 
relationships among managers as they pursue collectively economic competence. 
The latter argued that upgrading the tacit knowledge base at the top depends on 
having a career system to allocate competent people in a manner that educates 
them by varied job experiences. The firm-specific nature of management also 
suggests that shared ownership through shares was appropriate compensation. 
TACIT SKILLS IN THE COMPUTERIZED ENVIRONMENT 
The introduction of computerized production has created a debate on the skills 
impact. Machines may replace many workers and those that remain do simple 
tasks on and around the equipment; de-skilling takes place to the benefit of 
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management control and increased productivity (Braverman, 1974; Edwards, 
1979). On the other hand, a work organisation which creates synergy between the 
machine and the intelligent worker may achieve higher productivity and up- 
skilling while sharing control with the workers (Walton and Susman, 1987). 
Apparently a spectrum of possibilities exist. However, Manwaring and Wood (1985) 
concluded that no level of automation has succeeded in eliminating the tacit skills 
of people working with and around technology. This conclusion applies as well to 
expert systems which, contrary to expectation, need expert users (Collins, 1986; 
Scarbrough & Corbett, 1992). 
Leonard-Barton (1990) reported that the skills context was a critical factor for 
successfully transferring a new technology within a multi-site firm. Corporate office 
could facilitate by making resources available for linking sites into a formal and 
informal information network to capture diffuse knowledge on organisational 
impact and operational "tricks". Local user-experts absorb and transmit the 
implementation knowledge in a manner appropriate to their context. 
Manwaring and Wood (1985) reported that managers value social skills as much as 
technical skills in their production workers; cooperation, responsibility, stability 
and trustworthiness were important to the work situation and to "fitting in". These 
qualities have a high tacit component; feelings about self and others coupled with 
discretion are operative. Thus, in group settings, skills are expressed within a 
social fabric. 
Zuboff (1988) contributed several useful insights on skills in the computerized work 
setting. Computers have increased the importance of intellective skills; employees 
now interface with the computer screen and its symbolic content. At first glance, we 
see isolated individuals monitoring, enquiring, and inputting commands. But under 
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conditions of uncertainty, these individuals have dialogues with themselves and 
others, and congregate around the computer screen to solve the problem. The 
computer screen and room become the action context where the intellective skills 
operate within a playful group interaction. In no time, a group culture evolves 
where permeable work roles create meaningful interpretations. of the core processes 
captured by the electronic text. 
Zuboff noted that intellective skills, with the activities of reading and writing, are 
based on an explicit symbolic language code which can be taught. But once 
mastered, the individual displays a degree of tacit knowledge that becomes the 
basis for insight, innovation and improvement. Language can also be restricted 
rather than elaborated and operate within a shared context (Berstein, 1975). A 
person can point to the spatial relation of symbols on the screen and suggest to a 
viewer his intended meaning. We suggest that, even with articulate speakers, a 
conversation involves many pointers to items and aggregates of knowledge and 
experience. 
It appears that intellective skills can operate with more or less reliance on an 
action context but cannot divorce itself from it. Gardner (1983) has identified six 
relatively autonomous human intellectual competences which combine in a 
multiplicity of adaptive ways: linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, 
bodily-kinesthetic, and personal. This patterning of intelligence in relation to the 
environment resembles a tacit faculty. 
Zuboff (1988) concluded that knowledge, authority and technique are 
interdependent, and that a new strategy was required to obtain the full benefits of 
computerization. This means changes in career ladders, reward systems, access to 
information, and devolution of responsibility to operators, coupled with egalitarian 
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managers. The work contract would emphasise commitment to the enterprise 
instead of the job, and would be supported by new mechanisms for employee voice 
and influence. Operating as interdisciplinary teams, middle managers would have 
responsibility for intellectual skill development, technical development, strategy 
formulations, and social system development. Strategy would include assessing 
alternatives and focusing organisational intelligence in areas of strategic value by 
guiding and coordinating learning efforts. Presumably a line and staff function, 
such a strategy, if it e3dsts, would resembles a SKISS. 
Aoki (1986) dealt with similar themes in comparing large unionised Japanese and 
U. S. manufacturing firms. Japanese firms had horizontal rather than hierarchical 
information systems, and made good use of specific knowledge distributed across 
sub-units. Tapping and enriching tacit knowledge was supported by people policies 
of lifetime employment and stable relational contracts with a network of sub- 
contractors. Aoki found that U. S. firms had more specialised and standardised jobs, 
experienced more inter-finn mobility, and more use of the outside labour market. 
Managers spent more time integrating the various specialisations. Aoki believed 
that this applies as well to R&D . These results suggest that the firm's information 
and management systems are inter-dependent with the internal labour market and 
adapted to the external labour market. 
TACIT SKILLS, STRUCTURE & NETWORKS 
Dosi (1988) suggested that in-house R&D is the dominant form for building 
knowledge bases because (1) it allows for tailoring the activities to the idiosyncratic 
and tacit aspects of the technology explored; (2) it facilitates information flow from 
R&D to production and marketing arms; and (3) it gives the organisation the 
capacity to evaluate and adopt external technology. Both Mowery (1980) and Pavitt 
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(1986) believed that large-scale corporate research is most effective in exploiting 
and internalizing the tacit and cumulative features of technological knowledge. 
Williamson (1985) and Teece (1987) pointed out the danger that contracting out 
R&D can lead to dependence on an outside party for critical assets. The "know-how" 
or practice of technological innqVation has a high tacit component that is neither 
easily imitated or transferred. Winters (1987) proposed six dimensions helpful for 
the management of these firm-specific skills and for securing control: 
Tacit 
Not Teachable 
Not Articulated 
Not Observable in Use 
Complex 
Element of a System 
Articulable 
Teachable 
Articulated (ie., Captured) 
Observable in Use 
Simple (Quantity of Info. ) 
Independent 
In order to exploit knowledge within the firm, management would encourage skills 
with characteristics to the left; to rapidly expand the use of knowledge and enter 
partnerships and the like, skill characteristics to the right are stimulated. 
Presumably, for the life cycle of a given innovation, an organisation would move 
from the left to the right. However, Winter did not explore the people policies which 
can influence knowledge assets, nor how skills are developed. 
Badaracco (1991) was more interested in the global phenomenon of knowledge 
transfers and joint ventures of large sophisticated organisations. He contrasted 
embedded knowledge with migratory knowledge: packaged, articulated and mobile 
knowledge such as designs, machines, and to some extent individual minds. In 
order for a firm to exploit the migratory knowledge, it must already possess 
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complementary capabilities that form a receptive context. However, Badaracco did 
not explore the logical conclusion that all knowledge is an embedded phenomenon, 
and only contexts vary in terms of their receptiveness to the particular knowledge 
transfered. 
For competitive reasons, Badarraco recommended the building of knowledge links 
with a wide variety of outside organisations (buyers and suppliers, university 
laboratories, firms, and labour unions) through relatively long-term alliances 
composing a network of trusting relationships. This network permits accessing the 
embedded knowledge of other organisations and of jointly developing new 
capability. Staff, equipment, ideas and cultural traits flow across organisational 
boundaries in a network of intimate social relationships. Badaracco concluded that 
the traditional organisational structure is displaced by network-based structure 
with more diffuse ownership. Managing within this new structure involves a more 
collaborative style, and the task of safeguarding and strengthening the firm's core 
skills. 
Other authors have discussed the issues of dependence-independence in joint 
ventures and alliances, and the difficulties of achieving a successful relationship 
(Ohmae, 1989; Bleeke and Ernst, 1991). However, like Badarraco, they did not deal 
with the detail of how competitive skills are developed within and across 
organisations. In contrast, -Grandstrand and Sjolander (1990) found that 
acquisition of small high-tech firms by larger firms within Sweden succeeded only if 
the managers and key personnel were retained, and if relatively independent 
venture units were established. Synergies were difficult to obtain from merging 
R&D functions which tended to compete. One could argue that the skill contexts 
under-pinning the innovation process explain these results. 
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Having reviewed the literature on tacit skills, what are the implications for 
research in skill supply strategy? Hendry (1993) has discussed the difficulty of 
treating skills as part of strategic management. The typical preoccupation of 
management with operational issues can point to either the strategic significance of 
the skillbase or the inability of managers to rise above the social and technical 
embeddeness of skills. It may be difficult to differentiate between these two 
conditions. The criteria for identifying a skills supply strategy become of critical 
importance. 
BUSINESS STRATEGY & SKILLS 
Broadly speaking, business strategy can be defined in terms of content and context: 
an organisation's positioning in terms of products and services within a competitive 
market, and the structure it adopts to support this positioning (Miles and Snow, 
1978; Porter, 1980). Business strategy can also be viewed from the perspective of 
process: a pattern in a stream of decisions where leadership plans and intentions 
can be compared with what the organisation actually did (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Typically (but not exclusively) the purview of senior 
management, business strategy has an organisation-wide impact and represents a 
planned and significant investment of resources. However, viewed over time, the 
intended strategy may be transformed or even displaced by an emergent pattern 
which is less planned and more reactive. 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) summarized the empirical literature on strategic 
decision making and identified two dominant paradigms: rationality and bounded 
rationality (e. g., Cyert and March, 1963; Eisenhardt, 1989a), and politics and power 
(e. g., Pettigrew, 1973; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). This researcher believes 
that both paradigms can accomodate intended and emergent processes, and that for 
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an empirical study, the appropriateness of one paradigm over the other will be 
indicated by the findings. 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) have combined the two strategic approaches (content 
and context vs. content and process) by linking competitiveness and strategic 
change: senior management and other key participants make efforts to identify and 
understand the competitive forces at play and how they change over time, and 
attempt to mobilize and manage the resources necessary for the chosen competitive 
response over time. For the purposes of this dissertation, business strategy is 
assumed to have a content (particular products and services and adjustments to 
them), an inner context (resources, capabilities, structure, and culture), an outer 
context (markets, technology, and regulation), and a process (a pattern, with both 
intended and emergent properties, within a stream of decisions). 
Recent empirical contributions in the strategic mI anagement literature have 
demonstrated how human resource management plays a key role in strategic 
change and competitive success (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; Beer et al., 1990). 
They showed how focused HRM activities created spirals of change and helped 
condition the remaining HRM context. Because their research questions were large 
in scope, these studies left unanswered the more specific question of how skills and 
their supply contribute to business strategy. Storey (1992) also reported on a major 
empirical study of 15 large unionized organisations and the changing employment 
relationship. 'While this work has revealed some fascinating trends in these 
"mainstream" companies (e. g., growing involvement of middle line management in 
HRM), it has little to say on the management of skills. A more focal "skills" study 
can be done similar to that of Pettigrew et al. (1988) which produced a contextual 
model of training and development. 
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The strategy literature has witnessed a small revival of interest in skills (Peters, 
1984). Based on case studies of major U. S. and Japanese corporations, Prahalad 
and Hamel (1990) have argued that competitive advantage can be built on 
management's ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production 
skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to 
changing opportunities. These core competencies are under-pinned by a variety of 
managerial, professional and technical skills. These authors have recognised the 
influence of the HRM context in fostering and mobilising these skills through 
communication patterns, career paths, management rewards, top management 
commitment, skill audits, and key skills as corporate rather than business unit 
resources. Implicit in their argument we find the internal labour market, but as a 
unitary concept and with no relation to external labour markets. 
Mein et al. (1991) have criticised core competencies as a relatively static concept. 
They proposed the alternative of core skills as a systemic concept involving both 
human skill and a variety of organisational factors, for example, equipment and 
facilities, and organisational culture and design. They presented a simple model for 
acquiring and maintaining skills through innovation and learning, with the 
assumption that the skillbase is undergoing continuous change. They also 
introduced "skill categorising": the strategic process of combining and structuring 
dedicated skills into a forward looking set of core skills. This would involve an 
integrated approach to skillbase management cutting across HRM and capital 
budgeting, starting with skill audits. Whether organisations actually do so and how 
they came to a strategic approach to skills remains an unknown. In practice, these 
desirable skill synergies have been difficult to create (Sparrow, 1988). 
Mein et al. (1991) argued that "embedding" of core skills could be promoted by an 
organisational culture encouraging employee retention, some stable structures to 
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protect them, and research projects to sustain them. With the absence of empirical 
evidence, how an organisation comes to foster and sustain core skills remains 
unanswered, and the dynamics between internal and external labour markets 
unexplored. Authors have yet to demonstrate the utility of the concept of core skills. 
HRM VERSUS SKISS 
SKISS involves accessing and influencing the supply of skills in labour pools 
outside and inside the organisation with the intention of supporting the business 
strategy. Skills supply as a core organising concept was suggested by Hendry and 
Pettigrew (1990), but its rigorous definition and empirical investigation was left to 
future researchers. Before defining the concept in detail, locating it in the HRM 
literature may shed some light on its origins. Excluding the normative versions of 
HRM as best practice, the academic literature contains two alternative visions: 
human resources as means supporting ends, or as an end in itself. The former, 
labelled Strategic HRM, views people as an important asset which can contribute 
significantly to the business strategy (Wright and McMahan, 1992; Badaracco, 
1991; Itami, 1987; Fornbrun et al., 1984; Hendry and Pettigrew, 1986). The latter, 
called Consensual HRM, presents people as the cornerstone of the modern 
knowledge-intensive organisation; sound business strategy becomes synonymous 
with sound people management (Beer et al., 1984; Walton and Lawrence, 1985; 
Keep, 1991; Schuller, 1991). The distinction between means and ends tends to 
disappear. The high commitment organisational culture becomes the guiding vision 
of HRM. Storey (1992) described both of the above approaches as strong versions of 
HRM, that is, HRM integrated with the business strategy, with one being soft 
(Consensual HRM) and the other being hard (Strategic HRM). This researcher 
prefers the hard version: strategic HRM ought to have identifiable and specific 
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linkage with the business strategy, and demonstrate the same focus, adaptability, 
and market orientation. Organisational culture, then, is treated as part of the inner 
context which influences strategic HRM. 
Both alternatives replace the more traditional view of people as costs (Goold and 
Campbell, 1986; Purcell, 1991). This traditional view was inspired by a 
confrontational labour relations climate and by the dominance of the financial 
function within organisations. It nevertheless has a strategic aspect in that careful 
plans are made to manage the workforce budget and operationalisation takes place 
through the financial control system. However, because this approach lacks a 
sophisticated appreciation of the potential contribution of people, it has little to say 
about skills. 
The new competing visions overlap and are differentiated on the basis of degree on 
most matters. They differ sharply in how they relate to the larger concept of HRM. 
Strategic HRM permits selective attention to those components which address a 
critical business requirement such as addressing a skills gap (Hendry et al., 1988) 
or fostering entrepreneurship within the firm (Burgelman, 1983; Kanter, 1985). 
The remaining components of HRM can be viewed as the immediate context for the 
focused activity. In contrast, consensual HRM remains engaged with the entire 
spectrum of HRM policies and practices, and drifts towards the framework of 
organisational culture and a humanist HR philosophy. 
The concept of SMSS distinguishes between an intentional pattern of HRM 
components (policies and practices) that together aim to influence skills supply, and 
other HRM components which serve other purposes. Human resource management 
is the larger concept, and includes policies, practices, and formal and informal 
systems which can be called upon to influence the workforce. It also includes 
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elements which, to some extent, are imposed on management such as legally 
mandated obligations, collective agreements, and the organisational culture or 
tradition. In other words, HRM acts as a context for the more focused skills supply 
strategy. As context HRM can both facilitate and inhibit changes in SKISS. 
Sometimes changes in HRM features may be required before a skills supply 
strategy can emerge and succeed. 
Within the panoply of HRM, the concept of workforce planning resembles that of 
SKISS. Workforce planning studies and forecasts the supply of labour (labour 
markets and internal workforce) and its demand based on organisational and 
business assessments. The dynamic nature of skills supply is captured by the 
notion of human resource (HR) flows: people moving into and out of - the 
organisation and within it as well. Timperley and Sisson (1989) have reviewed the 
history of manpower planning in Britain. Typically the purview of personnel 
managers, manpower planning tended to be reactive and isolated from the strategy 
process. Jobs and not skills were the unit of analysis, though the latter was given 
some consideration. The literature has been technique oriented with little attention 
given to the implementation of these plans. Within the current business 
environment of intensified competition and skill shortages, these authors suggested 
that manpower planning might be transformed by the needs of organizations and 
their top executives, and the search for the 'right' people performing the 
'appropriate' tasks. 
Within the U. S., Beer et al. (1984) saw HR flows as an important policy area to 
ensure employee performance now and in the future. Moving people in, around and 
out of the organisation ought to make sense in terms of desired employee 
performance; the pace or velocity of movement becomes an issue. Career paths need 
to build the right mix of skills in terms of depth and breadth. Though neither side 
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of the Atlantic has adopted the language of skills supply strategy, discussion 
focuses on the management of the internal workforce. Timperley and Sisson (1989) 
noted that operational studies of manpower planning have received little attention 
in the literature. Hence, a change study of HR flows would help to fill this gap, and 
adopting a SKISS approach would anchor the study in business strategy concerns. 
Wright and McMahan (1992) defined strategic HRM as "the pattern of planned 
human resource deployments and activities intended to enable an organization to 
achieve its goals". They reviewed four theoretical models of strategic HRM: 
resource-based view of the organisation (Wernerfelt, 1984; Schuler and MacMillan, 
1984; Ulrich, 1991), behavioral perspective (Miles and Snow, 1984; Schuler, 1991; 
Schuler and Jackson, 1987), cybernetic models (Mowday, 1985; Wright and Snell, 
1991), agency/transaction cost theory (Jones and Hill, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1988). 
Butler (1988) proposed that HRM policy is a product of an intentional strategy, but 
could lead to both intended and unintended actions which would influence the 
emergent business strategy. Similarly, Wright and McMahan (1992) supplemented 
their initial review of HRM theories, which assume rational and intentional 
decision-making, with two nonrational theories: power/resource dependence models 
(Pfeffer and Cohen, 1984), and institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 
1987). 
This dissertation sits squarely within the resource-based or internal capability 
theory where human resources (along with other resources) are intentionally 
managed in order that the organisation develop a unique ability to deliver products 
and services. This basis of competitive advantage requires constant nurturing and 
adjustment of the skillbase. The adoption of contextualism (see Chapter 3) as a 
framework for the study of SMSS overcomes the limitations of the above theories 
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(including resource-based theory) which emphasise one or the other of the content, 
context and process of strategic HRM. However, aspects of these theories may help 
to inform the findings of our case studies. Strategic HRM as an intentional process 
is a starting assumption that will focus our attention on the linkage with business 
strategy. Thereafter, the case analysis can point out the emergent aspects as part 
of the contrast between intentions and realizations (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
We conclude that SKISS shows promise as an analytical tool for the investigation of 
the contribution of human resources to a business strategy seeking competitive 
advantage. The focal nature of SKISS means that human resource management 
can be viewed as part of the organisational context which influences the 
relationship between, SKISS and this business strategy. Based on the above 
literature, a recognizable pattern of changes in HRM policies, programmes and 
practices would qualify as a SKISS if four criteria were satisfied: 
(1) an identifiable link with the changing business strategy; 
(2) managerial intentions to create and maintain HRM support for the business strategy; 
(3) a coherence among the HRM elements which are mutually 
reinforcing in terms of supporting the business strategy; 
(4) a consistent managerial effort to achieve and exploit the desired linkage to business strategy. 
The evidence for linkage between the skill supply patterns and the business 
strategy should be unambiguous and persuasive in the same manner that, for 
example, developing new products would be linked to serving a new market 
(Criterion 1). Furthermore, the managerial group should demonstrate that the 
linkage is not a chance occurrence but a product of deliberations and intentions 
focused on the business strategy (Criterion 2). 
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Given that skill supply patterns are determined by specific HRM components, the 
coherence of the latter, how each component reinforces the other components, 
would ensure the desired strategic effect (Criterion 3). Lack of HRM coherence 
likely would create weak or conflicting patterns. 
Viewed over a time period, these three requirements (strategic linkage, managerial 
intentions, and the HRM coherence) should be reflected in consistent managerial 
efforts to achieve the benefits of the desired skill supply patterns (Criterion 4). By 
efforts, we mean numerous actions and decisions which bring to bear resources 
(time, people, and budgets) to resolve skill issues and create or sustain the desired 
skill supply patterns. 
We note that Criterion 1 (strategic linkage) and 3 (HRM coherence) refer to the 
content of SKISS, whereas Criterion 2 (managerial intentions) and 4 (managerial 
effort) refer to the process of SKISS. All of these criteria have as their backdrop the 
organisational inner and outer contexts which influence what people do and how 
they do it. 
DEFINING SKILLS SUPPLY STRATEGY 
A firm's skillbase may be defined as the combined technical, interpersonal and 
managerial skills of all of its employees which are exercised for the attainment of 
organisational 'goals. Skills are people-embodied, but become organisational 
capability when expressed within a work organisation composed typically of inter- 
dependent tasks which call for these skills and which are supported by technology 
and management systems. Defining these skills and tasks, creating/maintaining a 
supportive context, and adjusting the work organisation to new business 
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requirements, can be considered as an integral part of the business strategy or its 
operational phase. 
SKISS manages the skillbase through the coordinated use of the following levers: 
sources of initial recruitment into an organisation, additional training and 
development once recruited, and various policies for managing, retaining, 
promoting, and discarding people (Hendry et al., 1991). An important distinction is 
that of external labour markets (ELMs) accessed by the firm and the internal 
labour markets (ILMs) composed of some or all of the firm's employees. Though the 
first concept is straightforward, an ILM has come to signify patterns of movement, 
vertically and laterally, within and across organisational boundaries, to meet 
promotion needs and skill requirements, with restrictions on entry and leaving, and 
inducements to remain within the organisation (Osterman, 1984; Doeringer and 
Piore, 1971). Thus SKISS involves accessing and influencing the supply of skills in 
ELMs and ILMs, particularly skills critical for the corporate and business 
strategies. 
SKISS involves the shaping (mix of skills) and sizing (number of employees with 
key skills) of the skillbase in order to support the changing business and corporate 
strategies. It also underlines the competitive advantage that can flow from skills. 
On-going effort is required to understand the changing skillbase and to integrate 
this understanding into the strategy process. Where technology and products are 
changing rapidly, as in high tech firms, managing the under-pinning skillbase 
takes on strategic importance (Mein et al., 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
All business strategies, whether explicitly or implicitly, assume the availability of 
managerial, professional and technical skills to perform a set of business activities 
which operationalise the business strategy. In simplistic terms, this means 
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recruiting people with new skills and retaining them for the duration of their use, 
and retaining the. best of existing employees who have some of the desired skills. 
The departure of the remaining employees may be stimulated. Also, to the extent 
that some of the skills are firm-sPecific and need building-up through training and 
development, the retention of existing employees would be favoured. Whether firms 
set retention goals and what levers organisations pull to influence retention at the 
inflow, assignment flow and outflow of human resources (Beer et al., 1984) has 
received little attention in the literature. In the 1970s, Flamholz (1974,1973,1972, 
1971) studied the economic value of the employee to the firm (expected stream of 
revenu over the career of the individual). Replacement cost was viewed as a 
decision framework for attempts to retain the employee. While making an 
important contribution to the valuation of human capital, Flamholz's work makes 
unrealistic assumptions (stability and predictability) for the current economic 
environment and the operations of the organisation. However, the notion of 
targeting employees difficult or costly to replace through improved compensation 
continues to be relevant. 
In addition to the mix of skills, the size of the workforce would reflect expected 
levels of business activity; high recruitment and retention would apply under 
growth circumstances, and low recruitment and retention during a downturn. Thus 
retention mechanisms help to shape and size the workforce, and may target key 
groups of employees. As part of SKISS, retention policies and practices would be 
influenced by the HRM context. 
Organisational Model of SKISS. A conceptual model of SKISS is presented in 
Figure 2.1. The skills supply strategy can flow from the business strategy as an 
integral part of it when HRM planning contributes to strategy formulation. Such an 
integrated strategy process would addrress not only "size" issues (total number of 
CHAPTERTWO CONCEPTUAL FOU? VDA77ONS & THEORE77CAL PERSPECTIVES 
PAGE 32 
w Z LU -J < z 0 -i 
LU 
(L) 
1- 
z 
0 2 w FE Ujw V5 Lu Lu ZZ zo Ir a oz 0 
x 
0 
4 
m 0 :) 4 
com 
Lu 0 
LL 
o r- ( ) 
L, - 2 ýd 
c 
JLZ < 
ý- Z-j 
4 
. ý- O-j U) . mz ccz On c o 0 Mo WD M LL -:: CL 
ca 
0 
w 
cn Z U) o 
z 
ui IL 0 in 
0 It 0 
>- LLI 
-i -J CL 
0. 
U) cn Cl) 
cn >- w (n z cn cn U) 
cc 
0 
LL. 
cn CD cc ui 
z 
0 
ui p 
m Ne 
cr Z 
I 
no< 
CC J:: 0 Ir 
U) ca 0 
CO Z uj o 
cl) 
0 
i 
0 
-Oj 
IL Cn 
U) 
CC 
M LU 
uj ý- 
:3 UJ a ýd Z x ý- 
a :1 LU 0 be F- z m0 o m< ui 
5. uj 
0 
0 L) IL 
'-I 
"1 
CjjApTERTWO CONCEPTUAL FOUNDAT[ONS &THEORETICAL PERSPECTZvES 
PAGE 33 
employees in job groupings), but also "shape" issues (skill requirements). SKISS 
can also appear as the emergent operationalisation of a business strategy which 
has failed to go beyond the "size" issues at the formulation stage. These two 
processes (planned versus emergent) also impact on structure and work 
organisation which have a close relationship with skills supply at the operational 
level. The existing work system represents cumulative efforts to perform certain 
coordinated tasks through people who have become skilled in using certain 
resources (e. g., equipment and material). The work system influences current and 
future skill requirements, and the availability of skills within and outside the 
organisation makes certain work systems more possible and productive. The 
skillbase or skill configuration is shaped by the above process, impacts on the 
collective performance of the employees and thus on business performance. 
Through feedback loops, adjustments are made. 
The entire organisation is surrounded by an outer context of which the principal 
features are product-markets, technology, government policies and legislation, and 
national and local labour markets. In the long run, the outer context strongly 
influences the business strategy cycle and the contribution of skills to business 
success. To some extent the large firm can exert some influence on its environment. 
The organisational strategy and operations are also constantly influenced by the 
HRM inner context composed of the organisational history, top management, 
managerial and professional cultures, the personnel function'and operations, and 
workforce planning. Modification of the HRM context can take place, but the 
historical and cultural features likely would impose a slow pace of change (Storey, 
1992; Pettigrew, 1986). The model situates SIUSS within the organisation, and 
suggests possible pathways for change. But like any map, the model appears static 
and only gives the main roadside features. The top-down appearance of the model 
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reflects the starting assumption that business strategy is a planned activity. For 
the purpose of guiding this research endeavour, a more rigorous framework of 
organisational change is presented in Chapter 3. 
INTERNAL LABOUR MARKETS 
SKISS involves accessing and influencing the supply of skills in the external labour 
market (ELM) and the market internal to the organisation (ILM). These activities 
become strategic when they support the business strategy, or when their 
consideration is integrated into corporate decisions. The concept of ILM has a 
strong economic flavour due to its origins (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Economists 
assumed that the supply and demand of labour on the open markets is determined 
by the price and allocation of labour. They were interested in ILMs because they 
seemed to be an exception to the law of supply and demand. Within-firm rules were 
substituted to some degree, and were associated with long tenure, promotion from 
within, training and development, pay by seniority, pensions, and due process 
(Osterman, 1984; Siebert and Addison, 1991). Despite the interest in ILMs, little 
empirical work has been done at the organisational level. 
In order that a within-firm market develop, Siebert and Addison (1991) argued for 
a minimum of 500 employees. With this size criterion, they estimated that, in 1986, 
46% of all full-time U. M employees in the private and public sectors were in ILMs. 
Oi (1983) proposed an overall average of 40% for the U. S.. In a more general sense, 
whenever an employer has training and development of existing employees beyond 
the orientation phase, or practices a measure of promotion from within, some form 
of ILM is operating. Thus, a size criterion seems unnecessary, and the form and 
extent of ILMs operating become an empirical question. Indeed, Hendry et al. 
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(1991) have demonstrated the relevance of ILMs (as part of a skills supply strategy) 
to small and medium firms. 
Osterman (1984) reviewed two competing rationales for ILMs. First, high 
transaction costs lead to the creation of an ILM. This refers to the situation where 
the firm has specific and evolving tasks, and the feasibility of fully describing and 
enforcing the related jobs is low and the cost would be high. In order to obtain co- 
operative behaviour, rules and procedures (eg., promotion from within and 
grievance procedures) are set up to support group interests and discourage 
opportunistic behaviours (Williamson et al., 1975). Second, management seeks to 
control workers through new technology and deskilling, and creates an acquiescent 
internal workforce through payoffs (Braverman, 1974). Osterman concluded as 
follows: 
"Without doubt internal labour markets perform the efficiency 
functions of conserving on supervision, assisting in the training 
process, and helping to keep skilled employees attached to the firm. 
However, unionization drives, intraunion politics, government 
intervention, national and community cultures, and work group 
norms also play important roles in explaining the emergence of these 
job systems. As yet no well-developed paradigm is available to knit 
these factors together. " 
Siebert and Addison (1991) also reviewed the theoretical literature on ILMs and 
noted the focus on wages and transaction costs. They also identified the human 
capital approach which deals with investments that the firm and employee make in 
the hiring and training process where mutually beneficial incentives are at play. 
Long term employment contracts and self-selection of stable employees maintain a 
stable ILM. 
Flexible Firm. The investigation of innovative work organisation by the Institute of 
Manpower Studies has led to a model of the flexible firm in which the ILM has a 
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core and peripheral workforce (Atkinson and Meager, 1986). Based on case studies, 
the model proposes a core organisational workforce buffered by a peripheral 
workforce (part-time, temporary and contract). The core contains the critical skills 
and the workforce has high employment security. The periphery complements these 
firm-specific skills with additional capacity, less critical skills such as catering, and 
scarce specialist skills. The peripheral workforce has low employment security. In 
their continuous drive for productivity improvements, and due to growing 
uncertainty in product-market growth, organisations seek functional and numerical 
flexibility. The former is achieved through adaptable job demarcations and multi- 
skilling. The latter is obtained through careful management of the size of the core 
and the expansion/contraction of the periphery. The creation of the core/periphery 
workforce is facilitated by high local unemployment and by the fear of employment 
loss within the firm. Atkinson and Meager reported on wide changes in personnel 
policies and practices to support this skills supply pattern, namely, employment 
contract types, pay, benefits, recruitment, selection, and training. Yet for most 
firms, these changes were ad hoc and opportunistic instead of part of a strategic 
plan. 
Pollert (1988) and Elger (1987) have criticised the above model as simplistic and 
poorly supported by the case material. The Department of Employment has 
responded by careful analysis of a national survey and case material. McGregor 
and Sproull (1991) reported that the mid 1980s witnessed a modest growth in the 
proportion of the workforce in peripheral employment but no broad shift in the 
employer reasons for doing so. Offering part-time employment was viewed as a way 
of retaining valued staff who could no longer work full time. Many part-timers and 
self-employed persons were reported to prefer such contracts, presumably to suit 
their preferred lifestyle and obligations, and their desire for autonomy., However, a 
minority of firms were citing new reasons such as cost savings and manning 
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flexibility. Hunter and MacInnes (1991) found that some employers were increasing 
their use of non-standard contracts, but they did so in response to short-term 
competitive and budget requirements and not as part of a coherent strategy. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify the high technology organisation within the 
above studies. 
From the perspective of skills supply strategy, there is no apparent need to adhere 
to one theory of ILMs rather than another given that little empirical work has been 
done. For our purposes, the concept of ILM refers to a relatively stable internal 
workforce that is renewed, developed and modified over time as part of the 
adaptation to changing skill requirements. To what extent it operates successfully 
in large high technology organisations, and to what purpose, are best revealed by 
field work. 
RETENTION MECHANISMS 
Presently, there eidst few macro-organisational studies on retention, one of the key 
mechanisms operating in ILMs. Most of the current literature utilises person- 
centred models using concepts such as job satisfaction, job involvement, and 
organisational commitment, with commitment and turnover used as dependent 
variables (Blau and Boal, 1987; Morrow, 1983; Mowday et al., 1982). These 
concepts have been criticized as somewhat redundant because of similarity in the 
content of their operationalization giving rise to spurious correlations. Others have 
related human resources management practices directly to commitment levels 
(Ogilvie, 1986; Pinks, 1992), and structure and climate to commitment levels and 
turnover (DeCotiis and Summers, 1987; Eisenberger et al., 1990). Reichers; (1985) 
and Coopey and Hartley (1991) have criticised the commitment literature for failing 
to recognise that an individual's commitment is tied to a variety of constituents in 
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the organisation. In other words, the concept of organisational commitment as 
unitary and indivisible misrepresents the social dynamics at work. While 
recognising the contributions made to date to our understanding of individual 
(micro) behaviour, the task of explaining organisation-wide (macro) dynamics 
remains undone. Clearly, new concepts are needed to facilitate analysis. 
In this dissertation, retention mechanisms are conceptualised as packages of hard 
and soft benefits which are offered, explicitly or implicitly, to employees in order to 
influence their continued presence in the organisation. Hard benefits refer to 
compensation and related policies. The categorisation proposed by Blakin and 
Gomez-Mejia (1990) has been adopted with minor modifications for our study: base 
salary (market position), benefits, incentives such as bonuses and profit sharing, 
and the importance of each of these three components within the total 
compensation package. These three components are influenced by a variety of pay 
policies: type of employment contract, risk sharing between employer and 
employee, internal consistency, pay secrecy, pay for performance, pay 
decentralisation, egalitarian pay (perks), participation in pay decisions, job-based 
vs skilled-based pay, and long-term vs short-term pay orientation. Milkovich 
(1987), Bamberger et al. (1989) and Blakin and Gomez-Meiia (1990) have 
emphasised the centrality of compensation in the recruitment and retention of high 
technology employees. Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1989) found that packages 
emphasising aggregate incentives were viewed by knowledge workers as more 
effective than those emphasising individual-based rewards (merit pay or individual 
bonuses). ]Profit-sharing and stock-based plans were thought to increase employee 
retention, but team-based bonuses gave the additional advantages of impacting on 
performance and pay satisfaction. 
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Soft benefits cover a wide variety of characteristics of the job, the immediate job 
environment, and the organisational environment. Miller (1986) has provided 
insights and guidelines for the management and retention of R&D professionals in 
terms of discretion and control of the means and ends of their work. Mi1jius and 
Smith (1987) reported on three HRM activities important to attracting and 
retaining talent in U. S. high technology organisations: offering job challenge and 
recognition for their contribution to organisational success; innovative 
compensation and inducements; and individualised career development 
opportunities typically integrated with performance appraisals. Other authors have 
echoed the importance of these activities and added other soft benefits: exciting 
work related to cutting edge technology, company reputation for innovation and 
growth, presence of major research universities, career opportunities for the 
spouse, difficulty of switching school for children, desirable geography and weather, 
and cultural and recreational diversity. 
Sparrow (1988), Yeats (1987) and Connor et al. (1989) reported on British surveys 
of the recruitment and retention of professionals and specialists. Improvement of 
remuneration levels were the primary response to scarce skills. Market and skill 
pay supplements, and recruitment bonuses were offered with term contracts as the 
most flexible solution to recruitment and retention problems within the framework 
of the organisation's existing pay policies and structures. Reliance on freelance, 
contract or temporary labour increased the supply of scarce skills while helping to 
protect the core workforce from redundancies. Recruitment was also facilitated by 
the positive image of the organisation: technological leadership, investment in 
R&D, business success, and a fair employer offering good terms of pay and 
conditions. Retention of the best employees was sought through pay fle2dbility with 
high pay for high performance, salary adjustments 2 or 3 times a year for critical 
staff, and retention bonuses. A widening range of benefits was offered including a 
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car. Other practices included improved work content with new and exciting work, 
innovative employment practices such as homeworking, and improved career 
management and progression. 
The above findings suggest that recruitment and retention often are served by the 
same benefits. Other benefits are tailored for either recruitment or retention. 
Turbin and Ross (1990) deplored the lack of research into the effectiveness of 
alternative recruitment and retention strategies in high technology organisations, 
and the absence of contextual studies of organisations with their own internal 
dynamics and surrounded by specific labour market conditions. Von Glinow (1985) 
explored the inter-dependence between the reward system and the organisational 
culture, but provided no empirical evidence to support her typology. Balkin and 
Gomez-Meija (1990) matched compensation patterns (organic versus mechanistic) 
to organisational strategies (diversification and life cycle of business unit) based on 
a U. S. manufacturing survey of HRM executives. Both of these studies recognised 
the need for change-oriented research. At this point, little field work exists 
documenting the "what, why and how" of changes in packages of hard and soft 
benefits that take place in organisations responding to changing business and skill 
requirements. 
SKISS IN LARGE HIGH TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATIONS 
Within the information technology (IT) sector, two SKISS related topics have 
dominated the 1980s: skill shortages and changing skill needs. Skill shortages have 
captured management attention because of the widely shared opinion that business 
growth was constrained by the low supply of specialised skills and mixes of skills in 
ELMs. In the UK, efforts were made to attract and retain these people 
(Sparrow, 1988 ; Connor et al., 1989; Locksley et al., 1990). Presumably, firms that 
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successfully recruited and retained key skills obtained a competitive advantage. 
Faced with continuing recruitment problems and the effects of the demographic 
changes in the future supply of young entrants, some employers were starting to 
give more consideration to widening the range of sources of potential recruits, both 
internally (eg., retraining and deployment of staff, reorganising and redesigning IT 
work) and externally (eg., alternative degrees and accessing easier provincial 
labour markets by relocating their IT work). 
Within high technology firms, skill needs evolve rapidly because of the rapid 
changes in technologies which are applied to organisational. processes and products. 
As technologies change, existing skills are recombined and new ones may be 
recruited or developed. Considerable uncertainty surrounds the need for 
professional skills because of uncertainties in product markets and technology 
which are rapidly changing (Kosnik, 1990). A flexible and evolving skillbase 
becomes mandatory in these circumstances. 
During the 1980s, the role of management has undergone significant change 
through restructuring and the increasing use of information technology (Applegate 
et al., 1988; Kanter, 1989). Mobility among management has also increased 
(Nicholson and West, 1988) with downsizing among established firms and the 
creation of new firms. A growing number of managers may be adopting the new 
inter-firm career patterns described by Kanter (1989). In high technology firms, 
experienced project managers are highly sought because of their low supply 
(Connor et al., 1989). Within this context, the drive to increase the quality of 
management in the U. K. has led to an interest in defining managerial skills (Hirsh, 
1989). 
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Beer et al. (1984) described the skills supply pattern of lifelong employment typical 
in large U. S. firms. People enter at low entry-level positions and stay in the 
organisation for their entire career. Relatively low turnover e2dsts. Compulsory 
redundancies do not take place, but poor performers may be asked to leave. In the 
early 1990s, this researcher confirmed first-hand that within the British IT sector, 
all of the major players (IBM, Digital, ICL, Hewlett-Packard, and BT) continued to 
have lifetime employment policies, not to mention the public sector offering civil 
service tenure. At the same time, it was evident that changes were taking place, 
and that lifetime employment as an employment system was under attack. 
Beer et al. (1984) claimed that in most cases "the choice of patterns selected by an 
organization is less reflective of a coherent set of management attitudes and values 
than it is of the economic environment in which that organization operates "(p 10 1). 
On the other hand, they recognised the impact of societal values and legislation, 
and founders. 
Osterman (1987) describe the 'salaried' pattern of skills supply. Job descriptions 
are standard, but management can make revisions and the employee accepts doing 
new tasks. Job ladders and promotions are present but less evident than in 
industrial settings, and salaries are more merit-based. Greater commitment to 
employment security exists. Osterman believed that the salaried pattern fit the 
situation of most managers and professionals working in bureaucracies, and 
employees of innovative firms. Though Osterman recognised the likelihood of 
multiple ILMs within the same firm, his discussion ignores this possibility. 
Sonnenfeld (1991) described large firms as either "academies" (stable institution 
with an objective of developing the knowledge of its highly committed members) or 
"clubs" (fraternal order oriented towards rules of fair treatment of its members 
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with loyalty shown through seniority). Academies recruit exclusively at the career 
entry stage, emphasise development in their career system, and offer ample 
training throughout a person's career and in conjunction with new jobs. They 
control the assignment flow through sponsored tournaments, and exit people by 
retirement. In contrast, clubs also recruit at the early career stage though with 
more flexibility. The career system aims for the retention of employees, and 
assignments are given on the basis of seniority. Training is given mostly at the 
early career stage, and sporadically thereafter for general use. Again, employees 
are exited through retirement. 
Recognising the need for empirical work on the strategic management of HR flows, 
Sonnenfeld suggested that, based on Kanter's (1984) description of large high- 
technology firms, these organisations would be classified as "academies" intent on 
developing and retaining their own talent. 
In the U. S., Kanter (1989) has argued that the salaried or "academy" ILM is 
undergoing change in the direction of the core-periphery workforce. Smaller 
numbers of managers make their career in one organisation and larger numbers 
market their skills and innovativeness to a number of firms during the span of 
their career. The idea of employment security is being replaced by "employability" 
security. Even those managers benefiting from the traditional form of employment 
security find their jobs radically altered in the flatter organisations where different 
skills (e. g., persuasion and influence) are required. ]Presumably, new types of 
employment contracts are used to achieve this "flexible" use of managers. Also, the 
extent to which these same changes apply to the professional workforce remains 
unexplored. Streeke (1987) has suggested that organisational flexibility can be 
created by either more emphasis on contracts and ELMs or by more permanency 
status and an enlargement of the ILM. The task remains of documenting if, why 
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and how large organisations within the British IT sector are modifying their policy 
of lifetime employment and adopting a perceptible skills supply strategy. 
SUAMARY 
A skills supply strategy is defined as the intentional shaping and sizing of the 
organisation's skillbase (composed of technical, interpersonal, and managerial 
skills) for the purpose of supporting the business strategy. Influencing the skillbase 
takes place through the coordinated use of multiple levers such as recruitment, 
development and retention. Packages of hard and soft benefits compose the 
retention mechanisms which are adjusted, along with other levers, as skill 
requirements change. SKISS shows promise as an analytical tool for a focused 
investigation of the business contribution of human resources, with HRM treated 
as part of the organisational context. Within large high technology organisations, 
SKISS was built upon a policy of lifetime employment; these "academies" 
emphasised the sustained development of their committed employees. This 
dissertation can make a significant contribution by demonstrating that the concept 
of SKISS facilitates the discussion of skills in relation to the business strategy of 
these technological organisations. Though difficulties are anticipated in identifying 
SFISS in the field because of the tacit or embedded nature of skills, this researcher 
has set four criteria to be satisfied, namely, linkage with the business strategy, 
managerial intent, coherence of HRM elements, and consistent managerial efforts. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PROCESS 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the research framework and procedures are outlined, as well as the 
personal learning which the researcher experienced. Key concepts include receptive 
context, survey of academics, research objectives, significant academic contribution, 
craft of research, basic assumptions, contextualism as a research framework and 
method, theoretical sample, triangulation, corroboration of results, data reduction 
and summarization, and pattern recognition. The chapter begins with the history of 
the dissertation: what prompted the researcher to seek the Ph. D. at Warwick 
University, and how the research topic and objectives were sharpened. Craft aspects 
of research are introduced: the relationship between the Ph. D. student and 
supervisors, ethics and confidentiality. After presenting the researcher's basic 
assumptions, the chapter presents the framework of contextualism (the what, why 
and how of change) and its application in the field: choice of organisations, data 
gathering, and the iterative process of data analysis within and between cases. The 
chapter ends with a defence of the lone scholar, and a summary of the main points. 
The strengths and weaknesses of contextualism are discussed along with the 
personal learning which took place. 
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SEEKING THE PH. D. 
In 1983 1 joined the teaching and research staff of the School of Commerce & 
Administration at Laurentian University in Sudbury (Canada). Early on, it was 
pointed out to me that an academic career was built on expertise and the advanced 
degree of Ph. D.. As I began to publish in refereed journals, my confidence increased 
at the same time as my dissatisfaction grew. The quantitative survey techniques 
which I applied in the fields of housing and retirement gave interesting and 
generalisable results, but left me the task of describing and guessing what was 
taking place within the organisation. The researcher ended up supplying the 
background information to situate the findings and breath life into them. The 
limitations of the survey technique in terms of validity was doubly evident because 
of my daily exposure to the case method at the School of Commerce. Rich qualitative 
data with some supporting quantitative data succeeded in portraying organisational 
life with realism. Could this approach satisfy the rigorous methodological 
requirements of a Ph. D.? 
In the summer of 1988,1 came to "this blessed isle" and visited Warwick University 
and the Centre for Corporate Strategy and Change (CCSC). Three features 
influenced my decision to pursue the Ph. D. at this place. First, CCSC was 
impressively productive as measured by the number of publications, well organised 
and well funded. It assembled mature researchers in a cordial environment and gave 
them active support. Second, my discussions with Professor Andrew Pettigrew and 
Dr. Chris Hendry confirmed that they favoured in-depth case studies and were 
prepared to guide me in applying the methodology of contextualism broadly applied 
at CCSC. I became convinced that expectations would be high and that pressure 
would be applied as required. Such conditions would help me avoid the sad fate of 
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too many Ph. D. candidates, the timeless search that ends in despondency and 
abandonment. Third, Warwick University was thriving. The setting was attractive 
and the social and academic interaction was exciting. Leisure activities for body and 
soul would be within easy reach. All work and no play would have been unsuitable 
for my French-Canadian constitution. 
In January 1989,1 was formally enroled. Meanwhile, I undertook a survey of 
training activities in Ontario, Canada. This initiative was prompted by my interest 
in demonstrating that the case method constituted a firm base from which to apply 
the survey method (see Brewer and Hunter, 1989 for the benefits of using 
multimethods). If the two methods were complementary, both high validity and high 
generalisability would be achievable within a medium term research agenda. Thus a 
case-oriented Ph. D. would be amenable to such a follow-up. The Centre had just 
completed a series of case studies on training in the organisation and had proposed a 
change-oriented model to represent the findings (Pettigrew et al., 1988a; Pettigrew 
et al., 1988b). I resolved to translate the model into a questionnaire and test its 
generalisability to a Canadian sample of firms. The results (LeBrasseur and 
Lambert, 1991) were supportive. 
SHARPENING THE RESEARCH TOPIC 
Initially I prepared a research proposal titled "Strategic Human Resource 
Management of Older Workers". Based on my experience in Canada, the general 
ageing of the industrialised countries, the trend towards early retirement, and the 
presence of skill shortages in high technology settings, I thought that such a study 
would be timely. Firms should be making efforts to retain their high skilled older 
V 
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employees. In the summer of 1989,1 visited CCSC for the second time, and was 
advised that a quick telephone "survey" of personnel managers and research centres 
was in order. Was the proposed topic an area of interest in the private sector in 
England? What kind of research was taking place related to this topic? In other 
words, was the topic considered of sufficient importance by firms that they would be 
willing to participate in such a study and grant site access, and was the research 
proposal covering new ground? 
The results of the dozen calls proved to be revealing. The situation was different 
than in Canada. "Yes", the population was aging, and "Yes" skill shortages e3dsted, 
but "No", firms were making no particular efforts in retaining older employees. In 
contrast to Canada, no cultural and legal imperative eyisted which pushed firms to 
approach the aging workforce in a positive light. Age discrimination in England was 
widespread and generally unquestioned. Consequently, the level of interest and 
research on the proposed topic was low. 
The telephone "survey" did uncover a more focused interest in the retention of 
critical skills. At that time the economy was expanding, and firms were experiencing 
difficulties in obtaining an adequate supply of expert managers and professionals. 
Little research had been done in this area, and academics felt that it was much 
needed. That autumn and winter, the proposal became "Retention Strategies in High 
Tech Companies". In the summer of 1990,1 undertook a pilot project involving two 
large Canadian firms, with the purpose of identifying retention mechanisms and of 
getting some field experience. This experience confirmed that the retention 
mechanism, refined into hard and soft benefits, was an analytically useful concept. 
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The full-time period of study lasted two years (September 1990 to July 1992), 
composed of a sabbatical year and a study leave. The arrival of the recession brought 
to light the limitations of a narrow attention to retention mechanisms. Within the 
new economic environment, managers complained that their large organisation was 
too successful in retaining people, and that the real challenge was finding ways of 
e)dting them in larger numbers despite the eidstence of a policy of lifetime 
employment. Thus, with changes in the economic environment, retention objectives 
were modified to deal with the new business requirement of cutting costs. The more 
inclusive concept proved to be that of skills supply strategy with retention 
mechanisms operating along with recruitment and development activities. 
SHAPING THE PROFESSIONAL 
The Ph. D. programme has a dual purpose: (1) producing significant contributions to 
the academic knowledge base, and (2) training and developing academics (Phillips 
and Pugh, 1987). The first point was discussed in the previous section. The second 
covers the practice of research in the field and at the writing desk. These craft 
aspects of research constitute part of the framework for making a knowledge 
contribution in that the research method chosen and how it is applied determine the 
kind of knowledge produced. The vantage point or perspective adopted and the path 
subsequently travelled determine what the traveller will experience and whether he 
or she comes out enriched. Exploring new territory calls for a guide that can 
demonstrate the method, help the researcher avoid pitfalls and have the leisure to 
scan the countryside, meet the natives, and interpret the experience. In my 
particular case, I had the strong desire to explore the management of knowledge 
workers using the longitudinal case method. Mastering this method would 
complement my current skills, and I would become a more rounded researcher. 
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The craft of research also includes ethics which already were familiar to me. Though 
one may agree with Carnap (1935) that ethical propositions have no knowledge 
content, it would be wise to remember that ethical conduct constitutes part of the 
foundation for a research community of serious enquiry. Any publication has value 
insofar as the researcher reports honestly on the method applied and the results 
obtained. In seeking recognition, the researcher has to balance the natural 
inclination to present the research in the best light in order to persuade colleagues 
and referees that the work is worthy of publication, with the requirement for full 
disclosure. At first glance, this appears to be easily achievable, but in practice 
researchers apply their method and achieve understanding through an untidy non- 
linear process of research. To some extent, all research reports are retrospective 
systematisation that emphasise the rational and the logical. This reinterpretation is 
part of the knowledge process (Miles and Huberman, A984), and facilitates the 
reader's task of assimilating the research exploit and findings. But the final 
document leaves the wrong impression. A growing number of researchers have 
admitted the "craft" aspect of research (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Pettigrew, 
1985). 
Confidentiality also has craft aspects. Offering confidentiality is straightforward: the 
person's name, the companys name, and the personal contents of the interview are 
kept under lock and key. Similarly, confidential documents are reported on in an 
oblique manner. The company is shown the preliminary report to check for 
inaccuracies and for possible misrepresentations that may harm the firrWs public 
image. However, once the work is in process, and the participants are comfortable 
and interested in the results, confidentiality requirements decrease. Achieving these 
lower requirements permits reporting the organisation's name in the public domain 
CHAPTER TBREM RESEARCH PROCESS PAGE 51 
and adds considerably to the value of the findings. Checks for reliability become 
much easier, and future work can build on a more definite foundation. 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE WORLD 
Every researcher operates within a framework of epistemology, but rarely exposes it. 
This lacuna is understandable because most of the time the researcher operates 
within a specialised field and dialogues with others who share the same framework. 
In my case, I take as given that the physical world exists and that persons composed 
of mind and body operate within it as purposive and enquiring creatures. Persons 
are assumed to be interpreting their environment on an on-going basis as they seek 
to understand, shape and appropriate parts of it (Whitehead, 1938). 
While persons are thinking creatures with self-defined aims, organisations do not 
think (Lawrence et al., 1988). Organisations are complex entities operating within 
an environment, and can be described in terms of resources, structures, policies and 
practices, activities and events. But their purposes and projects are determined by 
human actors within and outside the organisation. Only persons give and sustain 
meaning. Thus business strategy and the related construct of skills supply strategy 
reflect a particularly human concept. Was something intended and deliberate? 
Purpose also can be forgotten through neglect and constant repetition due to the 
failings of the human attention process. Furthermore, purpose may be shaped 
opportunistically when participants witness events which prove to be advantageous 
for the firm, and management subsequently adopts the pattern of events as a formal 
policy or strategy (Nfintzberg and Waters, 1985). Strategy as emergent or intended is 
assumed to be influenced by the bounded rationality of the actors (Simon, 1957). 
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH PROCESS PAGE 52 
ADOPTING CONTEXTUALISM 
According to White (1955), the 19th century philosopher Friedrich Hegel is 
responsible for the importance given in the 20th century to studying ideas, activities 
and events contextually and historically. He gave primary attention to change and 
development, and his famous dialectic of logic was rooted in history. More recently, 
Pepper (1942) argued that all search for knowledge is guided by an underlying world 
hypothesis. The most widespread in our technological age is that of Mechanism, of 
law-like relationships between classes of phenomena, with truth demonstrated by 
cause and effect. An alternative and equally valid world hypothesis is that of 
Contextualism where events are studied in their setting. Truth is determined'by 
qualitative confirmation because the context continues to change, obliging 
knowledge to change with it. 
Within the social sciences, leadership was given by the ethnographer Malinowski in 
the early 20th century (Ellen, 1984). His method of participant observation'obliged 
the researcher to understand first hand the community under study. As for the 
science of organisational studies, longitudinal case studies were an odd occurrence, 
but their numbers have grown significantly in the 1980s (Pettigrew, 1990). 
Polanyi (1957) strongly favoured a historical and comparative analysis of economic 
activity, but ignored the variety of economic organisations which have operated and 
changed over time (Lie, 1991). Both Granovetter (1985) and Lie (1991) have argued 
that economic activity, whether in the shape of markets or hierarchies, is embedded 
in concrete systems of social relations. Thus the study of economic activity requires 
attention to the context in all its complexity. 
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Contextualism as articulated by Pettigrew (1990) represents a framework for the 
study of organisational change. An analysis of the interplay among the content of 
change (WHAT), the context of change (WHY), and the process of change (HOW) 
reveals the patterns that account for the change. Figure 3.1. outlines the framework 
in relation to this dissertation. The content of change refers to the specific topic of 
interest and the changes that are taking place. In this case, the content is composed 
of skill supply patterns and the hard and soft benefits that compose the retention 
dimension of these patterns. Changes in these patterns and the benefits offered are 
described. 
The context of change is composed of an outer and inner component which represent 
features which can facilitate change or can hamper and block it. These contexts also 
undergo change, and can become more favourable or less so over time. Thus skill 
supply patterns and the packages of hard and soft benefits are nested within a 
changing organisation (inner context) which can be described in terms of history, 
business strategy, structure and work organisation, culture, and human resource 
management policies and practices. There also exists a larger dynamic outer context 
within which the inner context is nested: economic cycles, political formation, 
technology, product/markets, and labour markets. Changes within the outer context 
can provoke changes in the inner context, but the pace of change in the outer context 
may be slower or faster than within the inner context because of particular features 
operating in the latter. There exists some interpenetration between the inner and 
outer contexts, and sometimes the direction of change can be from the inner context 
outward as, for example, when a firm leads the industry in innovation, or when large 
firm overwhelms a specific labour market. But most of the time, the organisation 
exercises a low level of influence on the outer context. The idea of receptive and 
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FIGURE 3.1: 
OUTLINE OF CONTEXTUALISM FOR THE STUDY 
OF SKILLS SUPPLY STRATEGY 
z Outer 
Inner 
CONTENT PROCESS 
OUTER CONTEXT General Economy 
Industry Composition 
Political Formation 
Technological Developments 
Products & Markets 
Local and National Labour Markets 
Geography 
INNER CONTEXT History of Organisation 
Business Strategy 
Management Style & Leadership 
Structure 
Work Organisation 
Managerial & Professional Culture 
HRM Policies, Programmes & Practices 
CONTENT Organisational Skill Base 
Scarce and Critical Skills 
Skill Supply Patterns 
Combination of Hard & Soft Benefits 
PROCESS Events in Time 
Action & Reaction 
Product Champions 
Perceptions & Assumptions 
Values 
Roles 
Legitimisation 
Source: Adaptation of Pettigrew (1987). 
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CONTEXT 
unreceptive conte: ýts for change draws heavily on the work of Kurt Lewin (1951) on 
social force field analysis. 
The third leg of Contextualism, the process of change, is concerned with the patterns 
of actions and reactions of the participants and interested parties. The researcher 
can bring to bear whatever theories of change that help explain the findings, such as 
decision-making and power relations, but also pays attention to the management of 
the process itself. For example, who assumed responsibility for skills planning, how 
did they become responsible, and how did-they drive forward their change agenda? 
How was the skills strategy given legitimacy? How was the meaning of lifetime 
employment altered to justify the new skill supply patterns? 
Examining the content, context and process of organisational change suffers from 
complexity, but one must keep in mind that the organisation under study is itself a 
complex entity. Successful research depends to a great degree on the craft skills of 
the enquirer, and the Ph. D. supervisor plays an important role in elucidating and 
demonstrating the methodology. A simpler approach, such as contingency theory 
applied to strategic HRM (e. g., Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Fombrun et al. 1984), 
would be more manageable because the static criterion of fit predominates and it is 
assumed that management can pick and choose from a menu of HRM elements to 
maintain a fit with the changing business strategy. This approach does not do justice 
to historical influences and the past patterns of change that condition the present. It 
makes little attempt at clarifying how the new HRM configuration comes to be in 
terms of sequences of events and actions both influencing and shaped by the inner 
and outer contexts of the organisation. 
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APPLYING CONTEXTUALISM 
The study of organisational change as a process within a context has made some 
progress in the 1980s, but the knowledge base remains rudimentary. Skill as a 
strategic HRM concept has been given little attention. Therefore, important 
contributions can be made in the description and analysis of the context of a skill- 
based strategy, and in the development of organisational concepts and theory for the 
understanding of the management of skills. In order to make such contributions, 
longitudinal and comparative case studies are required (Miles and Hub6rman, 1984; 
Eisenhardt, 1989b; Pettigrew, 1990). These qualitative studies would facilitate a 
wide scope of exploration and establish an adequate data base from which to 
recognise patterns in the content, process and context of change. 
This researcher assumed that a longitudinal study emphasised the historical 
dimension: the mapping of events and actions in their changing contexts over a 
significant period of time, say 5 to 10 years, in order to see patterns. Firstly, this 
means capturing the story of the organisation. Secondly, the analysis of patterns 
reveals the dynamic relationships among actors, events and their context. Various 
means were available to collect this historical data, from actual observation to the 
study of documents. With limited time available, it was decided that interviews of 
persons with long experience within the organisation coupled with corroborating 
written sources of information would be sufficient to capture the organisation's past. 
These sources of information are subject to "doctoring": participants choose the story 
they wish to relate and annual reports deliberately project professionalism and 
success. However, even actual observation over time is influenced by the character 
and intentions of the observer. Furthermore, the past is an abstraction produced by 
memory and by people's attempts to make sense of the present and to prepare for an 
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uncertain and abstract future. Similarly, through this dissertation, this researcher 
attempts to make sense of the organisations under study as part of the ever present 
sense-making of the human community. 
Pragmatic concerns also dictate rapid data collection. Within a three year Ph. D. 
programme in organisational studies, a longitudinal study has a particular meaning. 
Entry into an organisation takes six to twelve months, and the equivalent time is set 
aside for the writing of the dissertation. In doing more than one case, the time 
pressures increase, and the time available for real-time data collection in any one 
organisation shrinks. Interviews and review of documents can accommodate this 
time schedule. 
Dimension of Time. Strategic change takes place at variable rates, sometimes slowly 
and at other times quickly (Quinn, 1980; Doz and Prahalad, 1987; Pettigrew, 1987). 
In order to witness patterns of change, a large time span must be investigated. 
Skinner (1981) believed that strategic HRM involved a seven year time horizon. 
Mills (1985) reported that some U. S. firms linked their personnel plans to the 
business plan covering three to six years. These intentional plans are part of a 
dynamic process with emergent elements, and with actions and reactions that 
become visible if enough time elapses. Too short a period could give the impression 
of stability and continuity when a larger time period might reveal significant 
change. The reverse could also happen, with a period of significant change masking 
periods of continuity before and after. A ten year span appears to be in order. The 
world-wide recession at the beginning of the 1980s and the arrival of Thatcherism in 
1983 reinforces this choice. Thus, the cases would cover the early 1980s up to 1991 
when both historical and real-time information would be collected. 
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Dimension of Space. The main focus of the investigation is the organisation. Three 
comprehensive cases (25 interviews per case) preceded by a pilot study were 
considered sufficient for comparative purposes. It was decided that only large firms 
operating in the information technology (IT) sector of England would be chosen. 
Because of the international nature of both R&D and the IT sector, attention would 
be paid to both the national and international context. Labour markets, on the other 
hand, are known to be primarily local and national. As for the organisation itself, 
installations typically are dispersed. The researcher was prepared to travel 
throughout England. 
Choice of Organisations. The initial choice was between large and small firms. Some 
research had already been done on strategic HRM in large organisations, and was 
useful in defining and situating the concept of retention mechanism and packages of 
hard and soft benefits (Hendry and Pettigrew, 1990). The second choice was the 
specific firms; obtaining access proved to be a process of negotiation. The network of 
associations of the Centre for Corporate Strategy and Change was used to introduce 
the study and solicit participation. The arrival of the recession and structural 
changes taking place within many firms made this a long process. Some firms such 
as Olivetti refused immediately; others refused after a visit to their R&D 
installation (Hewlett-Packard) or their head office (ICL). In time, firm commitments 
were obtained from IBM and BT. The participation of RSRE was serendipitous and 
circuitous: a chance encounter of an enthusiastic product manager on the plane, and 
gradual access through a senior line manager prompted by the product manager. 
The original design was composed of three large firms operating within the IT sector 
of England. In the end, three large organisations participated, all major players in 
the IT sector with R&D facilities composed of appro3dmately 2000 professionals and 
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managers. All had a large internal labour market whose management was 
,ý undergoing change in response to skill issues. However, they straddled both the 
private and public sectors, and engaged in different stages of R&D. This "emergent" 
element helped to create the following design: 
IBM: Private sector organisation with an important R&D division 
emphasising development. 
BT: Public sector organisation that underwent privatisation in the 
1980s; it had an important R&D division and put more emphasis on 
development. 
RSRE: Public sector R&D facility which traditionally emphasised 
research and which gradually took on private sector practices in the 
late 1980s. 
This combination of cases proved to have several desirable qualities, and constituted 
a theoretical sample as opposed to a random or systematic sample (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). All of the organisations had undergone important changes which 
impacted on the R&D operations. This commonality facilitated theory-building 
across cases; each case was treated as a separate opportunity for the creation and 
refinement of constructs on skills management (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Eisenhardt, 1989b). The different emphases on R and D (big R and little D 2r little R 
and big D) widened the applicability of the findings. Similarly, the sampling of both 
the private and public sectors fit well with the broader 1980s trend of the enterprise 
culture that spilled over from the private to the public sectors (Wilson, 1992). The 
RSRE case could shed some light on the BT case insofar as RSRE represents what 
BT might have been if it remained within the public sector. 
Data Gathering - Interview Protocol. The main instrument for collecting data was 
the interview protocol, a comprehensive list of questions designed to uncover specific 
information on the content, context and process of the management of skills (see 
Appendix 3.1). Questions were clustered under headings which reflected the main 
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organisational concepts which would help to build the case study: company and 
strategic overview, skill requirements, skills availability, skills supply strategy, 
management of the internal labour market, turnover, human resource management, 
human resource development, management style, project management, network 
management, and questions for employees with key skills. No one individual 
answered all of the questions. Choice of questions depended on the person's position 
and location in the organisation. '17ypically, the same questions were asked of two or 
three persons. Follow-up telephone calls were made to collect additional information 
as required. The pilot study had indicated that close-ended questions were 
appropriate to keep both the researcher and the interviewee on topic. Both the pilot 
study and the first case (RSRE) pointed out the need for additional questions which 
were added for the subsequent cases. 
Data Gathering Within-RSRE. A total of 25 persons were interviewed during May 
and June of 1991, representing 40 hours of data collection, most of which was tape 
recorded. Each interview lasted about one hour, and was transcribed by the 
researcher or a paid assistant. 
All interviews took place on-site and conducted in private. The site was visited, as 
well as the offices and the research labs. In addition to the formal interviews, 
conversations in the cafeteria took place frequently, usually with one of the 
participants, sometimes with another employee, and covered topics that were being 
highlighted in the interviews or impressions that needed verification. Similar 
incidental conversations took place at off moments during tours and in going from 
one location to another. At all stages of the interviews, current and historical 
documents were collected, mostly annual company and R&D reports, personnel 
related reports, and task force reports. 
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The researcher was guided by four sampling assumptions: 
(1) The plurality of views within the organisation can be captured by a 
broad vertical and horizontal sample. 
(2) Areas undergoing high levels of change are more likely to have visible 
skill issues and to foster skill supply interventions. 
(3) Organisational insiders are in a privileged position to identify 
potential participants currently facing skill issues and could facilitate 
their participation. 
(4) HRM activities are shared by line and staff managers. 
Initially, general documentation was obtained by mail followed by the interview of a 
senior line manager of the establishment. This researcher summarized the nature of 
the intended study in detail (how the management of skills could support the 
business strategy of an organisation). Then, the contact person was asked to explain 
the functioning and structure of the organisation, the past and current strategic 
business issues, and the related skill issues. Choice of participants was discussed in 
terms of the following criteria: broad vertical selection of managers including both 
line and staff functions with emphasis on personnel and the research areas; a broad 
selection of managers and researchers in areas undergoing important changes which 
were raising skill questions. The contact person and the researcher agreed that the 
best approach was to set a first round of interviews of the more senior managers in 
order to obtain an overview of strategic issues and obtain their support: 3 senior 
managers (including the contact person) and 6 middle-line managers. Thereafter, 
interviews in those areas which seemed promising and open to participation would 
be set jointly with the local manager in order to go deeper in the organisation. 
Because of the contact person's very senior position and the civil service way, the 
first round of interviews were scheduled without giving people a choice. A one-page 
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description of the study (prepared by the researcher) was sent to each participant 
along with confirmation of the interview time. With the active support of three 
business unit directors and some lateral referrals, 16 additional interviews were 
conducted with 8 middle managers in support functions (personnel and other), 4 
first-line managers, and 4 outstanding scientists. Again, participants were not given 
any choice. 
Data Gathering Within BT. The above experience with RSRE produced a sizable 
body of data and information which proved to be satisfactory for case writing. The 
above procedures were repeated for BT with some modifications. Thirty interviews 
took place between September and December 1991 for some 40 hours of tape. A 
senior personnel manager within corporate headquarters acted as contact person. 
The first round of interviews included 2 personnel managers within corporate office 
and 2 senior personnel managers within the divisions ý (R&D and Worldwide 
Networks or WN). The second round of interviews involved 26 persons: 
In headquarters, 4 managers in personnel and related areas; 
In R&D, 2 middle-line managers, 5 middle-support managers, 3 first-line 
managers, 4 researchers and group leaders for a total of 14; 
In WN, 3 middle-line managers, 4 middle-support managers and one first- line manager for a total of 8. 
In general, interviews were voluntary and consent obtained by phone by the delegate 
of the contact person, followed up with written confirmation accompanied by the 
description of the project. However, within R&D, the senior personnel manager 
circulated an invitation to senior middle line managers to participate. Only those 
who responded positively were interviewed, followed by a second round of interviews 
deeper within their areas which were assigned without choice. The researcher 
noticed improved quality of the data collected when compared with the RSRE case 
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due to a revision of the interview protocol and the growing experience of the 
researcher. 
Data Collected Within IBM. Twenty persons were interviewed, and one group 
interview took place, between February and April 1992, representing 30 hours of 
data. A senior personnel manager within corporate headquarters was the contact 
person. Obtaining consent was similar to that within BT, a mixture of voluntary and 
involuntary participation. The first round of interviews involved 2 persons: a senior 
personnel manager at headquarters and another within Hursley Lab. The latter 
interview took place as part of a group discussion with 3 middle-line managers 
invited by the interviewee. The researcher was surprised by the group format, and 
accepted it as a way of obtaining wider entry into the organisation. The second 
round involved 18 interviews including 3 personnel managers at corporate 
headquarters and 15 interviews in R&D: 3 middle-line managers, 6 middle-support 
managers, 3 first-line managers and 3 researchers. 
Data Analyzis. The transition from data collection to data analysis was in one sense 
overlapping and in another distinct and sequential. During the data collection, the 
researcher noted in writing "exciting" ideas and impressions, identified key themes 
and events, and formed an overall assessment of the organisation. These notes were 
made in hotels, on the train and at the local pub. Subsequently the case was written 
in an inductive manner while the "insights" both inspired the write-up and were 
tested against the data base. 
Because of the time-consuming task of transcribing the taped interviews, the 
systematic write-up took place, for the most part, only after all of the data was 
accessible. In each case, the process began with a review of the documentation 
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collected (interview transcripts, in-house and annual reports, newspaper and 
magazine articles). As obtained, the documents were sorted and placed in separate 
files according to main headings (history of organisation, business strategy, HRM, 
R&D) as much as possible. Thereafter, a descriptive case was written by reviewing 
the files in a sequence corresponding to the case headings. The chronology of main 
events for the 1980s and early 1990s was established during the data collection to 
facilitate the interviews, and now was revised. As a longitudinal study, this 
chronology and the descriptive case built around it created the foundation upon 
which inter-related events and activities were examined (Miles and Huberman, 
1984; Van de Ven, 1987; Pettigrew, 1990). 
.I 
Triangulation was used regularly and flexibly (Fetterman, 1989, Brewer and 
Hunter, 1989). Three independent sources of information were sought to confirm 
events and measure the consensus (or lack of it). Different types of information were 
compared, such as interviews from different locations within the organisation, 
interviews versus documents, and internal versus external documents. Because of 
security constraints, little use of internal documents took place in RSRE- 
Ethnographic information gleaned through observation was used in a less 
systematic manner, and was helpful in obtaining a general sense of the organisation 
and its culture, and in verifying the details of the work settings and the availability 
of resources. 
When triangulation indicated consensus on a topic, the researcher would accept the 
view expressed. However, when divergence was evident, the researcher reconciled 
the conflictual evidence by searching for different uses of language and different 
perspectives. For example, participants situated events according to when they had 
an impact on their lives. If they were involved in the early stages, they would speak 
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of this period as if the event was a wide phenomenon instead of a localised one. In 
contrast, documents would report on the same event after it was beyond the 
emergent phase and well established. In this case, the differences would prove to be 
superficial. At other times, the divergence was due more to different perspectives 
created by the location of the participants in the organisation and their different 
preoccupations and values. Such differences were treated as part of the plurality of 
the organisational social reality that participants individually and collectively 
created. 
The cases were written in the following order: RSRE, BT, and finally IBM. The 
initial descriptive case of RSRE suffered from unfocused comprehensiveness. It was 
voluminous and much was included that did not pertain specifically to skill issues. 
The revised case was shorter and more analytical as the researcher tried harder to 
build on the list of hard and soft benefits created in the pilot study, and to relate 
these retention mechanisms to the business requirements. While the construct of 
SKISS had not yet emerged, it was noted that management interest in outflows Of 
employees pointed out the limitation of linking retention mechanisms directly to 
business strategy. Changing packages of hard and soft benefits were not an 
adequate construct for the analysis of the business issues confronting RSRE- 
In light of the RSRE experience, the interview protocol was revised with more 
questions on the importance and management of skills. The next case, BT, followed 
the same procedure, and again a weighty descriptive case was written. However, 
this time the malaise that was evident in the first case (RSRE) was confirmed and a 
conceptual solution suggested itself. The revision of the BT case at a more analytical 
level was facilitated by the adoption of SKISS as the core construct. But first, a new 
literature review was completed to demonstrate that the construct had academic 
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relevance and support. Second, the analytical procedures recommended by Miles and 
Huberman (1984), notably event listing and causal networks, were brought to bear 
on the descriptive case. These techniques facilitated careful attention to the 
chronology of inter-related events across levels of analysis, and helped to reduce and 
summarize the description. The researcher found that the tables and figures created 
helped to raise the level of analysis, but were in themselves only an intermediate 
step. Needless to say, the third case, IBM-UK benefited greatly from this analytical 
progress, and the first case, RSRE, was revised. In order to make a stronger 
argument for the e3dstence of SKISS, the cases are presented in the thesis in an 
order opposite to their chronological creation: IBM, BT, and finally RSRE. Both IBM 
and BT were sophisticated firms undergoing broad changes with evident skill 
implications, whereas RSRE remained part of the civil service. 
Feedback to participants was used to check on the accuracy of the information 
collected, and to reward participants for their time and efforts. In RSRE the contact 
person was given a verbal report on completion of the interviews, and a descriptive 
case a couple of months later. Two workshop presentations were given to the 
participants who confirmed the findings and appreciated the sense-making of 
presenting events in the context. In BT and IBM, a descriptive case report was sent 
to the contact person and to the senior personnel participant in each division and 
business area. They declined the workshop offer. A list of participants accompanied 
the report, but it was up to Personnel to distribute it more widely. 
Participants who saw the report found the historical perspective captivating, as if 
they had discovered a part of themselves that they had lived through but had not 
fully appreciated. Though some differences of opinion remained, they verbally 
confirmed the contents of the case, and for IBM and BT, they found the analysis 
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pertinent. Interestingly, middle managers were more interested in the process of the 
research which was seen as an opportunity to assess current views and identify 
possible adjustments for pressing business requirements. 
The above pertains to within-case analysis. The across-case analysis was thematic 
and based on a search for patterns in the content, context and process of change. 
Again, the researcher had spontaneously reflected on the themes before the three 
cases were fully analysed. The initial draft of a chapter was written off-the-top, and 
revised on the basis of the literature reviews already completed. Thereafter, a case 
by case comparison was made as a test of the applicability and comprehensiveness of 
the theme. Furthermore, some thematic chapters were elaborations of a conclusion 
which needed to be informed by the literature. This was the situation when trying to 
explain skill management practices and the difficulties that managers had in 
discussing skills. Thus, the between-case analysis was an interactive process of the 
deductions and inductions of the researcher stimulated by the analytical cases and 
informed by the academic literature. 
IdentifAng Skills Supply Strategy. As presented in Chapter 2, a recognizable 
pattern of changes in HRM policies, programmes and practices would qualify as a 
SKISS if four criteria were satisfied: strategic linkage, managerial intent, coherence 
of HRM elements, and consistency of managerial effort. While these criteria could 
apply to IBM, they are more difficult to satisfy in BT which has been in the private 
sector only since 1985. Similarly, RSRE has adopted some private sector practices 
only since 1985. Whether BT and RSRE can be said to have a business strategy 
remains to be seen. Alternatively, the creation of a business strategy within these 
organisations might prove to be fertile ground for a radical reappraisal of the work 
organisation and the emergence of SKISS. 
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Pilot Project. In June 1990, a pilot study was undertaken in a metropolis of Ontario, 
Canada. Because of the 80,000 word limitation of this thesis, only a summary is 
presented. The researcher was pursuing limited goals: become familiar with field 
work and case write-up; identify the hard and soft benefits acting as retention 
mechanisms; and situate these mechanisms within their organisational context. Ten 
large firms were contacted before obtaining the agreement of two of them. The 
contact person was a senior personnel manager. A protocol of fifteen broad questions 
guided the interviews; six were conducted in one firm and eight in the other. 
Interviews were supplemented by HRM documents, annual reports, and news 
clippings. 
A number of lessons were learned which were useful for the main study. A 
classification of hard and soft benefits offered by large high technology organisations 
was empirically derived. The pilot study also indicated that hard and soft benefits 
were either addressing an employee "care" need or a business and performance 
requirement. Furthermore, changes in a specific benefit could be care-driven or 
business-driven independent of the original purpose of offering the benefit. 
The importance of collecting ample data in order to follow the evolution of changes in 
benefits in relation to the different levels of context became evident. More interviews 
and historical documentation would be required. In order to succeed in collecting 
complete data for the main cases, a detailed interview protocol was in order. The 
researcher had adopted an open-ended question format as the follow-up to the initial 
answers given, and this proved to be a dangerous practice. Too often, the discussion 
dealt with interesting but tangential topics. More closed-ended questions would 
ensure that the desired topics were covered. Also, in order to supply quotations from 
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the interviews, tape-recorded interviews would be in order. The researcher's memory 
was inadequate to the task. 
These Canadian firms were relatively young, 20 years old, and continued to be 
influenced by their founders. In contrast, the British organisations which were 
targeted for the main study were much older, over 40 years old, and presumably the 
founders would have less impact on business priorities and operations in the 1980s. 
Several other contextual features would also differ because of the national political, 
social and economic setting. It was decided to use the pilot study as an exploration of 
retention mechanisms and the case method, and not as part of the main research 
data base. 
The next section presents the classification of hard and soft benefits which was 
adopted for the three main cases. 
HARD & SOFT BENEFITS 
Hard benefits proved to be difficult to organise. A subsequent literature review 
uncovered the framework provided by Blakin and Gomez-Mejia (1990). With a 
modest modification (e. g., adding contract type) it was found to be adequate for case 
analysis. Hard benefits have three categories: 
base salary (market position). 
benefits 
incentives such as bonuses and profit sharing 
importance of each of the above in the total compensation package. 
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These hard benefits are accompanied by a variety of pay policies: 
type of employment contract (permanent, personal or 
term) 
risk sharing between employer and employee 
internal consistency 
pay secrecy 
pay for performance 
pay decentralisation 
egalitarian pay (perks) 
participation in pay decisions 
job-based vs skill-based pay 
long-term vs short-term pay orientation. 
The pilot study identicated that hard benefits were very important to recruitment 
and played some role in retention. Participants also believed that numerous soft 
benefits contributed to the retention of employees either directly by offering valued 
rewards or indirectly by improving morale. Thirteen soft benefits were identified 
which can be grouped into four categories: 
Primary performance-related benefits 
challenging work 
positive work environment 
recognition for employee contributions 
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Secondary performance-related benefits 
enriched training 
flexible work arrangement (teleworking) 
Communications-related benefits 
informal listening 
formal listening 
employee involvement 
(4) Care-related benefits 
employment security 
career development 
successful & responsible image 
quality & continuity of community 
THE LONE SCHOIAR 
This dissertation is the product of the solitary scholar working under the supervision 
of other more skilful scholars. In one sense, this solitary task is most appropriate as 
an apprenticeship with mastery as the goal. Schon (1983) and Pettigrew (1985) 
emphasised how the researcher operates reflectively to understand the situation. 
The ability to frame a problem out of a situation and to seek its solution constitute 
the professional's reflective skill. The professional imposes meaning through his or 
her singular perspective, and hopefully provides a fruitful way of handling the 
situation. The shaping of the professional involves singular engagement in this 
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process, but with some guidance which diminishes as the student gains in mastery 
and becomes the expert of the dissertation. 
Some may argue that the single perspective suffers from undue bias that can be 
corrected by multiple researchers. Such an approach is feasible in a coordinated 
laboratory or well endowed research centre. Within the social sciences, multiple 
researchers do create a forum for sharing and testing interpretations, and enriching 
theory-building (Eisenhardt, 1989), but their plurality can also introduce new 
variability in the data collection and write-up. As for this researcher, he benefited 
from regular discussions with his two supervisors who helped to clarify and test data 
interpretations. 
The dissertation can be criticised as lacking in generalisability. Given that the topic 
of skills supply strategy has been the subject of little research, the tradeoff was 
made in favour of a valid empirical and conceptual contribution. The small number 
of cases (three preceded by a pilot study) can be defended by the task at hand: a 
Ph. D. thesis that normally lasts three years of full time study, not a lifetime. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter describes the research process as both a very personal experience and a 
academic investigation within the social sciences. The Ph. D. must shape the future 
professional by developing and perfecting research skills. It must also produce a 
significant contribution to the academic knowledge base. The weaving of these two 
themes created this dissertation: a longitudinal and comparative case study of three 
large organisations operating in the IT sector in England. Contextualism was 
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adopted as both a framework to study change management as well as a method by 
borrowing heavily on the field practices of anthropology and sociology. The research 
process was described in sufficient detail so that the reader could appreciate 
research as a practice or craft and not some idealized method. 
Contextualism as a framework was found to be a useful starting point and a flexible 
approach to deal with the emerging constructs. However, the researcher was obliged 
to cultivate a new way of viewing the world in terms of the content, context and 
process of change. This overwhelmingly dynamic framework was stimulating but 
unfamiliar, promising but foreign. The shift to this new Gestalt took time and 
exacted a price. Undertaking a pilot project was a useful introduction to the method, 
and helped to operationalise the concept of hard and soft benefits. 
Contextualism as a method had both strengths and weaknesses. The recommended 
taped-recorded interviews created too much data and appeared to be wasteful of 
time and energy. Initial interviews of key informants remain justifiable, but 
subsequent interviews not so. They could be captured by the more efficient technique 
of note taking during the interview. Ideally this would be done with a team of two 
researchers, one to do the interview, and the other to take notes. This solution was 
not possible for this dissertation, and the researcher's weakness for 
comprehensiveness increased his burden. 
The transition from case description to analysis was a gradual and time-consuming 
process involving considerable learning. Perhaps this grind should not be rushed for 
fear of premature closure and inadequate learning. However, the method did not 
prove sufficient for the data reduction and summarization required. The specific 
procedures outlined in Miles and Huberman (1984) added the missing capability. 
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Part of the difficulty was the researcher's misunderstanding of what a 
comprehensive case constituted. In time, he learned to shift from comprehensiveness 
per se to comprehensiveness around a focal question and construct: identifying HRM 
patterns which could satisfy the criteria of SKISS, namely, strategic linkage, 
managerial intent, HRM coherence, and consistent managerial effort. Inevitably, 
some simplification of the descriptive case took place in the transition to an 
analytical case, but this loss was compensated by a gain in understanding of the 
strategic skill issues. 
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CHAPTER 4: IBM-UK CASE STUDY 
This chapter presents the case of IBM-UK, a firm noted for sophisticated HRM 
policies and practices, dynamic management, and mounting environmental 
pressures. It begins with an overview of the organisation and senior 
management, the environment and business strategy of the firm, and its 
organisational structure. The remainder of the case focuses on R&D, starting 
with a skills description of Hursley Laboratory. The case next shifts to the wider 
topics of skills supply and the ILM, and follows with the HRM context and an 
evaluation of the evidence for intentional skill supply patterns. In the next 
section, changes in hard and soft benefits are documented, and their support of 
the business strategy assessed. The case ends with an evaluation of the skills 
supply "strategy" and the influence of HRM as the context for skill supply 
patterns. 
OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANISATION & SENIORMANAGEMENT 
The multinational International Business Machines (IBM) Corporation has its 
headquarters in Armonk, New York. The firm entered the 1990s with 69$ billion 
in revenue composed of sales (64%), support services (16%), software (14%), and 
rentals and financing (14%). 350,000 employees were employed and more than 
10,000 different computing products were offered as packages of business 
solutions. The 1990s, began with years of crisis. IBM was guided by its CEO John 
Akers since the mid 1980s. Breaking with tradition, he was replaced in 1993 by 
an outsider, Louis Gerstner, previously chief executive of RJR Nabisco Inc. with 
no experience in the computer industry. His immediate priority was bringing 
IBM's costs in line with those of competitors. 
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Net Loss Restructuring Separations & 
Year ($ Billions) Costs M Relocations M 
1991 2.8 3.4 2.2 
1992 5.0 11.6 3.0 
IBM - United Kingdom Limited shared in the above debacle. This fully-owned 
subsidiary was established in 1951 with its headquarters currently in 
Portsmouth. Hursley Laboratory was set up in 1958 and remains the largest IBM 
lab outside of the U. S.. Revenue growth took place throughout the 1980s, but 
profit margin shrank and reached 9.7% in 1990. In 1991 IBM-UK experienced a 
net loss for the first time, including a restructuring cost of 184 million pounds. 
Downsizing affected all areas. 
Senior managers within IBM-UK were nationals groomed within the world-wide 
IBM organisation and culture. They shared IBM's basic beliefs of respect for the 
individual, service to the customer, and pursuit of excellence, and assumed 
continuity in IBM's market dominance. They adopted the IBM persuasion style; 
an internal champion was required for any change effort. Small incremental 
changes were preferred which could be absorbed by the company culture. 
The 1980s was noted for minimal change in the executive ranks of IBM-UM A 
gradual grooming of the leadership took place through the positions of chairman, 
chief executive and managing director. Edwin Nixon, Anthony Cleaver, and Nick 
Temple occupied in turn the position of chief executive. Leonard Peach was 
Director of Personnel & Corporate Affairs, with a three year secondment in 1986- 
89; John Steele was acting director for this period. There was some turnover in 
other positions due to retirements. In contrast, the Director of Hursley Lab was 
replaced every two years or so to reflect business requirements and executive 
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development within the network of IBAI labs. Geoff Robinson was director at the 
beginning of the study, and was replaced by Phyllis Byrne of the U. S. in 1992. 
ENVIRONMENT OF THE ORGANISATION 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the growing computing manufacturing industry 
was dominated by IBAI and its mainframe solutions. The trends of the late 1970s 
and 1980s led to restructuring of the industry, and IBM's loss of pre-eminence: 
Rapid innovation in power and minaturization (portable 
workstations and minicomputer); 
Personal computers (PCs) became a commodity; C 
Emergence of an information technology (IT) market based on 
networking through telecommunications and value added services; 
Proliferation of market niches (eg., software, distribution, 
consulting) and competitors able to match and often outperform 
IBAI; 
Open systems preferred by governments and consumers, whereas 
IBAI emphasised proprietary hardware and software. 
IT skill shortages were identified, and both government and IT 
business leaders attempted to increase research activity and skills 
supply. 
These six changes meant diminishing profit margins for hardware manufacturers 
and emphasis on volume sales. Proprietary strategies for the entire computing 
system (involving several components) became less viable. Ease of cloning and 
mimicking facilitated the entry of new competitors, and little protection e3dsted 
under GAM Lucrative market segments were concentrated in added-value 
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software and services, and flexible networked systems. Within this new 
environment, skill shortages were an issue as firms competed for skills that 
would help them grow. 
Sparrow (1988) described 1981-82 as a period of profitless prosperity noted by 
increasing sales but decreasing profits because of international price competition 
and spiralling salary costs. Thereafter sales and profits improved for the industry 
as a whole, but the industry restructuring created on-going challenges for the 
large established firms. In contrast, the recession of 1990-92 hit the mature 
computing industry hard with negative growth and widespread losses. There was 
oversupply of pc's and postponement of major investments by organisations. The 
combined effects of recession and industry restructuring obliged all major 
hardware manufacturers to undergo downsizing. 
IBM'S CORPORATE STRATEGY 
CENTRALLY-DRIVEN STRATEGY 
IBM and its subsidiaries pursued four explicit corporate goals in the 1980s: 
growing with the industry-, product leadership across the entire product line; 
greater efficiency in terms of low-cost activities and the highest quality products; 
and sustained profitability. These goals presumed the continued dominance of 
IBM. 
IBM's structure had three tiers: R&D was centralised on a world-wide basis with 
laboratories competing for specific missions; manufacturing was regionally based 
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with plants in each region covering the full line of products; and marketing and 
services was nationally organised though reporting to a regional headquarters. 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the creation of relatively autonomous business 
units, the decentralisation of responsibilities from regions to national 
organisations, and the spinning-off of non-core activities. The 1991 restructuring 
aimed to create decentralised business groups for mature products as well. These 
reorganisations were part of an incremental change revolving around 
centralisation to decentralisation. 
In order to increase fleidbility and efficiency in the 1980s, IBM Europe created 
- independent business units or centres serving all of Europe. IBM-UK performed 
some services on behalf of IBM Europe for customers throughout the region. It 
also had responsibility for supporting IBM world-wide in information services for 
internal use. Hursley Lab was expected to support these centres through 
involvement in multi-functional teams and in secondments. Relocation of world- 
wide headquarters of Communication Systems to London was announced in 1990. 
In parallel, the Lab adopted world-wide product missions in communications. 
Throughout this time, IBM retained a complex structure that tried to balance 
market and production requirements at the national, regional and world-wide 
levels, to obtain the benefits of both specialisation and economies of scale. 
Corporate headquarters continued to play a dominant role. The painful lessons of 
the 1980s did not go unnoticed. 
"If we look at the IBM of five years ago, we see a company 
concentrating in the research, development, manufacture and sale 
of IT hardware. Our service organisation was largely 
reactive ... Moreover, the company 
had become a follower-and its 
structure had become overly bureaucratic. " Nick Temple 1991 
Annual Review, p5 
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The decade witnessed a gradual shift from IBM's proprietary strategy 
(Badaracco, 1991): the introduction of the IBM pc from off-the-shelf components; 
the development of the AIX network operating system soft-ware to compete with 
AT&T"s Unix as the standard for open systems interconnection; buying growing 
quantities of components and technology from outside suppliers; and selling some 
of its components to rival firms to incorporate into their computer. 
IBM entered the 1990s with a three-part strategy: (1) increased customer focus; 
(2) strengthening the product line; and (3) targeting ways of making the 
organisation more efficient, competitive and profitable. The three thrusts were 
linked by Market-Driven Quality (MDQ) and called for increasing individual-, 
authority (IBM 1990 Annual Report). MDQ built upon TQM and process 
management which were operating for some years. 
IBM also continued to strengthen its presence in Europe. By the mid 1980s, 
European sales were growing faster than U. S. sales, and surpassed them in total 
sales in 1990. IBM began to decentralise to capitalise on this change. 
Headquarters of the Communication Systems Division moved from New York to 
London in 1991. Never before was a headquarters situated o utside the USA. 
Despite these efforts to sharpen the corporate strategy and culture, the media 
and financial analysts continued to criticise IBM's over-reliance on mainframe 
business, heavy bureaucracy and adherence to an expensive policy of lifetime 
employment (Financial Times, May 3,1991; June 21,1991; Nov. 21,1991; Nov. 
28,1991; Globe & Mail, Aug. 4,1992; Dec. 2,1992; Jan. 23,1993). 
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SUSTAINING R&D 
Consistent investment in R&D was seen as ensuring the firm's long-term growth 
and profitability. World-wide investment levels in R&D and engineering 
consistently averaged 10% with R&D accounting for three quarters of expenses 
and engineering the remainder. The R&D network grew from 24 to 36 labs in the 
1980s. A few pursued cutting-edge research while the remainder were limited to 
development. Traditionally focused on mainframes and related applications, the 
R&D effort gradually was adjusted to cover the entire range of computer sizes. It 
was complemented by shifting alliances with other major computing fir7ns such 
as Microsoft, Apple, Wang, and Siemen. These multiple alliances obliged the labs 
to develop managers and professionals able to function with external partners. 
BUSINESS STRATEGY OF IBM-UK & HURSLEY LAB 
CUSTOMER FOCUS IN ALARKETING & SALES 
Loss of market share and fierce price competition led IBM to study its 
competitors more closely (1985). These firms proved to have a lower cost 
structure: less overhead and support and more customer-facing employees in 
sales and related activities. While IBM was able to match their manufacturing 
performance, it suffered from an expensive and poorly deployed workforce. IBM- 
UK introduced the strategic push to change its workforce ratios in favour of 
customer-facing. Gradually more employees were redeployed and retrained, and 
cross-functional team involving Hursley people became more numerous. 
The pace of change slowly accelerated as there was continued management 
disappointment in corporate performance. The percentage of employees in 
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customer-facing areas of the business stood at 45% in 1986 and approached 60% 
in 1990. In 1991 IBM-UK outlined its Blueprint for the 1990s: customer-facing 
employees would reach 75% by the end of 1992. Under pressure to improve 
performance, the 5 year redeployment plan was accelerated to 2 years (1991-92). 
The Blueprint also provided for more decentralised business groups focused on 
particular products or market segments. Greater management discretion 
included the right to combine IBM products and services with offerings from 
other companies. 
INTERNAL EFFICIENCY & QUALITY 
Manufacturing Efficiency & Quality (1985). In the first half of the 1980s, IBM 
succeeded in lowering manufacturing costs through the introduction of 
continuous production and a constant drive for quality. Gradually process quality 
and ISO certification became the preoccupation of all areas in IBM-UM However, 
competition from low cost firms was unrelenting, and IBM countered by creating 
closer integration of R&D with manufacturing to decrease product development 
cycle times and increase process quality. This integration was implemented 
principally by multiple cross-functional project teams and joint management 
teams. 
Manufacturing Suppliers. With increasing automation (eg,. robotics, automated 
material handling) and continuous manufacturing, the UK plants (Havant & 
Greenock) reinforced and organised their suppliers into a tighter network able to 
deliver on time and to quality requirements. 
SupRort Systems. In 1984 IBM-UK installed the National Office Support System 
(NOSS). By the end of 1986 most employees were trained to make use of NOSS 
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for sending and receiving electronic mail and administrative support. In 1990 
development of a modem on-line HRM system was initiated to replace the 
mainframe system in operations since the early 1970s. 
SPECIALISATION AT HURSLEY IABORATORY 
While Hursley supported IBM-UK in Marketing & Sales (M&S) and 
manufacturing, it's primary goal was product development for IBM Research 
Division. Within its network of 36 laboratories, missions were obtained 
competitively. While some laboratories like Hursley were successful in obtaining 
both hardware and software missions, most specialised in supporting a business 
line. 
Hursley was mainly concerned with graphics displays and systems, direct access 
storage devices and programming. Customer Information Control System (CICS) 
was developed in 1975 and remained IBM's successful mainframe program 
package world-wide. It was constantly enhanced and updated, and occupied a 
third of the lab's workforce. Investment in buildings and equipment took place 
throughout the 1980s and the workforce grew from 1500 to 1700. 
In 1983 and with the introduction of the IBM pc in Europe, Development and 
Manufacturing in the UK were brought under a single director. Growing 
cooperation between the two plants, the Lab, and suppliers took place. In 1988 
Hursley moved its monitor development to the Greenock plant, and development 
of storage products, sub-systems and flexible circuits to Havant. 
ware Mission (1990). IBM had been trying to penetrate the lucrative 
markets of software and computing services since 1980, and did make some 
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headway. But as usual, the firm moved slowly and by 1990 it was still refocusing 
its resources and efforts. In 1989, corporate office decided that Hursley would 
adopt a 100% software mission. 
Hursley took on more global software missions, including responsibility for part 
of the software development of Communication Systems, IBM's networking 
products and services division. By 1990 Hursley had completed the transfer, and 
had world-wide responsibilities for transaction systems and voice-enhanced 
solutions. The following year, the downsizing of the Lab brought the workforce 
back to 1500. 
Productivity Push (1991). The crisis of 1991 precipitated the massive e2dting of 
people with careful attention to the retention of skills considered important for 
maintaining and enhancing business performance. Hursley transferred the 
employees closely tied to hardware development, but it still had numerous 
researchers and managers with a hardware background. 
"If we are going to be affordable as a software development 
organisation, we need a higher level of productivity. " 2nd Line Hursley Manager 
BUSINESS STRATEGY & HRM IMPLICATIONS 
IBM's intentions to decentralise posed a serious challenge to the established HR 
policies which emphasise world-wide equity and security ý of employment. 
Meanwhile attention to efficiency and quality, and focusing the business 
functions called for sustained training and development of its workforce. High 
overhead costs were a pressing issue which could only be solved by downsizing. 
How could Hursley resize and reshape the skillbase at the same time? Some 
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managers wondered how successful IBM could be in preparing large numbers of 
displaced people for high levels of performance. The strategy also had an 
inevitable cost associated with the learning curve. 
Despite the dissatisfaction of investors and investment analysts, senior 
management consistently defended the practice of full employment. The 
business crisis and restructuring of 1991 brought additional pressure. 
"Having top-quality people ... a true competitive advantage. " John Akers, Chairman, 1990 IBM Annual Report. 
"If further significant reductions are required, we will reassess full 
employment and do what is best for IBM. " John Akers, Chairman, 
1991 IBM Annual Report. 
HURSLEY LABORATORY 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The 1991 world-wide downsizing shifted Marketing and Sales (M&S) in IBM-UK 
from its geographically-based structure to one aligned with industry sectors (see 
Figure 4.1). The aim was a network of separate, self-contained businesses, 
supported by a service organisation. Rationalisation also was taking place in 
manufacturing. In 1991 the Greenock and Havant plants were being integrated, 
with common support and administrative functions. Each plant also absorbed the 
engineering support and workforce which was separated from Hursley Lab. 
Product and market missions were reflected in Hursley Lab's structure with 
relatively self-contained business units except for some support functions 
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(personnel and finance) which were centralised in the Lab. Despite changing 
product missions and their involvement in marketing pursuits, the Labs 
structure remained relatively stable. In 1991 the introduction of a single coherent 
software mission, the spinning-off of hardware R&D, and the introduction of 
team working spawned a new structure (see Figure 4.2). 
SKILLS STRUCTURE 
IBM-UK started the 1980s with a headcount approaching 15,000 (see Table 4.1). 
The firm underwent rapid growth after the recession and plateaued at 19,000. 
Downsizing began in 1990 and was pronounced in the next two years. 
Throughout the 1980s IBM-UK maintained relatively stable workforce ratios 
with 50% in M&S, 20% in Manufacturing, 20% in Administration, and 10% in 
R&D. 
Hursley Lab started the decade with 1,400 people and underwent slow growth 
approaching 2000 in 1990 (see Table 4.2). The Lab was successful in obtaining a 
variety of missions, and more important for the long term, succeeded in achieving 
a profile in a few software areas, namely transactions management (CICS) and 
imaging. Most professionals occupied one of three job categories: planner, 
engineer, and programmer. The latter was by far the fastest growing group and 
outnumbered engineers by 1986. With the transfer of engineering support to the 
plants in 1991, programmers became the predominant skill group. 
4 
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FIGURE 4.2. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
OF HURSLEY LAB- JANUARY 1991 
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LAB DIRECTOR 
GEOFF ROBINSON 
TABLE 4.1. IBM-UK WORKFORCE STATISTICS 1981-1992 
Year Total 
Recruitment 
Graduate 
Recruitment 
Workforce 
Turnover 
Year-End 
Workforce 
Year-End 
1981 n. a. n. a. 3.4% 14752 
1982 600 90 3.1% 14862 
1983 988 225 2.5% 15475 
1984 1744 363 2.7% 17506 
1985 1798 420 2.7% 18798 
1986 586 241 2.8% 18801 
1987 163 43 3.1% 18026 
1988 1129 697 3.3% 18686 
1989 640 209 4.3% 19565 
1990 750 236 5.0% 18374 
1991 11 0 15.0% 15665 
1992 n. a. n. a. 7.2% 14514 
Source: IBM-UK Annual Reviews. Figures include R&D. 
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WORK ORGANISATION AT HURSLEY 
The typical project cycle lasts two years. Most of the work involves teams 
developing the underlying structure that will support new sets of applications. 
Applications for a customer-specific requirement require a few weeks or months. 
Teams also support, service and improve existing products. 
Teams have 15 to 20 people reporting to a first line manager. Each team may be 
subdivided into smaller groups with one to five persons depending on the work 
stages. Teams may be producers or planners (market and product) reporting to 
different managers and integrated at higher levels. Sometimes the team leader 
acts as both technical leader and project manager, and sometimes only as the 
former with the latter assumed by a team coordinator or the first line manager, 
according to the preferences of the team leader. 
Second line managers have 4 to 6 managers reporting to them. With the 1991-92 
downsizing from 300 to 170 managers, a larger span of control has been achieved. 
It is fairly common for managers to have more senior (technical) people reporting 
to them. 
Team duration can reach two years, varies considerably and depends on the 
manager, the stream of work projects and their development stage, and 
individual career aspirations. Managers thought that sometimes teams were 
maintained too long while at other times were disbanded too soon. 
"There is a hidden problem in that the (team) structure tends to 
persist even when the project needs to change. A manager might 
not release his people. " Hursley Line Manager 
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The CICS Area employs some 500 people organised in teams within larger teams. 
There exists a fixed release cycle of 18 to 24 months with incremental changes 
introduced. In response to the planning area, development groups evaluate 
whether they can deliver a piece of the work. In practice the work tends to get 
divided out according to long-standing areas of responsibility. Both continuity 
and specialisation are achieved, but skill development concerns arise. Movement 
of people normally is driven by individual career concerns. Movement across 
development teams reporting to the same second line manager takes place easily. 
HURSLEY CULTURE 
Technical Culture. Traditionally the Lab emphasised technical expertise as the 
most important quality for promotion into the management stream. By the mid 
1980s, broader professionals and managers were sought. Consequently, a 
blurring of the divide took place. Older researchers have resisted this broader 
role. They have plateaued in their career, continue to give adequate performance 
but no more. Performance appraisals do not address this problem. 
"You remember that someday these same people may be your 
manager. This leads to cautiousness. " Scientific Centre 
Professional 
Hardware and software people mix regularly and share the basic IBM and Lab 
culture. They do differ in work horizons (long versus short) and product 
orientation (ideas versus products), and the engineers were described as "nitty 
gritty" compared to the "airy fairy" programmers. 
Local Cultures. CICS is very lucrative for IBM, has locked-in customers and aims 
for yearly releases. Lower managers are not responsible for project budgets, and 
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risk-taking is discouraged and considered potentially costly. This comfortable and 
secure environment has discouraged productivity concerns. 
"People are not used to working to their full potential ... the 
environment is too comfortable. " Coordinator in CICS Area 
"I do not have the entrepreneurial need to go and look for a piece of 
work for my teams. " CICS 2nd Line Manager 
Organisational Climate. The village-like environment is very friendly and tight 
knit. In the past most people made their careers at Hursley. They expect high 
professionalism, and challenge regularly. The "not invented here" syndrome 
prevails. The atmosphere tends to be informal, and contrary to IBM-UK practice, 
people finish at 3 pm on Friday afternoon. 
"There is still a lot of reluctance to actually mix with other IBM 
people. It is a cultural thing. " Hursley Personnel Officer 
Power & Champions. Throughout IBM the line manager was viewed as the key 
individual with responsibility for performance and budget signing authority. This 
has begun to change with the introduction of team working. The responsibility 
becomes that of the entire team with the team leader facilitating consensus 
decision-making. 
Managers also act as champions within the complex matrix organisation. The 
structure and the introverted culture imposed slow decision-making which could 
only be modified and accelerated by forceful management interventions. The 
continued push towards decentralisation and business units started in mid 1980s 
attempted to introduce entrepreneurial roles. 
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RESTRUCTURING FOR SKILLS ADVANTAGES 
Hursley management saw the 1990-91 reorganisation of the Lab as a challenge to 
make better use of the skillbase and improve research productivity. The Skills 
Development area was created with the expressed purpose of satisfying strategic 
rather than tactical skill requirements and individual career needs. The new area 
soon fostered broader technical roles for team leaders and innovative team 
structures-. 
Within a lab culture emphasising technical leadership, senior researchers tended 
to view management as a demeaning task. Responsibilities over resources were 
also clearly divided. 
"If things were going wrong they (team leaders) did not actually 
take remedial action themselves. " CICS 2nd Line Manager - 
"A low line manager has financial signoff whereas a high tech 
person does not. That has not changed. " Scientific Centre 
Professional 
Planning the new structure led to a new conception of team leadership with work 
ownership and people accountability. Team leaders became responsible, with the 
first line manager, for obtaining the right resources to build the team. However, 
with no HRM adjustments, professionals continued to view management 
positions as the real power base. 
The new Lab environment needed both broader researchers and more specialised 
researchers, but differences of opinion misted and no coherent system was yet in 
place. 
"If you are going to be a world class individual in a subject, you will 
not get it through being broad-based, hopping from job to job. We 
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need both sorts, but we seem unable to convince the people 
involved that we need both. " Skill Development Head 
Restructuring was guided by the work of a task force on team working. Collecting 
information on practices in other labs, their assessment of the Lab was circulated 
internally as papers and conferencesl. With half of the middle managers 
removed and a wider span of control due to delevelling, the surviving managers 
were open to productivity experiments. 
Green Blue & Red Manaaers. Based on a U. S. and Canadian experiment, Hursley 
introduced a pilot project involving 150 employees and using a structure of green, 
blue and red managers surrounding semi-autonomous teams. The green manager 
concentrates on getting pieces of work done, the blue on skills, and the red on 
project management with budget and business responsibilities and broad skill 
issues. The green or "team" manager plays the traditional technical task role. 
The blue manager is concerned with growing the skills of people within a career 
team, recruiting and building skills, and process improvement (skills supply 
required for future processes). This manager also does the appraisals. Green and 
blue managers meet to solve across-team problems. 
In the old hierarchical structure, the first line manager had both task and people 
responsibilities. Second line managers had significant task and people 
responsibilities but low involvement in laboratory-wide concerns. Pushing task 
responsibility down to the team level, flattening the organisation, and giving the 
Lab a single coherent (software) mission combined to redefine the responsibilities 
lFor more information, refer to IBM-UK internal papers written by E. W. Bryan, 
"Creating Effective Work Teams" and "The Role of the Manager". 
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of second line managers. They now spent more of their time on laboratory-wide 
concerns (2 days per week). 
"There is far more cross-lab involvement and decisions being 
made ... In my case 
it is things associated with the software 
development process, movement of people within the Lab, the 
management of the overall skills problem. " 2nd Line Hursley 
Manager 
The process was primarily learning-by-doing. The role of the blue manager in 
career development remains uncertain in the initial year of implementation. The 
green and line manager continue to play the dominant role for agreeing 
development goals with the individual and assigning tasks. Generic skill 
questions are being addressed by the blue manager, but from a small experience 
base. 
"I do not have any experience in thinking about what skills I am 
going to need in two year's time, so I do not know what will be involved. " Hursley Blue Manager 
Acceptance by professionals of this skill experiment has been mixed. Team 
working did address a long standing criticism that technical decisions were 
referred to upper line managers with less technical expertise. Group versus 
individual rewards were considered more appropriate but unavailable. Managers 
experienced some discomfort on the manager's leadership role. 
"I think team work is fine while it succeeds .... The role of manager is changing but to me "manager" is synonymous with leadership. " 
Hursley Personnel Officer 
The new management positions (blue and green) call for different skill sets and 
career paths than in the past. Also, with a number of variations of skill working 
co-e3dsting across the Lab, it may become difficult to transfer people. 
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"We do not know quite how to train these people (green 
managers) ... We do formal education but there is some practical learning in there as well. " Hursley 2nd Line Manager 
"What happens when people move from one area to another 
because we are now creating three different environments. " 
Hursley Transformation Team Member 
Focus & Core Groups in CICS. A local task force found that senior professionals 
with high knowledge and skills were interrupted regularly to answer questions 
- and assist others in problem-solving. This led to ineffective teams and low 
productivity. 
"Some groups had variable sized teams, some did not have a team 
at all, they just put their resources where they were needed. This 
caused pretty low activity rates in work as you can imagine. " CICS 
2nd Line Manager 
Consequently in 1992 development groups were reorganised into a core group 
responsible for the development work and a focus group acting as the interface 
with customers and other groups and documenting process work. First line 
managers were expected to minimise their technical role and emphasise their 
personnel responsibilities. 
Within the core group, the team leaders became responsible for people some of 
whom come from outside groups, and for technical decisions at their level. This 
devolving of responsibility may have some repercussions on the appraisal 
process, the responsibility of the line manager. 
The established practice remains of splitting the role of technical leadership and 
project management/coordination to suit the preferences of the team leader. Only 
now the decision belongs to the team leader rather than the first line manager. 
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Also, senior professionals wanted to keep in touch with customers and have task 
variety. At this point, the focus group is viewed as low status and undesirable for 
career purposes. 
I think there are variations, and there is not one rule that says 
you have to have your most senior technical person as team 
leader. " CICS First Line Manager 
"People view it as role that is not as highly valued as the other 
(core) one... I do not think that we have truly worked out yet how 
core team leadership compares to other work. " CICS First Line 
Manager 
Second line management responsibilities have been modified, but not specifically 
for the core/focus experiment. The managers have adopted a stronger focus on' " 
people management. 
"I guess it is demographics rather than individual management of 
personnel issues .... I worry about technical maturity and the ability to do our job ... I manage career development with inventory lists. " CICS 2nd Line Management 
CONCLUSION: BUSINESS STRATEGY & SKILLS SUPPLY AT HURSLEY 
In the 1980s the skill profile of the Lab responded to four processes: (1) the 
pursuit and allocation of missions, (2) the business strategy of IBM-UK (3) the 
work requirements at the team level, and finally, (4) headcount and 
redeployment practices. Because senior management was successful in obtaining 
a mix of hardware and software missions, it operated the Lab as a contracting 
business with short-term horizons and adopted a structure compartmentalised by 
mission. 
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The Lab did respond to the changing requirements of IBM-UK M&S needed 
closer working relationships with R&D people to offer new computing services 
and to deal with more demanding and sophisticated customers. This trend 
accelerated in the mid 1980s and became more pronounced in the 1990s. 
Manufacturing needed support for automation and process management, and for 
the faster engineering of product development results. In 1989 it became clear 
that corporate headquarters wanted to accelerate the market penetration of 
computing services and networking. Hursley Lab would adopt a 100% software 
mission and manufacturing support was transferred to the plants. 
The introduction of a dedicated software mission of the Lab coincided with the 
downsizing. With smaller numbers and competitive requirements, the Lab was 
expected to become more productive. A flurry of change followed with both 
structure and management systems modified, and a variety of skill experiments 
introduced. With the creation of the Skills Development area, the Lab began to 
adopt a skills strategy which impacted on most HRM practices. 
Though the missions of the Lab determined the overall skill requirements, in 
practice skills management took place bottom-up at first and second line 
management levels. The focus was their existing people and their development 
needs, and matching these with work opportunities which flowed from the 
missions. Table 4.2 suggests that this incremental process led to the gradual 
strengthening in numbers of the software skills within the Lab. 
These four processes operated somewhat independently. By the late 1980s, forces 
in favour of a skills strategy were increasing. The 1990s would see a very 
different situation with the rapid emergence of a skills-oriented Lab. Before 
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discussing in detail the Lab's "skills supply strategy", it would be'helpful to 
review the skill supply practices of IBM-UK and Hursley within the larger 
context of HRM structures and practices. 
SKILLS SUPPLY & THE INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET 
CURRENT SKILL NEEDS & SUPPLY 
The demand and supply of skills within Hursley Lab has been shaped by the 
changing work requirements and, more recently, by changes in the work 
organisation. This pattern has altered requirements for both professional and 
managerial skills. The skill groups have become blurred as the concept of the 
broader professional and balanced manager has taken hold. At the same time, 
devolution and various "skill" experiments have created greater differentiation of 
roles and vertical recombination of skills. The skills inventory below was 
constructed from the interview material and reflects the. skill concepts of the 
- participants. 
Professional Skills. The 100% software mission has increased the importance of 
systems engineering, software development, network transactions, and 
advanced communications. These skills support the activities of the 
Communication Systems business. Software skills related to the CICS products 
remain important. With the exception of the CICS area, these skills are in low 
supply. Depth of expertise has become more important to increase productivity. 
Technical leadership and coaching, usually assumed by the team leader, 
continue to be key to research teams. 
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In the 1990s, the Lab workforce needed to be reshaped at the same time as it was 
being downsized. -This required both retraining and reorganising the support 
facilities. 
"Obtaining the 100% software mission was partly based on 
reputation and partly on skill mix and that you have a few of the 
key core skills to go and develop the mission. " Hursley 
Management Programmes Manager 
In the 1970s, hardware people were rapidly moving towards screen-based work 
as opposed to manipulating objects. The transformation continued in the 1980s 
with people retraining gradually. Whether their level of software skills are 
adequate for the new mission remain a concern. 
"We are beginning to have within the Lab a miss-match of skills. We have a lot of traditional skills. " Hursley Management Programmes Manager 
"You have some younger members of the workforce who have been through a computer science education... Other mature people have learned to programme by hands-on learning. We would like to up their base level. " 2nd Level Hursley Manager 
Senior professionals have come to occupy broad jobs in the professional ladder 
which evolved since the mid 1980s. They are expected to understand the 
business environment, the customer environment, and the pressures on 
people, in addition to possessing technical mastery of the* software product. In 
many areas, they are also expected to do project management and require strong 
interpersonal and influence skills. 
The increasing use of interdisciplinary project teams to bring a product to market 
and to offer consultancy services has obliged Hursley people to have contact with 
marketing people and customers at all stages of the project. Thus interpersonal 
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and presentation skills, broad consultancy skills, and team playing have 
grown in importance. 
"In 1989, managers asked more skill questions: What is needed? 
What have we got to offer which goes beyond support for sales? " 
M&S Personnel Manager 
"We could be pulling on a much wider range of skills ... to provide a total solution to the customer and to work more in a partnership. " 
Manpower Planning Manager at Corporate Personnel. 
With the increasing emphasis on team selling and short-term development 
project teams, personal skills and transferable skills have become more 
important. Graduate recruitment criteria now highlight these skills as well as 
the normal technical skills sought. 
"The total person was always important at IBM, both technical and 
personal, but now it's more critical. " Recruitment Manager at Corporate Personnel. 
The new skillbase and team organisation at Hursley requires team building 
and working skills and an attitude of empowerment. However, team 
leaders seem to lack the skill to differentiate types of decision situations. 
Training has tried to address these requirements. 
"By now they realise that they do not need to agonise over all 
decisions. I think the team leaders just have to grasp the problem. " 
Hursley 2nd Line Manager 
To enhance IBM's scientific profile, researchers need to have the corresponding 
interpersonal skills to complement their technical skills. This rounded 
professional would be able to initiate and develop external involvement and 
act as a bridge between the Lab and the outside. 
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Managerial Skills. The main technical managerial skills include project 
scoping, project management and control of resources. In the early 1980s 
and beyond, IBM ensured, through training, that its managers had a balance of 
task and people skills. These skills were considered very relevant for the R&D 
environment where technical bias prevails. Recently change management 
skills have become important for all managers. 
"It is important that we have managers that adapt to change and 
are happy in a changing environment and feel not threatened. " 
Hursley Management Programmes Manager 
Team working and the software mission have increased the importance of skills 
management and coaching. Team working has also changed the managerial 
emphasis away from direction and control and towards leadership: 
interpersonal skills, external awareness, ability to champion change, strategic 
planning skills, and ability to balance the needs of the individual, team, and 
business. The availability of these skills remains uncertain. 
The above inventory of skill needs and supply are addressed by two overlapping 
but independent processes: the core HRM policies and practices of IBM, and 
concerted skill supply practices. Both processes impact on the skillbase as 
mediated by the internal labour market (ILM) which is described below. 
INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET 
IBM operates a well defined internal labour market with limited recruitment, 
promotion from within, and lifetime employment. On average, turnover rates of 
3-6% were experienced in IBM-UK and Hursley in the 1980s. 
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Recruitment & Turnove . Recruitment in the 1980s was strong throughout IBM- 
UK in the first half, and thereafter irregular (see Table 4.1). Fresh graduates 
accounted for a growing percentage of recruits. Turnover remained at 3-4% and 
increased as of 1989 in response to release schemes. In 1991, almost no 
recruitment took place, and turnover climbed to 15% with restructuring and 
downsizing. That year, Hursley released its share of managers and professionals. 
At Hursley turnover rates remained at 5-6% with people in their early 30s as the 
most prominent leak (see Table 4.2). The Lab has lost a few first line managers 
who were specifically targeted by poachers or lured by the lifestyle of the 
American west coast. These few losses were regretted, as well as the occasional 
loss of people from the executive resources programme dissatisfied with their I 
progress. Some professionals were lost because of their misfit with team working 
or their desire for a "socially worthwhile" job. 
Promotion 
-from 
Within forms part of the tradition of commitment to "full 
employment". An extensive posting system exists within the UK and world-wide. 
Depending on the expected availability of candidates with skills, management 
chooses to post within the division only, UK wide, or world-wide. A regular two- 
way flow exists between Hursley and the U. S. labs as part of executive 
development. Within Hursley, promotion from within acts as an Oimportant 
motivator. 1.0 
"We tell employees on day one that the opportunity to progress 
depends upon your own skills and talents and the way you apply 
yourself. Not only do we not recruit but we are actually pretty 
proud that we do not recruit. " Lab Management Programmes 
Manager 
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Some divisions have at times refused to post jobs for fear of losing critical skills. 
When prompted by senior line managers, Personnel would intervene to help find 
a solution. 
"The personnel manager would be empowered to arrange a 
compromise. Marketing wanted to recruit from Hursley which did 
not want to lose these people. The Lab eventually agreed to do the 
programming. " Senior Personnel Consultant 
Use of Contractors. For decades IBM has used sub-contractors in core and non- 
core areas. In the 1970s individuals and teams of programmers increasingly were 
brought on-site at Hursley, and some pieces of work began to be given off-site. 
Within Hursley no concerted policy was set. Management used contractors as a 
buffer for the peaks and troughs in work demands. Contractors received up to 
triple the salary of its regular researchers, and their long-term use has led to 
morale problems. Concerns have also risen about training people from the 
outside on new products instead of IBM people. 
"We ought to have our own people working on new products for 
motivational reasons and certainly for building core skills. We 
tended to put contractors in where we needed them on an 
expediency basis. " CICS 2nd Line Manager 
Use of Part Timers. -In 
Hursley part-timers were extensively used in support 
areas, and the full-time complement of positions was reserved for researchers. 
While part-timers benefited from the full employment policy, they were not on 
the headcount. 
Both sub-contractors and part-timers have become steady sources of recruitment 
for full-time positions in manufacturing and the Lab. This practice has worried 
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Personnel which argues in favour of open competition to find the best possible 
candidate. 
M&Iity. Under normal circumstances, movement took place because of career 
development, personal reasons or a desire to change job. IBM offered financial 
and general assistance. Geography and multiple sites play a role, favouring M&S 
and disadvantaging Manufacturing and Development. Personnel and line 
managers have complained about the unwillingness of some people to relocate for 
strictly business requirements. Typically line managers handle mobility issues 
unless the transfer of large numbers of persons is involved. 
HUALAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AS CONTEXT 
TRADITIONAL HRM UNDER PRESSURE 
IBM Corporation has a long tradition of valuing its employees, dating back to the 
1950s and 1960s, through core policies of full employment, single status, 
employee fle3dbility, and employee influence. These policies are underpinned by 
the belief in respect for the dignity of the individual and appropriate rewards 
(individual merit pay). 
Staying abreast of technical change while maintaining full employment are 
pursued through workforce planning and internal promotion, generous use of 
education and retraining programmes, willingness to pay people for the expenses 
and problems of moving, and a willingness on the part of employees to accept the 
need for skill changes. 
This commercial version of lifetime employment was supported by the corporate 
personnel function which viewed itself as the guardian of HRM. While changes 
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were made to adapt to a changing internal and external environment, only 
organisation-wide. incremental adjustments were supported. Hursley Lab was 
able to organise the work as desired, but corporate people policies and practices 
were respected. By 1990, the world-wide IBM organisation was undergoing major 
change as incremental adjustments had failed to improve revenues and profits. 
The personnel function was slimmed and personnel systems were modernised to 
support line managers. Hursley would emerge as somewhat smaller, focused on 
software, and with a new function called Skills Development. 
PERSONNEL FUNCTION & STYLE 
While the line manager was primarily responsible for managing people, 
Personnel saw itself as defender of the core people policies. Within the Hursley 
Lab, personnel was divided into three areas: (1) personnel operations for routine 
administration, (2) personnel systems and support where four personnel officers 
supported senior managers and offered consultancy, and (3) management 
programmes (see Figure 4.2). IBM-UK gradually imposed standard policies and 
procedures on Hursley over the decades by filling the position of Lab Personnel 
Chief, introducing a common patrol system (early 1980s), and centralising files in 
IBM-UK (1992). The Lab Personnel Chief has a difficult balancing act: 
"First, I had to satisfy the Lab Director. Second, we were part of a 
network of U. S. labs. I went there six times a year to compare U. S. 
and UJL personnel policies and practices .... Third, personnel 
policies and practices had to be in line with IBM-UK which would 
get upset otherwise. " (Previous Lab Personnel Chief) 
Personnel people included personnel specialists and line managers with a track 
record. The latter typically remained for a few years to champion a current 
"issue" on a project basis and broaden their experience. The Lab benefited from 
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many on-site services which gave line managers a high level of administrative 
assistance. 
"The philosophy in development was, we are here to manage the 
task of developing products and we have not got time for personnel 
type activity. " Hursley Management Programmes Manager 
The reorganisation of 1991-92 transferred personnel responsibilities to line 
managers, but with less discretion. Filling key vacancies was controlled by new 
coordinating bodies. 
PERSONNEL SYSTEMS 0 
Until recently, IBM-UK and Hursley Personnel were supported by a 1970s 
personnel system which was paper and people intensive, and operated on a 
mainframe system. It generated individual employee profiles and aggregate 
reports. 
Anticipating the key role of line managers, planning for an on-line distributed 
system with user-friendly icons began in 1990. Line managers will call up an 
individual's file by name and insert decisions on screen (eg., performance 
appraisals and rewards) which evoke action elsewhere in the organisation. The 
system also would situate the individual in the job and the organisation, 
contained detailed skill information, capture vacancies and people availability, 
and serve the individual for career development and training. At this point, little 
discussion has taken place on strategic skills and on helping managers think 
about it. 
"We are now moving into the area of what skills does the business 
need to operate. This is a far bigger question. " Personnel Systems 
Planner. 
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Parallel to the development of the above system were independent efforts by both 
Hursley Lab (started in 1991) and M&S. Their experience would help guide the 
skill components of the HRM system. 
RECRUITMENT PRACTICES 
Stable recruitment practices were in effect with changes in the numbers of fresh 
and experienced graduates recruited. Corporate Personnel handled the front-end 
and the Lab the back-end (offer of employment). Graduate recruitment includes 
the national milkrun followed by a second interview in the operations area and a 
group influence exercise. Týypically line managers become involved at all stages. 
Graduates are judged in a holistic manner. Recently, more emphasis is being 
placed on personal skills and transferable skills. 
The 1991 milkrun was cancelled because of the recession and absence of business 
growth. In 1992 graduate recruitment was expected to number 40-50, well below 
the average level of 250 in the 1980s. Only fixed-term contracts of 4 years 
duration would be offered. 
Within IBM-UK generally, more experienced graduates were hired in 1990 than 
fresh graduates (249 vs 236). Within Hursley, the reverse was true as of 1986, 
reflecting the difficulties of recruiting expensive software professionals. In the 
past skill considerations in recruitment were generally very crude. 
"When I worked in CICS programming-we wanted to get a 
balance between graduates and non-graduates, so we recruited 25 
graduates and 25 experienced people. And that is as scientific as 
we do our skills planning. " HRM Systems Planner 
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Internal IBM movement flows through the job posting system, but managers also 
make use of their personal networks and word-of-mouth. Though formally 
discouraged, the informal route is exploited by first and second line managers 
within the Lab when confronted with skill shortages. 
TRAINING PRACTICES & PROGRAM31ES 
Within IBM-UK, the training and education programme was part of corporate 
Personnel. Operating primarily out of Newplace, a wide variety of courses are 
offered: technical, personal development, and managerial development. On 
average each employee receives 10 days per year of training and education. The 
programmes address both regular personal development needs, work-related 
requirements, and reskilling for redeployment. In addition they act as the main 
lever of corporate-wide programmes such as the technical vitality programme 
and the managerial rebalancing programme (people and task considerations) of 
the early 1980s. Rebalancing was viewed as very successful and appropriate for 
Hursley. 
Hursley made use of IBM-UK's training organisation for general management 
training, but maintained a separate education programme and facilities. The 
Programme services the needs of team leaders and senior technical people, 
sometimes in collaboration with other IBM labs. While the line manager helps to 
identify the individual's skill and development needs and corresponding courses 
as part of the yearly career planning exercise, it remains the responsibility of the 
individual to enrol in them. Hursley Education advertises a list of courses for the 
next three to six months. 
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Within an area, structured education in the processes, tools and products are 
offered for new arrivals and redeployment. Thereafter formal training and on- 
the-job training are intertwined. 
"There is a road map laid out which gives you the sort of courses 
that we expect people to go through. " CICS First Line Manager 
Graduate Traininz. In 1988-89, graduate training was reorganised away from the 
intensive formal classroom environment in response to graduates eager to have a 
"real job". The GEM programme provides for both rapid job placement and 
training in modules tied to the job over 18 to 24 months. The initial 3 week 
induction moves people around to acquaint them with the different areas. Mutual 
expectations are built into the system. 
"This training commitment is written into their employment 
contract to make sure that pressures of work and management do 
not actually forget about it or force it out so that we cannot do it. " Hursley Personnel Officer 
Controlling Costs. In 1989, corporate personnel introduced the policy requiring 
executive sponsorship for any new training and education development work. 
Now each course has an executive sponsor who is responsible for the yearly 
review and for modification requests. 
"We are more focused than before. In the past, we would supply 
trainers without asking too many questions. " Corporate Personnel 
Manager 
With reorganisation and the slimming of corporate personnel (1991-92), 
Education and Training responsibilities were contracted to Skillbase Inc. It has 
taken over the long-term leased building and the curriculum of courses. The cost 
savings to IBM were significant, and training became more focused. However, the 
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smaller workforce in Skillbase has less flexibility in responding to short-notice 
requests. The new arrangement has meant little change for line managers who 
had already adjusted to the requirement for executive sponsorship of education 
initiatives. 
REDEPLOYMENT & DOWNSIZING 
Within IBM, there was a general belief that the training and education function 
could reskill people for new areas. By the mid 1980s IBM-UK began to redeploy 
growing numbers of support people into revenue-generating positions. The 
percentage of customer-facing employees jumped from 45% in 1986 to 60% in 
1990. This redeployment was accompanied by gradual workforce reduction. The 
financial crisis of 1991 pushed management to accelerate the restructuring and 
the accompanying downsizing. 
11 ... moving more employees into the field, streamlining our 
organisation, shortening reporting lines and devolving decision 
making. The process will continue. " 1989 IBM-UK Annual Review 
p5. 
Hursley experienced gradual redeployment with changes in skill requirements. 
Displaced employees generally went to other areas in the Lab, but some were 
transferred into the growth area of M&S in systems support. The Lab also 
underwent downsizing in the 1991-92 restructuring, and saw its hardware 
missions transferred wholly to the manufacturing plants. 
VOLUNTARY RETIREMENTS & REDUNDANCIES 
Corporate Personnel had the task of creating release programmes to meet 
downsizing targets. Initiated in 1987, early retirement packages were 
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successively offered and came to cover younger age groups. Workforce turnover 
percentages are presented below. 
Year Early Retirement Total 
& Releases Turnover 
1987 2.4 3.1 
1988 n. a. 3.3 
1889 1.2 4.3 
1990 3.1 5.0 
1991 12.7 15.0 
1992 5.4 7.2 
Source: IBM-UK Annual Reviews 
Between 1987 and 1989, persons targeted had long service or were 58 years of 
age or more. Each business area helped to identify candidates. The offer was not 
publicised and individuals were not pressured. 
In 1990 a major programme was launched with incentives for job categories and 
age groups. A different package was needed for persons 56-58 years of age who 
tended to desire two more years of employment. Skillbase was set up for that 
purpose. The following year witnessed major downsizing which impacted on 
Hursley Lab. Voluntary redundancy took place for the first time under the 
Careers Transition Programme. 
Certain groups of employees were targeted based on skill and age considerations 
with the 40-50 age bulge as the principle challenge (Peach, 1992). Preserving 
scarce skills important for business and forecasting take-up rates were important 
considerations. The process began with a study of desired versus existing 
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headcounts and ratios and gradually worked its way to departments where local 
managers were involved. 
The main target were senior professionals and managers on the support side 
earning more than E31,000. Improved pension was accompanied by paid leave of 
absence to find other jobs, outplacement services including Skillbase, and an 
opportunity to purchase their company car. Spin-offs also took place: property 
services, the transfer of professional and management development training to 
Skillbase, and the creation of Lexmark to sell IBM equipment and printers. 
Exclusion (and consequently retention) took place at three levels: whole 
departments were excluded (eg., those offering consulting services); managers 
could select individuals and dissuade them from volunteering on the basis of 
their skills or high potential; and when the total number of applications in a 
department threatened its capability to continue business, some offers were 
withheld. However, the demanding downsizing targets of 1991 meant that 
managers had difficulty in protecting valued skills. 
"Information on skills were accessed through job titles, business 
area, and knowledge of the local manager. " Senior Personnel 
Consultant 
Over 2,000 employees accepted the offer. Surprisingly, 265 employees under the 
age of 40 volunteered and were accepted; among them were younger women who 
saw an opportunity to fulfil family goals and responsibilities. 
CAREER AUNAGEMENT 
In the mid 1970s IBM introduced career management systems and officers to 
address the needs of its aging employees and reassure them of career 
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opportunities despite the slow business growth. The 1980s witnessed a push 
towards self-directed career management in IBM-UK. Dissatisfaction with job 
postings led to employee's wanting to do more of their own career management. 
According to the attitude surveys, employees generally saw the job posting 
system as unfair with the job going to a pre-destined candidate. Hursley Lab 
responded to this perception in the early 1980s by a formal policy to post all 
vacancies and giving all interested persons the opportunity to apply. This remedy 
failed. Sometimes a department of five persons would be reorganised when one 
person left, giving rise to four enriched positions and no replacement. Even if 
there was a replacement, the posted job would group tasks considered 
undesirable by those already in the unit. 
In the late 1980s, the Lab Director responded to continued employee 
dissatisfaction. A new career management system was put on-line in 1989-90, 
jointly managed by the employees and immediate managers, and part of the 
informal appraisal counselling system. It allowed individuals to list their skills, 
include a free text curriculum vitae, and learn about the skill requirements of 
other jobs. As it happened, with the reorganisation of 1991 the new system 
assisted redeployment through key word searching, and was little used in career 
planning. 
Career Paths. The dual career path of management and professional was 
established decades ago with professionals able to attain a high job level and a 
salary of 150,000 plus. However few such positions exist in comparison to 
management positions. 
"In the early years, people drifted in and out of management. There 
was a lack of technical leadership as people sought more rewards 
and recognition by going into management. " Hursley Personnel 
Officer 
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At Hursley, the professional path was modified in the mid 1980s. Senior positions 
became broader and included business and customer understanding and an 
appreciation of people dynamics. This modification was part of the medium-term 
plan to downsize IBM and its labs, and delevel management ranks. 
MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT AT HURSLEY 
Management Programmes (M. P. ) Manager has two inter-related responsibilities: 
the appointment of new managers and job changes for existing managers; and 
executive resourcing for rapid development. This long established area aims to 
.I 
enhance the skills of the entire management team in counter-balance to local 
preoccupations. ýWith the reorganisation, a more pro-active approach has been 
adopted. 
Executive Resourcing has three established programmes: (1) Early Eye for fresh 
graduates involving identifying their potential in the first four years of their 
employment and specifying their special needs to achieve this potential; (2) High 
Management Potential for people usually in their thirties who are thought to be 
executive material for the Lab and elsewhere; and (3) High Technical Potential 
for those capable of becoming the best in their field. 
The M. P. Manager follows up a line request for filling a position by matching the 
specific work requirements to his lists and current information, and proposing 1- 
3 candidates. The line manager does the final selection for junior management 
positions. For senior positions, the Lab Director assumes responsibility. 
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0 The downsizing of the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the management group 
drop from 300 to 180; managerial layers were removed and non-managerial 
positions given broader responsibilities. Management development activities 
were broadened to include senior professionals and team leaders, for a total of 
400. This trend was reinforced in 1991 by the Lab Director's decision to include a 
larger audience at the bi-monthly plenary management meeting. 
"Some of the team leaders and technical heavy-weights were made 
part of the greater team. They are not actually management but 
they are starting to become more like managers. " Hursley 
Management Programmes Manager 
RESPONDING TO THE 1990S - SKILLBASE INC. 
IBM-UK had some regrets in losing the skills of retirees. At the same time, IBM- 
UK was planning to expand its consultancy services, particularly the high end of 
the consultancy business. Based on IBM experience elsewhere, Skillbase was 
established in 1990 as a joint venture between IBM-UI& and nine of its senior 
people taking retirement. It offered a wide range of consultancy services 
(strategic and business planning, corporate communications, operational 
efficiency, education & training) at competitive rates thanks to its low overhead 
costs. The initial "programme" included 350 IBM retirees placed on a registry. 
Following other release programmes, the registry quickly grew to 1200 IBM 
people less and less old. IBM-UK quickly saw that Skillbase could also take over 
its Education & T! raining function, a non-core activity. The company trusted its 
ex-IBM people to deliver an appropriate and reliable service at a savings of 30%. 
"It had created a unique pool of people that it knows and can 
trust .... it could not possibly put it into the market place and lose 
control. " Skillbase Manager 
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Skillbase has also acted as marketing channel for a few products with short life 
expectancies, thus giving IBM-UK additional flexibility. In February 1992 
Skillbase accepted the responsibility for 3000 BT retirees. Also, it expected to 
pick up 30 to 60 IBM-UK retirees per year. No skill gaps were experienced or 
expected in the future. 
The consultants have proven to be excellent in their work, and have 
demonstrated more fle3dbility in work assignments involving major 
displacements. So far, Skillbase has had no impact on Hursley. 
"The general reaction is that they are absolutely fantastic ... He likes it and cannot believe how lovely it is to do one job at a time. " 
Skillbase Manager - 
CONCLUSION: HRM & SKILL SUPPLY PATTERNS 
The above review of HRM practices and programmes demonstrates the volume of 
resources which were dedicated to the management of the ILM. One clear theme 
to emerge is that of historical continuity around the corporate policy of lifetime 
employment with small incremental changes introduced in recruitment, training 
and development, and exiting to modify the ILM for business requirements. 
While corporate programmes were rolled out periodically to address a skill issue, 
the management of the Lab's skillbase appeared to be a bottom-up and 
incremental process within the framework of corporate policies. 
A second theme presents itself by the amplitude of change in the 1990s. The 
traditional management of the ILM was becoming difficult; new levers and 
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approaches were introduced to resize and reshape the internal workforce. The 
diminishing role. of the personnel function and the growing role of the line 
manager in personnel administration were counter-balanced by the growing role 
of the middle manager in managing the downsizing, redeployment and reskilling. 
This new arrangement of responsibilities in HRM brought more emphasis on 
organisation-wide business requirements. This theme suggests that the ERM 
context within Hursley had become more favourable for the emergence of a skills 
supply strategy. To be fair to the personnel function, workforce planning and skill 
audits were not new activities. A review of these activities is presented below to 
assess their skills preoccupation, followed by the more recent and promising 
developments called Hursley Skills Development. 
INTENTIONAL SKILL SUPPLY PAIMPERNS 
WORKFORCE MANNING 
Manpower planning within IBM-UK is integrated into the 5 year strategic 
business plan; components include workforce, revenue, expense, and 
compensation. The expected level of revenue would dictate the workforce levels. 
A one and two year operating plan ensures its implementation and control. The 
main tool of manpower planning is the personnel data system which includes 
patrol. 
Targets for recruitment, redeployment and exiting are adjusted to achieve 
desired staff ratios (support/non-support). With the business shift towards 
software and services, manpower planning has focused on rebalancing the 
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workforce. Desired ratios have changed. In 1985 45% were working directly with 
customers; by the end of 1992 the figure was to reach 70%. 
A variety of assumptions are made to generate the manpower plans, such as the 
U. K. economy and employment prospects, and historic wastage rates by 
geographic and business area. Manpower planning also recognises contract types: 
permanent, expensive core people; people with contracts from 6 months to 4 
years; and contracted services (e. g., security). This peripheral workforce 
gradually has grown in importance. 
Manpower planning views skills as a product of the organisational structure with 
skill groups limited to macro labels such as managers and professionals of a 
given level in a certain business area. Skill acquisition and development are seen 
as remote concerns. 
4; 
"At the individual level, you may be saying, do I have the right individual for a key job in the future. Am I retaining the right' 
quality in a selective way? That perspective is not one that I need to concern myself about. " Manpower Planning Manager 
A tenuous link existed between IBM-UK manpower planning and Hursley. The 
workforce planning of Hursley was centrally done in Armonk in response to 
mission and budget allocations. IBM-UK overlayed to ensure a balance across 
divisions for career movement, and to balance the presence of M&S with 
Manufacturing and Development. As corporate citizen, IBM responded to 
government concerns about equity of investment across countries and balance of 
payments. 
Because the Lab had a variety of software and hardware missions, workforce 
planning became a bottom-up exercise from the product areas coor9dinated by the 
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strategy planning group. The recent emergence of the software mission and the 
creation of Skills Development has introduced a middle-down and lab-wide 
approach to skills planning. 
SKILLS PLANNING 
Skill audits within IBM-UK were used repeatedly to address redeployment 
requirements. Entry skills and subsequent work experience were reviewed for 
the changing work requirements. Each audit was driven by a single purpose and 
situation, and was short-lived. 
01 ... a line manager was put into personnel to push the initiative. The initiative usually died soon after this person moved on to 
another job. Typically the skills data base remains useful for no 
more than three years. " Senior Personnel Consultant 
IBM-UK also would learn of skill planning systems developed and used in other 
parts of corporate IBM, but management would choose not to adopt them because 
of adjustment and maintenance costs. 
In the early 1980s the Havant plant created a skills planning system to profile its 
workforce. The plant needed to demonstrate the availability of the right skills for 
product bidding. Management developed its own data base with aggregates of 
number of people with types of experience. It was deemed very successful as a 
strategic planning tool and less so as an education planning tool. 
The same system was installed at Hursley for education planning. A recent 
review called for important changes. Hursley managers needed a talent data base 
to find individual employees with skills desperately needed for a given project. 
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The Lab periodically tried to develop skill systems and skill inventories in the 
1970s and 1980s. Employees could not be persuaded to wade through long lists of 
skills. Recently, the Lab introduced a system where individuals voluntarily insert 
on-line their job history. The data base can be searched with key words (eg. APL 
coupled with large mainframes). Currently (1992), 600 of the 1400 professionals 
have done so, mostly those seeking new jobs. 
New Professions Proaramme (Skillplan 2). This world-wide programme was 
introduced in 1991 in IBM-UK (1992 in Hursley) to foster expert professionals 
through a skill certification process. Expert senior professional positions are 
included, covering 10% of the workforce. A tailored compensation plan exists with 
a new career ladder that builds upon that of the systems engineer. 
An individual can profile on-line his skills or competencies against those attached 
to seven senior positions, interpersonal skills and higher level cognitive skills, 
and identify training requirements. There are also internal review bodies of 
professionals (not managers) who specify additional practicioner knowledge and 
certify their competencies. Line managers will only be able to fill these positions 
with certified people. 
Currently the programme remains isolated and almost invisible. Few promotion 
opportunities, lack of management buy-in, and absence of a UK champion have 
slowed down its introduction. Indeed a fundamental change in perception of 
business requirements was at issue. Meanwhile, the Lab had launched its own 
skill-based programmes. 
"The programme needs a UK champion. We also suffer from a "not 
invented here" syndrome. " M&S Skills Manager 
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"Before, we wanted generalists, but now we want expert 
professionals. " M&S Skills Manager 
Impact of Mixed Missions and Single Coherent One. The internal structure and 
politics of the Lab mirrored the missions with each group owning and controlling 
its own resources. The new focus on software and the clear reporting line to 
Communications Systems prompted a reappraisal of skill planning practices 
(1991). 
"With many masters it was very difficult to achieve stability and 
equally it was very easy to confuse them all ... Now with a single 
owner ... you can make all of the management decisions on 
allocation of skills within your own boundaries. " CICS 2nd Line 
Manager 
"The time has never been better to have a laboratory-wide look at 
the skills it needs. " Hursley Personnel Officer 
HURSLEY SKILLS DEVELOPMENT 
In late 1991, Skills Development was created, composed of the Skills Board and 
the Skills Process Council, and headed by Paul Gibson reporting directly to the 
Lab Director. It aimed to satisfy strategic rather than tactical skill requirements 
and individual career needs. Adjusting internal and external recruitment 
practices, reconceptualising the education programme, and creating new 
structures were the main levers. 
"Typically we hire externally 30 to 40 people. Compare that with 
the 300 to 400 people that move internally every twelve months. " 
Skills Development Head 
Skills Board. In order to redeploy some 400 hardware people (1990), a staffing 
committee was created composed of second line managers. Relying on personnel 
information and placement opportunities, the committee relocated people into 
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software and support activities. Little choice was given to either the people 
relocated or the managers receiving them. During this period all career 
movement was frozen. 
"We had to create some stability and generally speaking, the 
cooperation of all employees was very high .... This (redeployment) has never happened before on such a scale. " CICS 2nd Line 
Manager 
Redeployment was helped by the presence of some transferable skills. On the 
other hand, the self-taught programming skills of many hardware people meant 
that some un-learning was needed as well. Other areas were obliged to pursue 
new software work related to mainframes but different from CICS. People with 
different backgrounds (hardware, and software for workstations) were brought 
together. Local expertise was built from scratch. 
"There were no local experts on this software to say what sort of 
education was required. It was a question of people learning together. " Hursley Blue Manager 
In 1991 the staffing committee became the Skills Board with the addition of 
members of the business community, and received a new remit: identify the skill 
needs and supply across the Lab and manage shortages. In 1991-92, 
strengthening the core productive activities guided redeployment. The e3dsting 
HRM systems such as the employee development plan and job posting were 
viewed as serving the needs of individuals and not the business. Because of the 
rigidity of rewards dictated by corporate policy, comfort factors and innovative 
work dominated their choices. Job preferences have led to manpower imbalances 
with some Lab areas running under headcount because they were unable to 
attract people from within. The Skills Board was given control of the Quarterly 
Control Figures, the headcount across areas and positions opening and 
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diminishing in them. A voluntary system with an open job market was 
maintained. In addition the individual would be provided with information 
outlining the business needs and the effects on career and the personal choices 
being made. 
"We control the advertising of the skills within the Lab. So while 
we cannot make people go to particular places, we can manage the 
opportunity for people to move. " Skill Development Head 
Given that the recruitment process was one of the few levers that the Skills 
Board could influence, it used it extensively. Recently the Board instructed a 
department to advertise externally only in order to avoid internal transfers of 
scarce skills. The expectation remains that line managers retain ownership of the 
groups and encourage people to join their groups. -However, people no longer 
require permission of their line managers to apply for another job. Discu9sions 
are underway to target specific universities and specific groups and "attracting 
the right sort of people to be interested in IBM". 
Skills Process Council. This managing board is chaired by the Skills Development 
Head and composed of HRM related individuals from across the Lab. It deals 
with the management and growth of tactical skills, those related to immediate 
project needs. It also helps to define the "skill process" within a two to five year 
horizon and to sell the priorities across areas. The Council has a growing policy 
role in how skills move back and forth in the Lab (recruitment, release, 
complementary workforce, management development, assignment programmes). 
It also concerns itself with productivity. 
"We need to educate and persuade the producers of the Lab to use 
this technique (code re-use). It needs to be done in an 
organisational way. " Skills Development Head 
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SHAPING THE SKILLBASE 
In addition to recruitment controls, the Skills Board tried to redress the skills 
imbalance by attracting planners and managers back into their previous 
technical roles. The Restart or Transition Programme prompted a 
reevaluation of the use made of the management inventory. An annual review 
would take place with continued inclusion dependent on management 
performance. Exclusion would mean that the person would not qualify for 
management promotions and would not be taken back into the management 
stream if the person left for a career move. 
"We are taking some management action to say, in future the 
rewards, promotions, career paths will be advantageous in direct 
areas compared to support areas including management. " CICS 2nd Line Manager 
Skills Development set up an industry involvement initiative (Mentoring or 
Outward Looking Programme) where 30 senior technical people voluntarily agree 
to branch out into the broader community, attend meetings and "realise that 
there are more solutions outside this Lab than inside. " These people act as 
mentors for an equal number of juniors. A point system was set up to rate 
performance and after six months, non performers would be replaced. The Vast 
Technical Development Course was created for participants. Course content 
included both interpersonal skills training and technical material. The Skills 
Development Head has included the criterion of outside involvement for senior 
promotions. Line management reactions have been mixed to the idea of including 
outside participation in the regular appraisal. 
0 
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"A lot of managers did not want it. What will it do to my travel 
budget? Others, just the opposite: It is absolutely the right thing to 
do. " Skills Development Head 
Technical leadership became important within the focused mission. The 
reorganisation in the late 1991 and the activities of Skills Development led to the 
extended technical path, and some visible promotions. In order to ensure that 
productive technical people are not enticed into a planning (senior technical 
positions) or a management role, a third career path is being considered, that of 
Producer. 
Initial work on skills development revealed that the courses offered by Hursley 
were employee driven and provided according to employee preferences. 
Rethinking education for skills management led to use of the term "skill 
creatioxel. 
... we are getting away from thinking about delivering courses, teaching and running classes, and more into an interactive role 
with the (business) areas that need to grow their skills. " Skills DeveloPment Head 
"How many people do we need to have with transferable skills and be able 
to move them from A to B and so on? We are quite new at this game. " Hursley Management Programmes Manager 
With the new software mission, newly assembled teams have to achieve high 
performance as quickly as possible in a new area. This has proven to be difficult 
to achieve. A pilot project involved keeping teams together for longer periods of 
time, training them together and transferring them together to a new project. 
With the lower headcount, managers have become more sensitive to the effects of 
previous contracting practices. The use of contract people was easily justified: 
their lower overhead translated into profit for the Lab. The needed skills were 
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obtained through contracting without concern for the longer term effects. Some 
software skills were not developed internally (eg., Unix), and there was more 
growth of contract and coordinating managers. The Restart Programme has 
helped to pull work back into the ILM, but skill levels are too low. 
"We have lost the ability to do it ourselves in some cases.... We 
mended the workload based on expediency. " Hursley Line Manager 
"If you hire sub-contract staff on the site, then some of your IBM 
people end up being coordinated and run by the contractors and are 
moving further away from the front-line action. " Skills 
Development Head 
The Skills Board has given second line managers an organisational mechanism to. 
influence the Lab's skillbase, and has helped to cement this new emphasis in 
their work. With all Lab areas represented by knowledgeable line managers, we 
can conclude that harmonisation of short-term and long-term skill requirements 
are more likely. 
CONCLUSION: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
Manpower planning was part of the HRM framework supporting lifetime 
employment, and paid limited attention to skills. In contrast, skills planning had 
elements of SKISS in that skills were defined in relation to a larger business 
consideration, but lacked coherence and consistency over time. Hursley Skills 
Development has shown more promise. Driven by the mission change and the 
concurrent downsizing and restructuring, the skills strategy was anchored in the 
Lab Director and led to numerous structural and programme changes supported 
by changes in HRM policies and practices. Unfortunately, as of May 1992, Paul 
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Gibson moved on to Software Development Operations. In the past, the departure 
of the champion doomed the planning system. 
HARD & SOFT BENEFITS 
In this section, changes in hard and soft benefits are reviewed, as well as the 
intention to retain (and recruit) critical skills for business success. Were benefits 
combined and changed in a coherent manner for a skill-related purpose? 
HARD BENEFITS 
Throughout IBM, standard hard benefits (base salary, benefits, incentives and 
pay policies) have been the norm for decades and were driven by equity and 
market considerations. In many cases, little change has taken place. Hursley Lab 
adheres to the IBM-UK policies and practices. Interviewees consistently 
minimized the importance of hard benefits as retention benefits. The total 
package was deemed competitive and attractive, but also treated as a given. The 
changes in 1991 and 1992 were considered worrisome, but did not alter their 
perceptions on hard benefits. 
(1) Base Salary 
Standard conditions are offered to all employees in the form of a personal 
contract. Each job level has a base salary range of 100-150% to reward 
exceptional performance. Base salary is set by the market mid-Point for 
comparable work in selected competitors based on industry surveys. The relative 
value of each job is assessed through an IBM world-wide point system. 
CHAPTER FO UX- IBM- ETK CASE S77MY PAGE 130 
In 1990, salary increases (1-2% in taxable cash) or shares (non-taxable)) were 
linked to targeted increases in customer satisfaction as measured by an 
independent industry survey. There was no increase in satisfaction and hence no 
payout the following year. The scheme also became inoperable with the business 
downturn. In 1991 IBM-UK imposed the first ever pay freeze, effectively a 
decrease given the fact that IBM never offered cost-of-living adjustments. 
(2) Benefits 
All employees receive the same pension, medical cover for sickness and accident, 
vacation entitlement, life assurance, and travel accident protection, with some 
service-related entitlements. IBM aims to be above average on the overall 
package of benefits. 
Changes in Pension Benefits. In the early 1980s penalties for early retirement 
acted as a retention mechanism. Early retirement programmes were introduced 
in 1987 and thereafter. With repeated offers, more money was considered 
ineffective. Typically the offer included diminishing the 3% per year penalty for 
early retirement, and adding a lump-sum payment. In mid 1990 and guided by 
internal surveys, expensive employees were offered full pension, a lump-sum 
payment, and 90 days of consultancy through Skillbase for each of two years 
following retirement. The package was equivalent to their current salary. 
Equally important was the continued relationship with IBM-LTM 
"They all had some degree of fatigue and agreed that they could 
live on their pension and the lump sum .... They all felt they had a tremendous amount of knowledge and ability and experience to 
contribute. " Skillbase Manager 
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Subsequent releases targeted younger employees with long service, but the 90 
days of consultancy was not offered. For persons aged 48-49, pension adjustments 
were considered inappropriate as they likely would continue to work. However, 
their pension was made payable as of 50 years of age and the lump sum was 
improved. All could seek the services of Skillbase for some casual work. 
Hursley was affected by the 1991 and 1992 releases. Some managers and 
professionals disappeared, but the impact was less dramatic than elsewhere in 
IBM-LTK. 
Incentives 
Awards. Programmes of awards have been offered for decades including special 
contribution, exceptional achievement, outstanding technical achievement, 
outstanding innovation, a suggestion programme, and examination success 
awards. About 10% of employees received financial awards each year varying 
from 275 to thousands, many of which were accompanied by certificates and 
plateaus. 
Change in the Employee Stock Purchase Plan. About 70% of employees 
participated in the plan. In 1991 it was replaced by a new plan where each 
employee would receive shares (or cash) equivalent to 1% of their salary if the 
independent industry measure of customer satisfaction rose by 2 points, and 
shares worth 2% of salary for 4 points. With no improvement, no shares were 
distributed. 
CHAPTER FO ErR. IBM- EIK CASE STUDY PAGE 132 
(4) Pay Policies 
IBM had stable pay policies, and only a few important changes took place in the 
1990s: term contracts, and a shorter-term pay orientation. Internal consistency of 
salaries was high world-wide and standard within the UK, though pay secrecy 
was practiced. Pay for performance focused on performance objectives and was 
important: over time, the differential between a high and low performer can 
reach 40%. The principle of single status has led to standard conditions of 
employment and benefits, and pay discussions with the immediate manager can 
take place but rarely lead to salary adjustments. Skill considerations were 
reflected in the training-related goals in the annual performance review. 
History of Contract Types. Fixed-term contracts with high market rates were 
offered to experienced professionals with scarce skills. In 1988, they were offered 
to graduate recruits, but on the regular salary scale, when competition for the 
best was fierce. 
"We targeted a pool of good people who might not work for IBM for 
several reasons, one being a large technical company .... We offer you good programmes to get experience and a bonus at the end of the four years. " Corporate Recruitment Manager 
Graduates perceived both term and permanent positions as real offers. This 
practice continued for targetted groups. With the business performance crisis of 
1991, severe recruitment constraints on permanent headcounts; were introduced. 
Term contracts escaped the official headcount, and managers were able to 
maintain some recruitment through non-salary budgets. In the same time period, 
these contracts were introduced in M&S for the recruitment of retirees with 
specific industry expertise. In this business area, flexibility was the determining 
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factor from the beginning, whereas with graduates it became important under 
recruitment constraints. 
Hursley was different; both fixed term and permanent contracts were used 
frequently. While the Lab sub-contracted at high market rates for scarce skills, it 
also offered individual term contracts on the regular salary scale in support 
areas. 
As of 1992, all graduate employment offers would be fixed four year contracts 
because of the prolonged business downturn. With the completion of the first 
batch of fixed term contracts, personnel insisted on these employees either 
receiving a permanent contract or being released. Hursley line managers were 
arguing for contract renewal, and implicitly questioned the traditional policy of 
lifetime employment. 
Long-term vs Short-term Pay Orientation., The salary scales emphasise long-term 
financial goals through incremental improvements. However the yearly review 
and salary adjustment focus on the short-term. Stock purchase plans are long- 
term, with the exception of the recent linkage with improvement in customer 
satisfaction. The pension is definitely long-term, but the repetition of early 
release schemes has emphasized the short-term. While many of the awards 
target performance within a year or less, others are more long-term such as 
accrual of benefits from a suggestion or patent. All in all, there has been a minor 
pay shift towards the short term. 
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STRATEGIC USE OF EMLRD BENEFITS 
The hard benefits offered in the 1980s were a continuation of the package 
launched in the 1960s. Conceived in a decade of growth, the personal contract 
was meant to ensure competitive recruitment and retention within a policy of 
lifetime employment and single status. Perfor-inance-related pay linked 
performance requirements with financial rewards. 
Introduced in the 1970s, the objective-based performance evaluation presented 
difficulties in defining appropriate objectives for professionals and managers. 
Joint involvement of manager and employee, use of indicators rather than proven 
outcomes, and frequent interim review of objectives helped to make the system 
work. 
Change began to accelerate in the late 1980s with a small shift from long-term to 
short-term pay orientation. Downsizing and the exiting of expensive senior 
employees became pronounced in the 1990s. Pension penalties for early 
retirement were minimized and other incentives added to increase the outflow of 
progressively younger employees. The creation of Skillbase in 1990 helped by 
establishing a mechanism by which consultancy contracts could be offered to 
retiring employees, and IBM would retain access to their skills. 
Fixed-terin contracts were used more widely to recruit graduates and recently 
retired people. This approach permitted some recruitment of strategic skills 
while respecting headcount targets of permanent employees. It also provoked 
serious discussion about the changing commitment of IBM to lifetime 
employment and the nature of employment security. 
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Employees began to share in the risk in 1990 with the basic salary increase 
linked to improvements in customer satisfaction. Senior management sent a clear 
message that salary expectations would have to be in line with business 
performance. 
Overall, then, adjustments have been made to the policies and practices covering 
hard benefits starting in the late 1980s in response to the need for rapid 
improvements in business performance. The pace of change was slow and 
consistent with the strong IBM culture of lifetime employment and respect for 
the individual. Acceleration of change in hard benefits in 1991 was dramatic (e. g., 
salary freeze) and reflected IBM's deteriorating performance in the recession. 
SOFT BENEFITS 
IBM (including Hursley) consistently offered a variety of soft benefits, but 
important changes began to take place in the mid 1980s to improve business 
performance, with numerous changes in the early 1990s. Modifying the 
challenging work, focusing training to business requirements, and redefining 
employment security were the more significant changes. In addition, new ways of 
recognising employee contributions were introduced in the Lab: world-wide 
internal conferences organised by the new IBM Academy (1988), and the Hursley 
Authorship Recognition Programme (1991) rewarding researchers for 
publications and speaking at conferences to increase outward looking and 
visibility. 
Prior to the 1991 reorganisation, forced relocation of hardware staff to the 
manufacturing facilities disrupted community ties. With the reorganisation 
and the slimming of corporate personnel, the annual UK-wide survey of employee 
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satisfaction was abandoned, leaving each business area to decide whether it 
wished to compensate for diminishing formal listening/sensing. The 
reorganisation also froze and then diminished career movement opportunities 
as both managerial and support positions were viewed as costs. However, the 
technical career path was strengthened, and mentoring was introduced in the 
Lab to support team working and outward looking. 
The interviews indicated a recent loss of confidence of IBM employees in the 
future of the firm. In the 1980s, employees continued to believe that IBM was the 
IT leader and accepted the positive views of management shared through 
internal communications. In the 1990s, employees were confronted with 
messages and actions from within corresponding with the external criticisms 
(IBM-UK Annual Reviews, 1991,1992). The deteriorating company image 
became widespread, and IBM survivors began to doubt the future success of their 
firm. 
0 
Modif3dng Challenging Work. Within Hursley, broader technical roles were 
introduced in the mid 1980s and included people responsibilities, a focus on 
revenue-generating, and client contact. The years 1991 and 1992 witnessed 
several changes in the work organisation and job responsibilities. Broader 
technical roles were reinforced, and greater depth of technical skills and 
productivity was emphasised. SPecialised and autonomous groups were 
introduced. 
Simultaneously, management became more involved in assembling teams across 
boundaries, and managing skills in the long-term. With a larger span of control 
after restructuring, they had less involvement at the technical and team level. 
Line managers also took on more personnel administrative work and lost some 
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control over recruitment. Contract managers were redeployed into production 
roles. 
Reactions to these changes have been mixed among professionals, whereas 
managers have accepted the changes as necessary and open to modification. 
Focusing Training on Business Requirements. The training culture of IBM has 
been a strong selling point in attracting people and has made redeployment 
feasible. In response to graduate dissatisfaction, their contracts gained a training 
clause (1988) locking-in job-relevant training. The arrival of a new software 
mission at Hursley (1990) and the subsequent creation of Skills Development has 
prompted more effort to tie training offers to business requirements rather than 
to employee preferences, and recruit skills for long-term business requirements. 
Redefining EmRloylnent Securityt In the 1990s discussions of involuntary layoffs 
have spilled-over from the public forum into IBM itself. With the recent 
downsizing, massive redeployment and new mission of the Lab, people have 
become less secure. The voluntary early release schemes targetted progressively 
younger people. The Career Transition programme targeted younger people who 
were in surplus areas. Persons with key skills were not allowed to benefit. A few 
very good people left and this was viewed as inevitable. The targetting of younger 
people created insecurity for all survivors. 
"People are uneasy about whether IBM is a safe bet. The 
impression is that the attrition rate is lower here than elsewhere. I 
wonder whether the best are leaving. " Coordinator in CICS Area 
Modif3dng Career Development. The organisation also responded to care needs 
expressed around career development. The focusing of graduate training to 
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business requirements was partly a response to graduate criticisms. They wanted 
job-relevant experience and training as soon as possible to become professionals 
in their own right. 
The shift towards self-directed career development in the late 1980s also 
responded to employee dissatisfaction. The new HRM system offered a 
supporting framework, and employees would be given the ability to prompt 
managers to keep material current. 
STRATEGIC USE OF SOFT BENEFITS 
Numerous benefits were changed to support the pressing business requirements 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most of the changes were closely tied to 
performance requirements. Such adjustments have taken place in the past but 
not with the same amplitude. 
The few care-driven changes are understandable when one remembers that IBM 
offered a rich package of soft benefits. Additional enrichment was unlikely. 
A few of the changes were "costs" that IBM was prepared to accept. Deterioration 
in company image was an unavoidable consequence of the 1991 restructuring. 
Increasing employment insecurity was considered unfortunate, and redefining 
lifetime employment was a reactive process. Similarly, the abandonment of 
centrally-sponsored employee surveys was a consequence of the shrinking of 
Personnel. 
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CONCLUSION: COMBINING HARD & SOFT BENEFITS 
People were recruited and retained by IBM through a variety of hard and soft 
benefits: competitive salary and benefits, interesting work, and the image of a 
successful and responsible company. Retention over time also depended on "being 
respected by colleagues". 
Since the mid 1980s, most of the changes in hard and soft benefits aimed to 
improve business performance. The crisis in 1991 provoked multiple changes in 
benefits during and after the restructuring. Performance-related pay was no 
longer sufficient to ensure high business performance. 
IBM believed that it had a winning formula: sophisticated HRM and stable core 
policies of lifetime employment, redeployment through employee flexibility and 
retraining, and respect for the individual. Coupled with performance-related pay 
and an attractive benefits package, IBM believed that incremental internal 
changes were sufficient to master market conditions. The firm, however, had 
great difficulty in adopting a new approach. 
In the author's view, two changes were important steps in producing a new 
approach: use of term contracts, and the creation of Skillbase. The greater use of 
four-year term contracts for graduate recruits proved to be a satisfactory version 
of employment security, to management's surprise. Unfortunately, their wider 
use was being resisted by Personnel. Innovation in stimulating retirements took 
place through a combination of enhanced financial incentives and continuation of 
working relations with colleagues through Skillbase consultancy. 
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In both cases, we note a redefinition of lifetime employment at the beginning and 
end of a person's career through the modification of the employment contract. A 
more fleidble work contract gives the firm access to specialised skills and flexible 
control over headcounts. Furthermore it fits well with employee aspirations. IBM 
has been slow in recognising the changing expectations of young graduates and 
their own mature employees. 
These innovations fit into the IBM strategy of using a network of firms and 
individuals to support the core IBM activities. The spin-offs of the printing 
business (through minority ownership in Lexmark), the property management 
area, and training and education (through Skillbase) involved transferring some 
IBM employees to the employment of the new venture. New terms and conditions I 
of employment are offered with a stronger business-performance link and fewer 
expensive benefits. 
SUPPORTING BUSINESS STRATEGY WITH A 
SKILLS SUPPLY STRATEGY 
A summary of the link between business strategy and components of skill supply 
is presented in Table 4.3. From the perspective of Hursley, four changes in 
business strategy took place in the 1980s and 1990s: the push on manufacturing 
efficiency and quality (1985), greater customer-focus (1985), the dedicated 
software mission (1990), and the productivity drive (1991). 
The integration of the hardware areas of Hursley with the manufacturing plants 
started with cross-functional project teams and joint management teams, and 
ended with the block transfer of the R&D workforce to the plants. Modifications 
in work organisation followed by a structural reorganisation prepared Hursley 
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TABLE 4.3 
LINKING BUSINESS STRATEGY 
& SKILLS SUPPLY IN IBM 
Components Business Strategy 
of Skill Supply 
Efficiency Customer Software Produc- 
& Quality Focus Mission tivity 
1985 1985 1990191 1991 
Initial 
Recruitment x x 
Initial T&D x 
Work Org. /Job Design XXXX 
Perf. Appraisal X 
Compensation X 
Training XXXX 
Career Develop. XX 
Exiting XX 
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for the dedicated software mission. In a similar manner, the push for greater 
customer-focus in IBM-UK was supported by cross-functional teams involving 
Hursley. While the first of these strategic thrusts was incremental and 
opportunistic, the second was explicit with an intentional skills supply pattern. 
However, the pace of change was slow in both cases. 
100% Software Mission. The 1990-91 plan for Hurlsey was for redeployment and 
early releases with careful attention to keep those people with skills supporting 
the new mission. The Lab's managers were mobilised to restructure the Lab with 
a concern for skills. The subsequent creation of the Skills Development area 
helped to cement the new interest in strategic skills. In terms of levers, work 
reorganisation through redeployment, and skill-sensitive releases were applied. 
This explicit skills supply pattern supported the radical and rapid restructuring 
of the Lab. 
Productivity Push. Within Hursley, the redeployment of people into the new 
software areas and the serious shortages of experts in these areas highlighted the 
problem of productivity. Skills Development was created, and thereafter the 
skills board and the skills process council. Recruitment and internal movements 
were carefully controlled to support the new mission; career development was 
oriented towards business requirements. At the same time, restructuring 
experiments were taking place to increase productivity and skill levels: the 
matrix of blue and green managers, and the core and focus groups. In summary, 
the strategic push for greater productivity made explicit use of several skill 
supply levers with the main ones being recruitment and work organisation. 
To what extent were the above skill supply patterns intentional supports for the 
business strategy9 Did the changes in skill supply components reinforce each 
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other? The two strategic changes of 1985 tackled different problems, the first a 
manufacturing concern for quality and efficiency, and the second a general 
problem of costs and productivity with inadequate customer-facing. Each change 
prompted a similar and isolated response from the Lab: incremental changes in 
work organisation. In one sense both strategic changes aimed for closer contact 
with customers whether internal (manufacturing) or external. However, there 
was no evidence of a coordinated strategy involving both thrusts. 
The software mission introduced in 1990 benefited from the greater integration of 
the Lab's hardware areas with the manufacturing plants. It became realistic to 
spin-off these areas and merge them formally with the plants. The structural 
separation was opportunistic, and fit well with the preoccupation to increase 
IBM's activity in software. The removal of hardware missions proved to be very 
beneficial for the rapid mobilisation of management around the software mission. 
The customer focus thrust started in 1985 did prepare the ground for the 
productivity push of 1991. Revenue-generation was given added attention and 
more people were tied to such activities through redeployment. Cross-functional 
teams became more common. The changes of 1991 continued the emphasis on 
redeployment, job redesign, and exiting expensive and surplus people, but the 
amplitude of the changes was new. Zero recruitment was followed by fixed-term 
contracts only. 
Lastly, the software mission and the push for productivity came to be one and the 
same, partly because of their close contiguity in time, and partly because of the 
over-dependence on redeployment to create the new software areas. The 
downsizing of 1991 meant that more was expected of fewer people. This time the 
Lab was innovative in its search for greater productivity. The pace of change was 
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rapid: a major restructuring and downsizing left the surviving managers 
scrambling to secure improved business performance. 
INFLUENCE OF HRM ON SKILL SUPPLY PAYCERNS 
HRM within IBM-UK can be discussed under five features: the firm's 
inheritance, top management, the absence of unions, personnel management 
style, and manpower planning. Did these features facilitate or hinder required 
changes in skills supply? 
IBM's Inheritance. The firm's core people policies have remained unchanged for 
decades and have been applied world-wide. Full employment, single status, 
employee influence, and competitive equitable salaries and benefits were 
counterbalanced by controlled recruitment, generous training and education, and 
frequent employee redeployment. This package led to high employee commitment 
to the firm and a willingness to change jobs and reskill. This inheritance served 
the firm well in the 1960s and 70s, but no longer in the 1980s and 90s. Despite 
the clear signs that the - company was in trouble, IBM senior management 
continued to strongly support the core policies while pushing for incremental 
changes in business direction and work organisation. With the business crisis of 
the early 90s, both management and employees of IBM doubted whether the core 
policies could be maintained indefinitely. Nevertheless little change has occurred 
in the core policies while changes in business direction have accelerated. 
Top Management. Senior management within IBM are all in-bred and hold to the 
traditional IBM beliefs and policies. Though they are called upon to set the 
business direction and goals, they are also constrained by the firm's inheritance 
and their own socialisation. Gradual change was preferred. Within the larger 
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management group, a balance between organisational structure and the culture 
of champions was fostered. It originally was viewed as an innovative solution for 
managing a large and complex business. Senior management introduced multiple 
structural changes in the 1980s but gave less attention to altering the 
management culture. Devolution of decision-making and exiting of some 
expensive older managers and professionals had some impact on management 
roles, but the dominant role of champions continued. Given that most champions 
are seasoned IBM people, they likely continue to view structure (and the related 
work organisation) as complementary to their pivotal role as change agent. The 
crisis of the 90s did give senior management the justification to radically alter 
the organisation, and to exit large numbers of middle managers. 
Absence of Unions. The core people policies of IBM were inspired, in part, by the 
desire to keep unions outside. The firm succeeded in offering a package of hard 
and soft benefits which created employee commitment. The absence of unions 
gave IBM's management the freedom to modify work organisation and job design. 
All that was required was employee fle3dbility which was secured through the 
package of benefits. Thus the core people policies that guaranteed the continued 
absence of unions limited the levers that management could call upon to 
influence skills supply. In particular, rapid downsizing through layoffs was not 
an option, and recruitment of scarce skills through competitive packages of 
rewards was difficult when internal salary equity was the dominant 
consideration. 
Personnel ManaLement Style. While personnel assisted and guided the line 
manager, the latter remained the primary link to the employee and the main 
management decision-maker. Granted, all IBM people were immersed in the 
performance and care-oriented culture fostered by the core people policies. 
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Within this context, tension existed between line and staff in that line managers 
were inclined to make trade-offs in favour of business requirements while 
personnel defended the care and development needs of the employees. Despite 
this constraint, line managers were able to respond to immediate business 
requirements such as recruitment and retention of skilled team members. 
Hursley Lab had its own personnel function including training and education. 
While the tension described above existed at senior levels within the Lab, at 
lower levels Personnel was seen as administrative in nature, relieving line 
managers of tedious work and leaving them free to concentrate on R&D matters. 
Unfortunately some line managers and senior professionals had weak people. 
management skills. Little attention was paid to people issues that did not have 
immediate and local work impact. Lab-wide skills supply was not addressed. 
With the restructuring in 1991, the personnel function lost some of its activities 
to the line manager supported by a HRM system. The middle manager became 
more involved in skills planning and management. This rearrangement of role 
boundaries has created more emphasis on the contribution of skills to 
organisation-wide business requirements. 
Workforce Planning. Practices were very traditional with a focus on global 
headcounts and ratios of people in different functional and business areas. Skill 
concerns were tackled under the release schemes in the 1991 reorganisation. 
Skills planning has taken place in IBM for decades, but always to tackle a 
particular problem, such as redeployment of a surplus skill group. Significant 
effort was expended to monitor skills in the 1980s but not for skill supply 
reasons. Currently the Lab has set about creating a skills development 
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organisation and skills supply strategy. It remains too early to make conclusions 
about this response to the new software mission and the reorganisation. 
In conclusion, several features of the HRM culture were tightly linked around the 
core people policies. Changes in skills supply could only be gradual and slow at 
all levels of the organisation. Only the crisis and restructuring of 1991 were able 
to accelerate the pace of change, but the core HR policies were modified only at 
the edges. 
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CHAPTER 5: BT CASE STUDY 
This chapter presents the case of BT, a recently privatised telecommunications 
organisation which has undergone tremendous change. The chapter follows an 
outline similar to that of Chapter 4. 
OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANISATION & SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
BT plc (British Telecom) offers a wide variety of telecommunication services and 
equipment to residential and business customers primarily in the UK. It has 
facilities throughout the UK with corporate office in London. The main R&D 
facility is situated in Martlesham with offices in the surrounding area, London, 
Belfast and Glasgow. Originally part of the Post Office and the monopoly supplier 
of voice transmission, BT now competes with Mercury plc using fixed-link 
networks and with numerous firms offering value added networks (VANs) and 
mobile communications. 
According to BT's 1991 Annual Report, the firm weathered the recession with a 
turnover of 213.15 billion (6.8% increase from 1990), profits after taxation of 2.08 
billion pounds (up 16.3%), and earnings per share of 34 pence (up 16.4%), a 
performance hampered by low efficiency according to City analysts. 
The privatisation of BT in the 1980s was guided by Sir George Jefferson and Ian 
Vallance, and supported by the recruitment of private sector talent. In March 
1990, BT initiated a major restructuring (Project Sovereign) with an exceptional 
charge of E390 million for severance payments to employees. Rapid downsizing 
was continuous between 1991 and 1993. 
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ENVIRONMENT OF THE ORGANISATION 
PRIVATISATION 
The 1979 conservative victory of Margaret Thatcher signalled the beginning of a 
decade of resizing and reshaping the civil service into a customer-oriented 
service. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) have documented the first wave of 
privatisation involving firms with limited market power, and the second focusing 
- on utilities and their regulation. 
Privatisation of BT took place during a decade of market growth averaging over 
- 5% for inland calls and over 10% for international calls, with slower growth 
during the recessions. BT supplied about 95% of these markets, and Mercury the 
remainder. Rapid growth took place in the new markets of mobile 
communications and added value services where competition was more 
pronounced. 
The British Telecommunications Act of 1981 established BT as a public 
corporation and introduced competition through licensing provisions. BT was 
obliged to supply the network platform on which competitors offered basic and 
value-added services. The 1984 Telecommunications Act created the Office of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL), abolished all of BT's exclusivity, and imposed 
wide responsibilities (including promoting research and development). A long list 
of safeguards was stipulated because of the integrated nature of BT's operations 
and it's dominant influence as supplier, purchaser and provider. BT lobbied hard 
to maintain its integrated structure, and found some support from a government 
interested in maximizing the proceeds from selling BT's shares. 
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Price control was imposed such that the price of basic services had to fall in real 
terms annually. OFTEL also investigated quality of service. It concluded that 
over the period 1981-1986, BT's service had not improved. OFTEL considered 
making BT liable for losses to users caused by faults and poor service. BT 
management was spurred to accelerate modernisation and quality improvements. 
In 1991, the government introduced "Competition and Choice: 
Telecommunications Policy for the 1990s" (DTI, 1991). The duopoly of BT 
and Mercury was terminated, service barriers between cable and 
telecommunications were removed, and greater tariff flexibility for BT was 
granted. 
p 
With privatisation, City analysts and pension fund managers became harsh 
critics. BT compaied unfavourably with other telecommunication firms 
(TELCOs) as measured by the number of lines per 1000 employees. In 1990-91 
European operators averaged 186 lines and U. S. operators 221; BT averaged 124. 
The City pressured BT to downsize and improve profitability. Government 
sympathy was implicit for future stock sales; flotation of half of its holdings took 
place in November 1991. Privatised BT has found itself under continuous 
pressure from OFTEL and the City with no relief expected in the 1990s. 
TECHNOLOGY 
The maturing of the technologies of telecommunications (optic, fibres and 
digitalisation of switches and apparatus), and computer hardware (expanded 
power) and software (intelligent systems), created the push for the transition 
from the time-tested electromagnetic-based network to the electronic-cum-digital 
network on a world-wide basis. The ýransfbrmed system promised lower 
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operating costs, reliability, flexibility (eg. remote monitoring and configuration), 
and new capability in added-value services. 
CONCLUSION: BUSINESS IMPERATIVES & HRM STRATEGY 
The 1980s environment of BT was marked by sustained political and regulatory 
pressure and growing competition in all markets. Whereas BT had pursued 
public sector goals of low cost universal service and high employment levels 
under stable monopoly conditions, it was now required to offer a broader range of 
quality services at competitive prices. Management was pressed to transform BT 
into a more fle3dble organisation. In order to satisfy more discriminating 
customers and counter cost pressures, a leaner and higher performing 
organisation was required. The new BT would have fewer employees but 
presumably with appropriate breadth and depth of skills. 
BT'S CORPORATE STRATEGY 
MANAGEMENT STYLE: LEARNING TO COMPETE 
Sir George Jefferson (1980-1987) and his successor Ian Vallance (1985-1993) 
understood the importance of reshaping the skills of the senior management 
group for privatisation and competitive performance. New blood was brought into 
the senior management ranks between 1981 and 1990. In 1988, D. Day became 
managing director of the new division Communications Systems, formerly with 
Plessey and IBM. Alan Rudge, formerly chief executive of ERA Technology Ltd, 
joined in 1987 and became director of R&D in 1989. John Steele of IBM-UK 
joined in 1989 as Group Personnel Director. In September 1991, Michael Hepher, 
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chief executive of Lloyds Abbey Life (insurance and loans), became the managing 
director of BT. All of the new board members and senior managers belonged to 
Vallance's age cohort. A slow decentralisation from the board to senior 
management took place accompanied by frequent restructuring of the 
organisation. Vallance set up a management board (1988) to review operations 
and authorise certain large capital and business projects. The Director of Group 
Personnel and Corporate Services was included. 
Initial business strategy included rapid modernisation, increasing operating 
efficiency and preparation for competition within the UX and internationally. 
Marketing in all divisions would play an increasingly important role to enhance 
services and introduce new ones. Staffing levels would be reduced over the next 
few years (1981-85) by natural wastage and early retirements. This downsizing 
emphasis persisted with the exceptional period of 1987-1989 when the push on 
modernisation and improved services reversed the trend. 
The new strategy was supported by two major reorganisations: Districtisation in 
1984 and Project Sovereign in 1991. Districtisation took place for improved 
efficiency and customer service. One layer of management (regional office) was 
removed, and 1000 managers eitited. Now 30 districts (replacing 61 areas) 
reported directly to BT-UK headquarters and behaved as self-sufficient trading 
units. New techniques were introduced: stock control, customer data bases, and 
financial control systems. Though Districtisation achieved the intended goals, it 
fragmented management priorities and created uneven service quality across 
districts. This highly decentralised structure did not serve well the nationally- 
oriented business community. 
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Under Sovereign (1991), rapid downsizing in management and other levels took 
place (see Tables. 5.1 and 5.2). The new structure based on market segments 
would create improved performance: large service zones in personal 
communications (PC) and business communications (13C), both supported by an 
integrated network and a coherent portfolio of products. All inter-divisional 
relations were formalised in a matrix structure of customer-supplier obligations 
and service level agreements (see Figure 5.1). 
The above structural changes were directed at the twin goals of economies of 
scale and market focus. The autonomous districts were successful vehicles for 
introducing changes in management systems, encouraging managers to think 
commercially, and developing well-rounded managers as careers were built 
within a district. Sovereign pushed economies of scale even further but 
superimposed formal inter-dependencies. 
GLOBALISATION 
BT was a major shareholder of INTELSTAT (consortium of satellite users) from 
its inception, and a leader in the use of undersea cables across the Atlantic and 
elsewhere. As part of the Post Office, BT focused on the U. K. exclusively and did 
consulting work abroad when solicited. With privatisation, BT initiated new 
investments (e. g., Mitel in 1985, and 20% of McCaw Cellular Communications in 
1989). BT gradually built up partnerships and alliances in selected international 
markets (NA, Europe, and Southeast Asia). Ownership of infrastructure was 
avoided while contracts to create and maintain networks were sought. By 1991, 
BT employed 12,000 persons overseas. However... 
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TABLE 5.1: 
BT WORKFORCE STATISTICS 1981-93 
Total 
Recruitment Turnover 
Workforce 
YearEnd 
1981/82 12,964 5.3% 251,647 
1982/83 8,682 6.0% 245,976 
1983/84 10,472 6.0% 241,124 
1984/85 9,075 6.2% 235,178 
1985/86 13,212 7.7% 230,184 
1986/87 16,311 8.7% 223,084 
1987/88 25,577 10.4% 225,132 
19880 30,505 10.5% 231,982 
1989/90 20,761 9.1% 231,523 
1990/91 7,830 10.5% 215,366 
1991/92 6,105 10.3% 199,325 
1992/93 3,494 18.9% 165,210 
Source: BT Employee Statistics Report 1992-93 
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TABLE 5.2: 
RECRUITMENT AND WASTAGE IN BT, 1984-93 
PCG 
Recruitment as 
% of Grade Group 
Wastage as 
% of Grade Group 
Overall 
Gain (+) 
or Loss 
84/85 N. A. 6.0 N. A. 
85/86 7.8 5.0 + 
86/87 4.8 7.2 - 
87/88 3.7 9.1 a - 
88/89 2.8 9.00 - 
89/90 4.6 9.4a - 
90/91 2.7 15.1 a 
91/92 6.6 3.4 + 
92/93 2.3 2.1 + 
MPG 
84/85 N. A. 5.8 N. A. 
85/86 4.4 6.5 - 
86/87 5.0 6.4 - 
87/88 3.7 7.7b - 
88/89 5.3 6.4 - 
89/90 4.1 6.0 - 
90/91 1.8 16.7a - 
91/92 3.8 3.1 + 
92/93 1.4 13.6a 
PCG Personal Contract Grades 
MPG Managerial and Professional Grades 
a Increase due to voluntarv redundancies 
b Increase due to voluntary resignations 
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"We're not sure whether we want to build our business by putting British 
expatriates overseas or whether we ought to rely on local staff. " Personnel 
Development Manager, BC 
MODERNISATION 
The 1970s and 1980s saw the gradual upgrading of the larger Strowger electro- 
magnetic exchanges by an overlay of electronic apparatus. They became semi- 
electronic exchanges known as TXE4. Existing copper transmission lines in the 
trunk and between exchanges also were digitalised by electronic overlay. 
The new board (1981) planned for a major modernisation programme to 
compensate for inadequate investment in the past, but in fact, the programme 
accelerated only in the mid 1980s. Key elements included System X (a computer- 
controlled fully electronic digital exchange for the local and trunk exchanges), 
optical fibre cables in the trunk lines and between local exchanges, and finally 
optical cables between major customers and local exchanges. Intelligent systems 
were embedded in the network for traffic control, and remote monitoring, testing 
and repair. BT also improved basic customer service: the pay-phone service was 
modernised, and the speed of telephone fault detection and repair was improved. 
Initially engineering-driven, modernisation in BT was pushed by rising customer 
expectations and the c riticisms of OFTEL and the City. The improved network 
also benefited from the new Customer Service System which coordinated the 
interface between external customers and BT people across functions in the 
district. 
"The key to the five year plan are completing network 
modernisation, reducing unit costs, and increasing functionality to 
provide specific products and targeting markets. " Strategic 
Planning Manager, WN 
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ALIGNING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
BT had a strong R&D division driven by engineers. In the 1970s, R&D was 
dominated by the requirements of the switching System X. Hardware 
development was paramount and hardware skills were in high demand. By the 
early 1980s, support for manufacturing was required, but otherwise the focus 
shifted to software applications, support for System X, and improved digital 
capability in the network. Fewer hardware specialists were needed. Although 
R&D doubled from E123 to 2243 million between 1981-1991, investment as a 
proportion of revenue was reduced from 2.7% to 1.8% (BT Annual Reports) in 
keeping with its growing service orientation. 
Aligning R&D activities to other business concerns and demonstrating value for 
money were growing concerns. With the likelihood of privatisation (1982) three 
sponsorship categories were created: corporate research for platform and 
futuristic technologies; work sponsored by Divisions; and work carried out for 
outside organisations. New accounting arrangements were established to enable 
the true costs of R&D to be carried on the budgets of the sponsors. Projects with a 
visible commercial benefit in the near future were given priority. Software skills 
gave benefits quickly when compared to hardware contributions, could be flexibly 
deployed, and consequently grew in importance. In the late 1980s, renewed 
emphasis was placed on improving BT's internal network operations. 
"Current challenges are historical... R&D activities have not 
always been perceived to be of value. " R&D Personnel Director 
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TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (TQM) 
TQM was seen as a framework for culture change. In 1985, Ian Vallance, then 
managing director of Local Communications Services (the largest Division), 
supported TQM under the leadership of John Jarvis, the first Director of Quality 
Strategy, and David Kohler (recently retired from IBM). Two goals were set in 
1987: to reduce the costs of poor quality by 50% over a five year period, and to 
attain 80% participation of the top 20,000 managers. Each operational unit 
created quality improvement plans and projects owned by the senior 
management group of that unit, and a quality council to monitor and review 
progress. Quality concerns, especially for cost reductions, were integrated into 
the 5 year business planning cycle and the one year Quality Plan Budget. 
This first wave of TQM had several impacts: a published value statement and a 
Quality Policy, wider use of teams and new decision techniques, more awareness 
of internal and external customers, and a recognition and exercise of new skills. 
However, many managers perceived that the BT board failed to support a 
broader quality culture. 
"TQM was a separate initiative. It was supposed to get into the 
blood stream. " Corporate Personnel Strategy, Senior Manager 
Under Sovereign, TQM was renewed and accompanied by BT published values. 
Quality became a line management responsibility. A few hundred quality 
specialists remained to achieve standards (ISO 9000) and support line 
management. The hierarchy of quality councils was maintained. An organisation- 
wide training programme "Involving Everyone" was initiated. 
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CONCLUSION: BUSINESS STRATEGY & HRM IMPLICATIONS 
The slow pace of change in the period 1981-84 was followed by rapid change with 
the privatisation of BT. The leadership spent the time planning the transition 
and initiating its programmes. Thereafter, several management interventions 
pushed the organisation towards Districtisation, accelerated modernisation of the 
network, and TQM. With the rise of Ian Vallance to chief executive and 
chairman, and the inflow of private sector managers, the senior management 
team had the vision and drive to push change forward. 
In order to compete successfully, BT had to identify its management strengths 
(operating the core network), new strengths needed (marketing, competitive 
acumen, and rigourous financial accounting), and weaknesses (manufacturing 
which in time was corrected by divestiture). The management team would need 
the skills to drive the globalisation strategy while maintaining dominance in the 
U. K. market. Improved organisational performance was sought to keep costs 
down and improve the quality and variety of services. Recruitment to cover skill 
gaps and intense training were required. 
For R&D, aligning activities to current business concerns, improving network 
operations and servicing sophisticated customer needs was part of demonstrating 
added value. Fle3dble use of odsting skills with recruitment of software and 
network skills supported this thrust. 
Introducing TQM and building a hierarchy of quality councils helped to channel 
performance improvements. Recruitment of some outside experts and training of 
large numbers of managers took place. Though TQM was driven by a cost focus, 
it did emphasize customer focus, and new technical and team skills. Sovereign 
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continued the culture change by devolving quality concerns to the line, expanding 
training to all employees, and shifting the emphasis to process management. 
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: 
AMRTLESHAM & OTHER CENTRES 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
R&D and Procurement of major systems were consistently placed together in the 
organisation to help reduce the lead time between development and volume 
production (see Figure 5.2). Within R&D proper, there were two core 
directorates: Network Technology (NT) and Application & Services Development 
(ASD). As new topics were developed and old ones modified, sections were 
reorganised and new ones added. 
Sovereign (1991) emphasised customer orientation and introduced a matrix of 
internal customers. R&D was already well on its way in this approach and had 
little adaptation to do. The new operating Divisions did clarify internal customer 
relations and facilitated sponsorship decision-making. R&D absorbed Computing 
Services and Information Systems Development (ISD), previously centralised in 
BT-UM With the growing commercial emphasis within R&D, redundant services 
and development work were taking place, and the skillbases were converging. 
The merging of these directorates had two main effects. First, financial 
management practices within R&D were'adopted at the senior levels of the 
computing directorates. Previously locked into central computing support within 
BT-UK and paid by central overhead, internal customers now could choose an 
internal or external supplier and had to pay out of their own budget. Account 
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FIGURE 5.2: 
Managing 
Director 
(Alan 
Rudge 
STRUCTURE OF DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT 
APRIL 91 
Personnel Director 
(Vaughn Young) * 
Director Financial 
Control & Admin 
Group Technical 
Advisor 
Director, Procurement 
Services 
Director, Network 
Technology* (NT) 
Compensation & Benefits 
Advisor 
-Human Resources 
Development Manager 
-Employee Relations 
Manager 
-Personnel manager Assigned to each 
Directorate (5) 
Director Applications 
& Services Development* (ASD) 
Director, Information 
Technology 
Director, Information 
Systems Development* (ISD) 
Director, Group Computing 
Services 
* Interviews took place in that directorate. 
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managers were introduced and internal business systems (e. g., time recording) 
were improved. 
SKILLS STRUCTURE 
BT's grade groups have remained stable, but within them skills have changed 
depending on the location of the position within the organisation. Excluding 
subsidiaries, BT's workforce numbered 235,000 in 1985 of which 3000 were in 
R&D. By 1993 it had shrunk to 165,000 with R&D close to 3000 after a period of 
growth (software and network services) and recent shrinkage. A general shift 
took place in favour of managers, professionals and clerical people (see Table 5.3). 
MPG covers first line and middle managers and all specialisms except for 
engineering. Two grade levels predominate: Manager/Professional MPG2 and 
Manager/Senior Professional MPG4. Within R&D and computing environments, 
MPGs predominate. 
BASIC WORK ORGANISATION 
A team may have only one member, a senior professional on a small project. 
When it reaches 5-6 people, it is headed by a senior professional or a technical 
group leader. The latter may be responsible for 10 to 20 individuals, including 
agency people, covering a large project. A section has several large teams, a 
division several sections with 100-130 employees, and a department (business 
unit) five divisions and 600 employees. 
Teams can be stable (a few years, sometimes more) with some movement 
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Table 5.3: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF GRADE GROUPS WITHIN BT, 1985-93 
3185 3191 3193 
Grade Group % % % 
Senior Management (PCG) 0.4 4.3 
14.6 
Management & Professional (MPG) 16.8 16.8 
Engineering and Technology (ETG) 46.9 48.2 47.7 
Operators 14.0 11.6 6.2 
Clerical 13.6 15.6 18.7 
Others 10.9 7.4 6.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: BT Employee Statistics Reports 
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within the research section. Other people are pulled in as required. On-going 
relationships across units help to maintain the team working. Work can also be 
contracted out on a specific budget allocation. Within a team, technical 
activities include capturing requirements, writing specifications, design, 
development, testing integration, coordination, quality audit, quality review of 
work, monitoring progress against time scales, computing support and safety. 
The recent commercial emphasis has led to shorter work projects: more 
emergency work with 2-3 week duration, more work with a 2-3 year horizon, and 
fewer projects with a 6-7 year horizon. 
The introduction of software centres throughout the country created new 
challenges. Teams would sometimes include people widely dispersed. Simple 
partition of the work tended to take place, and low use of IT (eg., video 
conferencing) was made. Efforts were being made to improve it's use. 
"They were owned by one section manager for their life and he had 
a view of their career over a great span of time. He had the ability 
to move them in and out of projects. " Organisational Planning 
Manager, ISD 
R&D CULTURE 
As part of BT, the R&D people shared in its inheritance. The Post Office created 
a top-down and rule-bound environment. In private, managers and employees 
ignored the rules while achieving satisfactory financial performance. Outside 
managers joining this process-oriented and non-compliance culture had 
difficulties adapting. There was widespread distrust of senior management who 
were viewed as political and influenced by public policy requirements. A caring 
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and paternal climate congruent with lifetime employment prevailed. Poor 
performance at the individual or project level was rarely confronted. 
"If you were quietly disobedient that was all right. " Personnel 
Director, WN 
Cultural change in the 1980s was stimulated by the systematic recruitment of 
private sector executives and the exiting of old style managers. Empowering 
managers through objectives tied to their annual performance appraisal was 
pushing against the old culture of rules. Many middle managers were eager to 
adopt the new style. TQM (1985-89) encouraged a team approach and continuous 
improvement. Sovereign (1991) initiated drastic downsizing, and employees no 
longer assumed secure employment. 
"A family organisation that you joined when you left school or 
university and retired at sixty or sixty-five. But with increasing 
pressures ... it's 
become a sensitive issue. " Head of Personnel 
Services 
R&D also had it's own local culture. The mainly professional workforce was 
oriented towards self-development and skill use. Their union got little support 
from a membership preoccupied with the work. The main lab at Martlesham was 
relatively isolated and encouraged social bonding. A similar cohesiveness was 
found in Glasgow and Belfast which was strengthened by the national culture. In 
contrast, the London workforce was cosmopolitan and highly mobile. 
Management also found that the younger researchers had a different style, more 
business-like in dress and comfortable with a business perspective. 
IMPROVING FINANCLAL MANAGEMENT 
Commercial accounting of R&D was practiced since the 1970s with sponsorship 
from operating Divisions accounting for 60-80% of the work. Strategic research 
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was nominally controlled by corporate office which allocated it to both Divisions 
and R&D. Managers viewed project boundaries as flexible, "fiddling the books" 
when targets were not met within budget. The option of an external supplier was 
rarely used. Often Divisions looked to R&D staff to help determine the research 
topics. 
Alan Rudge became Managing Director in 1988, and brought experience in 
transforming a quasi-public lab into a commercial operation. Meeting weekly 
with his directors, he introduced rigorous commercial accounting with 
performance targets for all divisions. Profits and loses became comprehensive 
and transparent, and operating Divisions were able to assess value for money. He 
obtained control of the strategic research funds. Operating Divisions 
continued to do some of the work, but financial accountability was imposed. The 
commercial emphasis on project management gave rise to a significant increase 
in bureaucracy around approvals and progress control. Some technical experts 
found the new environment unpalatable. 
Alan Rudge also emphasised cross-divisional teams using traditional matrix 
management with a project manager and a technical manager. This approach 
grew in importance because a manager would seek absent skills in other 
divisions thus helping to avoid duplications. Managers became better informed of 
the skillbase in the entire directorate. Negotiation among managers became 
common. 
Managers were pushed to use their staff fully for billing purposes. Managers had 
to attract sufficient volumes of work from the operating Divisions to maintain 
their people. They became more focused on skills, what they could deliver 
effectively, what skill shortages existed, and what training and development was 
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required. Some managers used TQM and process management efforts to improve 
their management of skills. 
"Alan Rudge is very keen on making sure that we recover all our 
costs and are very accountable. " Organisational Planning Manager, 
ISD 
Sovereign provoked some delayering of middle management, but limited exiting 
took place in R&D. General management responsibilities were shifted up to 
section managers (budgets, managing human resources, and sales) and 
emphasised technical project management for the team leader with a wider 
span of control (10+). Section managers would concentrate on performance 
appraisals, career planning and training needs, tasks previously shared with., 
group leaders. Divisional managers would focus on strategic issues and planning. 
Previously, everyone did some technical work. 
Group leaders had tended to seek out small projects to maintain their groups. 
Now, the section managers would put together teams from across sections and 
divisions to achieve the best possible skills grouping, thus creating a flexible 
workforce. Some managers became uncomfortable because of the conflicting 
pressures of supporting the section while pursuing projects where skill 
requirements ignore section boundaries. One proposed solution is to create a 
Programme Manager with coordination responsibilities but no line staff. 
CONCLUSION: BUSINESS STRATEGY & SKILLS SUPPLY IN R&D 
The new commercial orientation of BT impacted on both the management and 
, 
professional groups of R&D. Some executive talent was brought in from the 
outside, but for the most part, training, work reorganisation, and new 
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management systems were the levers used to reshape the management style. 
Shorter project lifecycles to improve internal operations and support new 
products and services called for a workforce with abundant software and network 
skills. BT was obliged to compete for scarce skills as the IT sector grew. 
SKILLS SUPPLY & THE INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET 
CURRENT SKILL NEEDS & SUPPLY 
The rounded manager and professional are needed to provide quality 
services to internal and external customers. Important skills include customer 
sensitivity, financial management and project management, leadership and 
vision, persuasion and selling, risk taking and team work. 
BT has relied on the national graduate milkruns. Small numbers of specialists 
and experienced managers were hired regularly from the wider market. Thus, an 
even spread of new skills helped to cover critical gaps. In contrast, training and 
development of lower grades of managers and professionals were relied upon to 
adjust their skills. 
The international strategy calls for experience in dealing with different national 
contexts and cross-national issues. Currently the preferred solution is to hire a 
local national as general manager and phase-out the ex-patriate after initial 
set-up. 
Within R&D, intensive training of managers in commercial financial 
management took place for all managers down to technical group leader. 
Preparing a bid involved detail documentation of the human, material and other 
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costs. Performance targets were clearly stated, and project control followed 
budget and targets. 
Software and Network Skills are in demand and less so for hardware skills. 
Professionals require an understanding of the VAX operating system, the data 
base "manager", and preferably some exposure to the electronic and digital BT 
switches. These firm-specific skills are in low supply. Meanwhile, there is a slow 
shift away from VAX to Unix with reliance on contractors. Small numbers of 
mathematicians, physicists, chemists and psychologists are needed. 
"We are still 50% hard and 50% soft .... If you think about most 
systems they are 90% soft and 10% hard. " Divisional Manager, NT 
At the customer end, software intensive systems integration requires that the 
professionals work directly with the customer. Previously done by one group, 
increased volume of work has prompted the creation of two specialised groups 
within Network Management, hence the need for coordination and team 
work. 
Specialist vs Generalist Skills. In some areas (e. g., information technology), 
extensive recruitment of electrical engineers took place in the 1970s. These 
people proved to have basic transferable skills for the new areas. In other areas 
(e. g., software engineering), inter-changeability was higher across languages and 
computer models. 
"What you really have is somebody (electrical engineer) good at 
learning and good at applying his knowledge to problems. " 
Department Manager, ASD 
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ISD has gradually hired graduates with a broader background and an aptitude 
for IT. Communication skills have become more important to understand 
business problems. As the computing systems have matured, less technical 
expertise was required. Management has the view that communication skills and 
an appreciation for business problems are more difficult to train than technical 
skills. 
When BT withdrew from manufacturing of telephones and 
switches (1990), it meant little development would take place on this hardware. 
However, design of specifications increased for procurement. 
Quality Documentation. In order to obtain BSI-5750 and ISO-9001 standards 
accreditation, software and code writing must conform to a quality procedure. 
This has prompted training programmes to put people through the steps 
INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET 
Emerging from the Post Office, BT had an internal labour market maintained by 
a policy of lifetime employment. Controlled recruitment and releases were 
coupled with promotion from within and training. Management had wide 
discretion to reshape and resize the senior levels, but less so at lower levels 
because of unionization. The emphasis in R&D was that of developing individuals 
while meeting business goals; downsizing was given less attention by both 
corporate and R&D managers. See Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for workforce statistics. 
. National recruitment took place externally using the 
university milkruns, and internally using the posting system. Despite the 
downsizing trend, graduate recruitment was maintained, and specific growth 
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areas existed within R&D. Losses within these growth areas were viewed as 
undesirable, and competition in labour markets was keen with poaching taking 
place. 
Organisation-wide wastage averaged 6.1% in the period 1980-1985, and increased 
to 9.4% for 1985-1990 due to voluntary resignations which were influenced by the 
privatisation of BT and ample alternative employment opportunities (financial 
services, Mercury, VANs). Significant differences in average wastage existed 
among the employee grades: clerical 15%, operators 20%, senior management 
7.6%, MPGs 6.5%, and ETGs 4.6%. 
Voluntary redundancies consistently accounted for 1% of the total turnover. They 
climbed to over 3% in 1991,5.0% in 1992, and 15.7% in 1993. Improved operating 
efficiencies and delayering justified the release scheme. As of 1985-86, voluntary 
redundancy became the dominant mechanism for e3dting senior managers, and 
became more so in the following years. Between 1985-91,60% of senior managers 
left and only half were replaced by newcomers with commercial skills. 
Turnover in R&D has been less than 5% which was considered the target. More 
common was internal movement within R&D and to the operating Divisions. 
Wastage varied by location and by specialty. Wastage was lowest in Belfast, 
followed by Glasgow, Martlesham, and trailing, London which reached 20% in 
the late 1980s. Specialties in high demand such as experienced software 
engineers and network professionals had higher turnover. Losses were more 
prominent among R&D employees with 1-9 years of service and 20-29 years old, a 
feature of the IT industry. For this reason, BT managers considered their 
retention record as generally satisfactory. 
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Promotion from Within. A comprehensive internal posting system e3dsts which 
operates in a hierarchical fashion: posting in the R&D department, if unfilled 
then in the directorate, then in the division, then throughout BT. This system 
supports career progression on a localised basis, and has sufficient fle3dbility to 
tap the larger internal market when necessary. It also recognises the low 
mobility of most employees. 
Use of Contractors. Numerous specialists (eg., UNIX experts) offered their 
services on contract through agencies, and R&D increasingly was prepared to 
offer the going conditions. This created some friction with regular employees. In 
critical areas, contractors remained on-site for 3 years. 
Mobilit . BT has facilities throughout the country and could accommodate the 
geographic preferences of many. Mobility was characteristic of high flyers and of 
young singles who lacked community roots. Most employees preferred to stay in 
their geographic region and locality. Attachment to the community and family 
considerations (children in school, spouse/lover with employment) are given 
priority. London outsiders are loathe to move to the capital because of the high 
cost of living. Londoners resist moving out because of ample career opportunities 
and the fear of losing the ability to return to a high cost environment. 
"Our workforce are not particularly keen to move. " Corporate 
Personnel Strategy Manager 
It's difficult to get people into London: cost of living and cost of 
commuting. " Technical Support Group Leader, ISD 
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AS CONTEXT 
TOWARDS VALUING CORE HR ASSETS 
The culture of the Post Office valued the employees and their service to the 
public. At the same time, BT was more managerial in orientation. Since 
privatisation, senior management publicly recognised the importance of its staff 
to organisational success, but also emphasised costs and profits. These diverging 
messages did not persuade employees of their new importance. 
"Our success depends above all on the talents of the people in 
British Telecom. " Annual Report 1988-89 
.I 
"When push comes to shove, people (employees) come to the bottom 
of the heap. " Corporate Personnel Strategy Manager 
Within R&D the traditional focus on long-term projects and the need to develop 
skills over long periods supported the value of human assets. The gradual 
emphasis on shorter-term projects in the 1980s did not appreciably alter this 
view. However, the new management style and business strategy gave rise to a 
line-responsive personnel function and a slimmer focused workforce. Personnel 
systems were made more responsive to management queries, in particular the 
employee information system (PRISM). 
"PRISM is a great filing cabinet and retrieving is a great problem. 
You could not get meaningful management information. " Corporate 
Manpower Planning Manager 
PERSONNEL FUNCTION IN BT 
In the 1970s BT benefited from a professional and progressive, though 
bureaucratic and highly centralised, personnel function. In the 1980s the 
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personnel leadership underwent some external recruitment. A closer alignment 
of personnel with business concerns took place both at headquarters and in 
districts. Thanks to an aggressive stance with the unions, more management 
flexibility was obtained in work organisation, compensation and deployment. 
"A lot of policies were written down and set in concrete as a result 
of negotiation with unions. " Personnel Development Manager, BC 
"Personnel managers within districts found themselves captive to 
the managing directors. " Head of Personnel Services 
The arrival of John Steele from IBM-UK (1989) marked the emergence of a new 
corporate personnel mission, that of supporting the line. He gradually changed 
head office appointments, moving people into and out of the field. Shortly, 
Sovereign restructured Personnel into two "organisations" for economies of scale 
and expertise: (1) a highly centralised Personnel Services with zone directors, 
and (2) a Personnel Policy Board (PPB) composed of divisional personnel 
directors with expert support for line managers within each division. The PPB 
considered shaping, sizing and structuring the workforce as a priority. Project 
teams were set up composed of headquarters and division people. 
"John (Steele) is saying, We're here to support the line. What does 
the line want? " Corporate Personnel Strategy Manager 
"Personnel'has been positioned as reactive, and we want to move 
towards being a champion, a leader and shaper of change. " 
Corporate Personnel Strategy Senior Manager 
PERSONNEL FUNCTION IN R&D 
Personnel was part of the Financial Control & Administration Directorate for 
decades. With the arrival of Vaughn Young and Sovereign, and the creation of a 
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separate department, Personnel demonstrated its new ability to support line 
managers in solving people problems. R&D increased the number of personnel 
specialists who began to work closely with line managers, sitting as a member of 
the Directorate and department management teams. Administrative personnel 
numbers dropped and training was transferred in block to Personnel Services. 
Timely and flexible interventions were introduced. 
"Personnel was seen as the policeman of the rules .... Now managers 
make the decisions and we give options and advice. " Personnel 
Manager, ASD 
LABOUR RELATIONS 
High union membership diminished somewhat over the 1980s with the new 
labour relations laws making membership optional. Mergers led to 4 unions and 
employee associations instead of 30: National Communications Union, Union of 
Communication Workers, Society of Telecom Executives (includes R&D 
professionals), and Communication Managers' Association. Negotiations 
remained centralised, but created some flexibility within umbrella agreements. 
Management sought concessions on flexibility in work organisation and 
compensation. Within districts, Personnel gave priority to negotiating and 
implementing these changes, and tended to neglect other HRM areas such as 
workforce planning and career development. 
Industrial action was taken periodically by the Post Office Engineering Union for 
- benefits and security of employment. All unions opposed perfor7nance related pay 
(PRP) but management negotiated its entry for senior middle management, 
partly by strengthening direct communications with the management cadre and 
appealing to their career interests. 
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"We were not supposed to link the bonus and pay (of MPGs) in any 
way to the appraisal which is clearly nonsense. " Manager, Support 
Systems, ISD 
RECRUITMENT 
BT has retained its civil service inheritance of external national recruitment at 
low entry levels using fair' and exhaustive procedures. Recruitment of 
experienced people increased in the 1980s. Internal competitions were filled 
according to civil service board procedures; promotion readiness was determined 
and later matched to a vacancy. Since Sovereign, special selections are run where 
a job is advertised and the best are chosen among the applicants. 
Graduate Recruitment. Recruitment makes use of the national milkrun. The 
application process and initial interviews are confirmed by personal contacts 
within BT's university research programmes. R&D has strong links with York 
and Aston Universities. With Sovereign, graduate recruitment was removed from 
Martlesham and placed in Group Personnel. R&D was an exception within the 
old structure, and had argued their need to target quickly the "cream". 
Centralisation has meant the loss of rapid targeting. 
Headhunting and Poaching. Senior management recently have approved 
headhunting and targeted advertisement in response to poaching in the networks 
area. Low key advances have been made. Personnel prepared a tailored package 
with pay as the main lever, followed by assistance in removal and relocation 
expenses. Such offers were normally at the personal contract level where 
information was not widely shared. 
"I am now encouraging headhunting for people who we recognise as 
particularly good. " Director, ASD 
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"Contractors do not affect the BT staffing post. " Technical Group 
Leader 2, NT 
TRAINING 
BT Training Organisation has a number of specialised colleges, notably in 
engineering and management, and recently in customer facing. A wide variety of 
courses are offered. Management training has recently been tied to competencies 
based on a series of interviews conducted throughout the organisation. Senior 
management routinely used the training organisation to support its programmes 
including TQM, leadership, team work and goal setting. 
"BT Training did wonderful things ... but you never heard about business objectives and customers. That is completely changed. " 
Corporate Personnel Strategy Manager 
"Giving people financial training was a major activity. " Director, 
ASD 
Sovereign created significant overlap in training in the two personnel 
organisations because of the practice of using line managers as part-time 
accredited trainers and divisional interest in management development. While 
Personnel Services argued for economies of scale, line managers insisted on 
maintaining internal training units for flexibility and skill-specificity. Sovereign 
also imposed more rounded technical and managerial roles, thus raising 
questions about the limits of training. 
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CAREER MANAGEMENT 
During the 1980s, linear career paths were based on seniority with the exception 
of rapid promotion for high flyers. These paths were disrupted by frequent 
restructuring and the accompanying redeployment of people, and by the gradual 
spread of PRP. Between 1985-90 tangible improvements were achieved only for 
finance. Worried about the high turnover in the southeast, accounting/finance 
posts were reorganised to conform to the training requirements for accreditation 
by the Accounting Society. 
"Every time the company reorganised, the local schemes which had 
been put in place or were being planned collapsed .... There was much frustration. " Corporate Personnel Strategy Senior Manager 
Since Sovereign, a concerted effort has taken place to install robust and 
standardised career management. Defining the business direction and 
management commitment to training and job development were seen as 
important for morale and retention. However the immediate effect of Sovereign 
was to prioritise redeployment and create pent-up demand. 
BT T! raining had created the yearly planner, a tool for career planning under 
employee responsibility. Following Sovereign, the planner was adopted 
throughout R&D, and the manager (not the employee) was made responsible. In 
the old system, professional development was one box on the appraisal form and 
part of the appraisal review. 
"Managers were pleased with what is emerging with more 
openness of employee's aspiration, more relaxed than appraisal 
counselling. " Personnel Manager, ASD 
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The section manager became responsible for career development both on and off 
the job. The individual plan is fed to the divisional manager who feeds it to 
personnel who arranges for formal training. The divisional manager holds the 
staff and training budget which ties into his yearly resource and business plans. 
Thus the opportunity exists to tie career development closely with the 
management systems. 
TECHNOLOGY LIFE CYCLE & CAREERS 
In the 1970s and to a decreasing degree thereafter, the life cycle of a specific 
tephnology, the related R&D work organisation, and career development were 
inter-twined (see example in Figure 5.3). Supported by strategic funds, a 
researcher could grow in a specific expertise and take on more technical and 
supervisory responsibility over time. 
The multiplication of research groups in a new area leads to a dedicated section 
and later to a dedicated division. Maturing to commercial applications and 
products causes further reorganisation, and funding from operations 
supplements the strategic funds. This organisational growth creates promotion 
opportunities for the local experts. At the commodity stage, development 
becomes less profitable, withers or becomes absorbed by other divisions with 
larger scope. People are redeployed but do so from a higher career platform for 
continuing progress. Distant research horizons were common in the 1970s when 
tqchnology drove the research, publications and patents were encouraged, and 
business applications considered secondary. With privatisation (1981) and the 
emphasis on commercial contributions within a 2-3 year horizon, de-linking 
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FIGURE 5.3: 
TECHNOLOGY LIFE CYCLE - 
BT EXAMPLE OF SPEECH APPLICATIONS 
1980 Research Group Established 
W 
Multiple Groups Become 
a Section 
1985 Growing Section Split; 
New Division Formed 
Growing Sections 
1987 
1990 
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FIGURE 5.4, 
BT CAREER LADDERS IN R&D 
Director 
I 
Departmental Manager 
T. 
Technical Division Manager Principal Advisor 
(Budget Holder) 
TT 
Section Manager Senior Advisor 
(General Management Role) 
ff 
Technical Group Leader Advisor 
(7ýypically Prqject Manager) 
Senior Professional 
(MPG 4) 
University Professional 
Graduate (MPG 2) 
Stream 
Personal 
Contract 
Level 
---- -I- ------- Permeable Barrier 
0&A Levels Technician 
(Apprentices) 
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between the individual's career and the technology cycle took place to an 
increasing degree. Management created, adjusted and disbanded teams more 
frequently. 
"Over a 15 year career, somebody grew with the project, but the 
trouble is the projects and the technologies change too rapidly 
now. " Department Manager, ASD 
TECHNICAL CAREER PATH 
The position "Advisor" was used for a few technically gifted persons who refused 
managerial responsibility. Merit promotions took place without a promotion 
board, and were in effect so long as they remained in the designated areas. Most 
professionals targeted the more plentiful management positions creating a 
technical skills loss in the professional ranks and some poorly adapted managers. 
With Sovereign, technical work was confined to the group leader and withdrawn 
from higher management. "Advisor" was expanded to a career path (see Figure 
5.4). Unfortunately the implementation suffered in that people made surplus by 
I 
the reorganisation became advisors and appropriate candidates (key people for 
specific projects) were overlooked. With rapid technical obsolescence expected, 
the technical career path generated scepticism, and managers were introducing 
Advisors cautiously and defining the positions incrementally. 
"This guy is absolutely key to the project and should be an 
Advisor .... He wants to remain as a technical guru. 
" Technical 
Group Leader 2, NT 
"The advisor career route is not well focused. We have only one 
Advisor in the division because I have taken a fairly softly softly 
approach. " Division Manager, ASD 
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ComRuting Career--Path. Sovereign prompted ISD to address career and 
performance feedback dissatisfaction. The new technical and managerial career 
paths were extended downwards. MPG2-MPG4 was segmented into a number of 
intermediate steps and the specialist and the leader roles introduced early. Steps 
1 to 4 (MPG 2) would be skill-based, whereas steps 5 to 7 (MPG 4) would be 
competitive with limited posts. The career path would meet the standards 
currently being developed by the British Computing Society. With increasing use 
of "a" level recruits instead of graduates, training and on-the-job experience 
leading to certification would attract candidates. Despite strong union. support, 
management was cautious in its implementation. 
"Some of the people who left did not want to become a project 
manager. " Organisational Planning Manager, ISDM 
"The (technical) career path has been looked at over a number of 
years but never really got off the ground. " Personnel Manager, ISD 
EARLY RETIREMENT & REDUNDANCIES 
The culture of lifetime employment required controlled recruitment 
supplemented by voluntary retirements and redundancies to exit surplus 
employees. Dismissal for poor performance was difficult in the unionised context, 
and managers avoided the time-consuming process. 
Early retirement was used to gradually downsize and reshape the senior 
management group in the 1980s. With Districtisation, MPGs expressing the 
desire to retire early were exited, but no targeting took place. This informal 
process was subsequently formalised by declaring surpluses. 
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Sovereign included a separation package for 40-50 year old managers considered 
poor performers within the new business culture. The appraisal system proved to 
be inadequate to guide decisions on leavers and stayers. Some survivors received 
an early signal, though many of the surviving managers continued to suffer ftom 
uncertainty. 
In November 1991, a new voluntary scheme was announced, targeting all levels 
of the organisation, and particularly employees within the unionised ranks of WN 
where modernisation of the network was completed. This involved pension 
enhancements and several months of pensionable pay offered to surplus groups 
(40 years of age and over) within each unit. Counselling and support services 
were available. Those persons wishing to continue their employment were offered 
"personal rights" to their normal pay for four years. 
CONCLUSION: HRM & SKILL SUPPLY PATTERNS 
In the 1980s, the HRM context of centralised personnel and civil service lifetime 
employment supported a traditional approach to skills supply: competitive 
national recruitment for entry positions and internal competitions, and ample 
training and career progression on the basis of seniority. Within R&D there was 
the additional influence of the technology life cycle; individuals made their 
careers in parallel development to a new technology. 
By the mid 1980s the new mandate of senior management and the gradual 
downsizing and reshaping of their skillbase impacted on R&D. Short-term 
commercial projects grew in importance and the interests of the researcher 
became secondary. A weak union and a positive business sensitivity among the 
new recruits facilitated the transformation. 
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The HRM context was modified dramatically with Sovereign. Personnel became 
more efficient through increased centralisation and improved systems, and more 
skills-oriented with the activity of the PPB and the expert support offered to line 
managers within the Divisions. Within R&D, line managers approved of Vaughn 
Young who strongly supported flexible compensation and recruitment practices 
to address critical skill requirements. On the negative side, his personnel 
organisation lost some of its control over graduate recruitment, and training 
became a shared responsibility. 
Post-Sovereign, employee dissatisfaction was addressed by improving career 
planning and career paths with some alignment with external professional 
bodies. Locating career development responsibilities with R&D section managers 
has created the potential of integrating skill issues ( mi3dng, building, and 
adjusting specific and transferable skills) across projects. The desire to improve 
performance by polarising technical and managerial work, and the delinking of 
technology life cycles and individual careers, led to an improved technical career 
path which received little enthusiasm from professionals and managers. 
INTENTIONAL SKILL SUPPLY PATTERNS 
WORKFORCE PLANNING IN BT 
Headcount and budget controls operated throughout the 1980s in a manner 
similar to the civil service. Manpower planning was driven by the annual pay 
budget which was based on the number of people at each grade, and the average 
pay rates adjusted for London weighting and other allowances. Number of 
employees was linked to the expected turnover (employees per 2 million) which 
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for a monopoly was one of steady growth. The non-pay budget covered agency and 
casual employees. 
"The real issue was how many people and how much money am I 
allowed to spend, and adjusting the workforce to meet that. It was 
budget driven. " Head of Personnel Services 
Within districts, manpower planning suffered because of low expertise and the 
general belief that anyone could be a personnel planner. Headcount and budget 
controls were exercised but were focused on grades Ue., job classifications) 
instead of particular skills. 
With Sovereign, a downsizing target was set for the middle management group 
based primarily on financial criteria (decreasing the pay budget), and with only a 
vague link to the proposed structure. Over-manning was widely perceived to be 
the case. A release scheme was launched by corporate Group Organisation (Unit); 
older employees and poor performers were targeted with the participation of line 
management. A second round was launched for surplus managers after people 
were positioned in the new structure. In all, some 7000 managers exited. 
Recruitment was tightly controlled between 1990 and 1993, with priority given to 
managers with commercial experience and graduates. In 1992-93,258 graduates 
were recruited principally for R&D. For the first six months of Sovereign, 
movement within the firm was limited to absorbing redeployed persons. 
In 1991-92, operators, caterers and engineering technicians were the focus of 
downsizing. The controlling role had shifted into Group Personnel under the 
Manager of Personnel Strategy. Again, ad hoc targets were set by asking slightly 
more than the expected wastage based on a study of age and length of service 
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profiles. In the case of unionised engineering,. significant cuts (6,000 in VIN) took 
place in 1992. Workforce planning took a back seat to investment schedules for 
modernisation in the 1980s. The end result was significant over-manning. 
Post Sovereign, the new PPB and divisional personnel managers were modifying 
the meaning of workforce planning towards a framework where BT skills are 
understood, defined, monitored, selected, and developed as part of the business 
planning cycle. Downsizing the organisation was an on-going concern, but 
shaping the skillbase was considered important for the long-term success of the 
organisation. The identification of core management skills hnd the introduction of 
a manpower planning system (with training for planners) was part of this new 
approach. 
WORKFORCE PLANNING WITHIN R&D 
Headcounts in R&D were controlled as elsewhere in BT by multiple criteria. 
First, the level of business activity would establish the total R&D budget and 
headcount. Second, demand for certain skills would guide the finer adjustment in 
numbers, with recruitment of the new skills required. Senior management would 
re-allocate resources between research divisions. Once the headcount was 
finalised, the task of the divisional manager was to ensure sufficient income to 
break even and cover the manpower costs. 
Workforce Planning Within a Research Division. The business plan acted as the 
framework for HR considerations. With a push for ISO accreditation, HR 
resources were allocated to this purpose. With customer requirements in mind, 
an assessment was made of possibilities for technical and career development, 
and the ability to absorb new recruits in need of intensive training. Detailed 
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It 
project scoping took place through discussions among divisional head, section 
head, and project manager. Thus, within a directorate, there e3dsted an informal 
and historical skill "data base" which became formalised only when project 
scoping took place. Skill information across directorates and BT were much 
weaker. 
"Are we putting in place the right mechanism to deliver the right 
skillbase that the company needs in five year's time? ... The 
numbering game is not sufficiently granular. " Divisional Manager, 
NT 
"We try out two types of matrices ... a list of the projects and the key 
skills that are needed ... Then we have the people matrix. " Divisional Manager, ASD 
Belfast & Glasgow. R&D anticipated a software labour shortage in the 1980s. In 
order to diminish reliance on the London market, a software unit was created in 
Belfast (1981) and later in Glasgow (1986). Both cities had quality software 
graduates who were not keen to move. In addition, their apprenticeship programs 
were given additional software content. Recruited with "o" levels, these future 
technicians added to the supply of software skills. 
As of 1991,300 were employed in Belfast and 100 in Glasgow. Software units 
were maintained in London, and others set up in Ipswich and Felixstowe (near 
Ipswich). The tight conditions of the mid 1980s relaxed thereafter with more 
recruitment of polytechnique graduates and later the growing recession. 
Management of Retention. On-going leakage was not managed as a matter of 
policy and took place for a variety of reasons and circumstances. Employees were 
encouraged to meet divisional managers to discuss problems and issues. Line 
managers identified two significant outflows. First, a small number of 
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experienced and often exceptional researchers left because they wanted less 
bureaucracy and less commercial orientation. Second, young single researchers 
with some experience and critical technical skills became impatient and were 
lured by attractive packages. Both line and personnel management kept an open 
door in case the leavers chose to return, a policy operative throughout the 1980s. 
Retention efforts were more likely to focus on keeping a key person within a 
research team (intra-firm mobility) rather than addressing their possible 
departure from the firm. Low levels of turnover comparable with the industry 
reassured managers that there was no significant problem. In contrast, line 
managers in growth areas made consistent efforts to control retention after 
recruitment to meet growth targets. 
"It's not necessarily getting the number down from 5% to 0 %. It is 
actually controlling tightly those that you are losing and whether 
you are losing the right people or not. " Divisional Manager, NT 
TQM Platform for Graduate Retention Study (1990). Line managers in growth 
areas arranged for a study of graduate retention. The risk to future business 
performance and high avoidable replacement costs were considered "quality" 
issues. The results were based on a survey of 1000 recruits with less than 3 years 
service and 30 management interviews. Resignation rates Division-wide were 
found to be low: 3.7% for all grades, with the highest rate of 6.2% at Level 1 
where most recent recruits are found (see Table 5.4). Whereas satisfaction was 
shown with the content, challenge and variety of their jobs, dissatisfaction was 
evident on most other HR areas including use of their skills to the full, feedback 
and recognition, and career development. 
Over 25% of these new recruits said they were likely to leave the organisation 
within 2 years. A comparison of likely leavers and stayers indicated that the 
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former were more likely to be young, single women, living in rented 
accommodation, and living in London. 
Belfast and Glasgow were highly rated by the graduate recruits. These centres 
are relatively small, undergoing growth, and tap local labour markets. The study 
also highlighted that managers underestimated the spectrum of graduate 
concerns and their levels of dissatisfaction. This traditional manpower study led 
to broad improvements in orientation, training and career development for new 
recruits (1991). However, no discussion took place on influencing the mix of skills 
recruited for changing business requirements. 
"The one thing I feel a little disappointed in is this whole thing of 
managing the skillbases and integrating the business .... we should be operating more strategically to get the best out of our 
employees. " Divisional Manager, NT 
TQM Platform for Skill Interventions. A 1991 TQM exercise revealed that the 
Network Control Layer Group within NT suffered from isolated small groups 
with specialised but relatively inflexible skills reflecting the sub-systems worked 
on. Professionals wanted to broaden their experience and have opportunities to 
manage other people for career reasons. 
On a pilot basis, the incoming work was assigned to a mixed group and the task 
identity was maintained. After six months, it was found that the software 
produced was very good and skill fleidbility increased. However, MPG4s felt 
uncomfortable and lost while MPG2s enjoyed job enrichment. 
A similar result was experienced in a support unit of ISD. In their case, the work 
reorganisation was prompted by Sovereign and productivity requirements. 
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Hybrid M ISD. With Sovereign, ISD created the position of 
Organisational Planning Manager for strategic issues. Historically anchored in 
analyst roles, the directorate became interested in "hybrid" managers with an 
awareness of business as well as computing. Technical retraining for skill 
currency would be guided by planning in architectural platforms and other 
technology. Unfortunately, the eNisting workforce planning system was 
considered inadequate to the task. Harder still was the process for developing 
appropriate managers. A cautious approach was adopted with no quick changes 
in recruitment or promotions. 
"If you have not really got an idea of the sort of person you want 
and you go look for someone externally, you can bring in lots of 
problems. " ISD Organisational Planning Manager 
CONCLUSION: SKILLS PLANNING AS TOP-DOWN & BOTTOM-UP 
Workforce planning within BT was driven by financial and cost considerations. It 
was isolated from the resizing and reshaping of senior management (1984-1991) 
which was controlled by a small group of top managers. With Sovereign, it has 
played an important role in the downsizing of middle management and other 
groups. Skill issues were given secondary attention, but the new PPB line- 
oriented personnel managers have raised skill awareness within the personnel 
organisation. 
Within R&D, skills planning was a bottom-up process within the constraint of 
headcount controls. The increasing commercial orientation led to management 
roles with higher skill awareness and with more efforts to increase skill 
utilisation. TQM did provide a useful platform for local skill interventions. In the 
case of graduate retention, the effect expanded throughout R&D. Sovereign 
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encouraged managers to improve productivity and customer service, and thereby 
increased the attention to work organisation and the packaging of skills. 
Belfast and Glasgow (early 1980s) were exceptions in that they were prompted by 
critical skill shortages and expectations of continued shortages. These software 
centres were intentionally created by senior management within R&D as part of 
their strategic plans. 
HARD & SOFT BENEFITS 
ELARD BENEFITS 
Important changes in hard benefits around the personal contract took place for 
senior levels of management, in keeping with the new private sector orientation 
of the organisation. Less significant changes in the same direction took place for 
other managers and professional. 
(1) Base Salary 
Negotiated by corporate office, base salary was very important for professionals 
and lower managers, and was in the upper quartile with other large fir7ns. This 
component was of moderate importance for contract managers and not 
negotiated; their total package of hard benefits was considered average. 
Centralised negotiations took place for professionals. 
BT has great difficulty competing with small software houses and new 
telecommunication firms willing to pay top salaries in areas of skill shortages, 
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especially for young experienced professionals. Recently within R&D, some ad 
hoc salary increases (up to; E8-10,000) have been given to key staff in response to 
poaching fears. When recruiting critical skills, R&D can now match offers but 
leading offers continue to be given on a contract basis. 
Base Salary for Graduates. Year 1 and 2 are on a separate pay scale which is 
adjusted to mid-point between that scale and the regular scale after year 1 of 
employment. For the top 25% of performers, they are placed on the regular pay 
scale after 18 months, 6 months before schedule. 
Benefits 
Medical and health insurance, and an index-linked pension were offered. No 
noteworthy changes took place in the 1980s except for personal contractors who 
now have a company car, an expense account (American Express), two lines 
installed free in their home with a call allowance. 
From April 11983, a separate pension fund was created out of the existing state 
scheme. Pension contributions were made by both employer and employee. 
Managers saw pensions as locking them into the firm because of the substantial 
penalty for leaving early, relaxed only for targeted release schemes. Experienced 
mobile managers joining BT viewed the pension unfavourably as it did not 
address their career pattern. 
(3) Incentives 
A broader spectrum of incentives have appeared over the years. Line managers 
expressed satisfaction that they now have several ways of rewarding performance 
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and significant contributions. A bonus of up to E500 can be given for outstanding 
contribution; each divisional manager has a bonus budget. In addition, personal 
contractors may receive a bonus of 0 to 20% of their salary on the basis of 
performance, with a few receiving up to 35%. In 1991 an "encouragement" 
payment was given to graduate recruits to match that offered by competitors. 
Suggestion schemes with rewards had been operating in BT-UK for some time, 
but lacked structure, consistency, and breadth. In 1987 the New Ideas Scheme 
was revitalised in conjunction with TQM and received board support.. Adopted 
ideas led to an award of 5% of one year's savings up to 225,000. Ideas that were 
adopted but without savings received an encouragement award. Between May 
1988 and 1991, more than 20,000 suggestions were submitted, 20% of which were 
implemented. 
With privatisation (1985), the firm established two employee share schemes, the 
first (Employee Sharesave Scheme) savings related and the second (Share Option 
Scheme) involved purchase options for senior managers. Senior management also 
introduced the Employee Share Ownership Scheme, a periodic distribution of 
shares to employees but held in trust. Top management used the shares as a 
reward for a profitable year and as a punishment (no shares) for strike action 
(1986). 
Employees were not enthusiastic about profit-sharing which represented a small 
annual reward (E200). However, the emphasis on equal treatment added an 
attractive element, and the sharing or withholding of profits had symbolic value. 
Adding a commercial flavour to the compensation packages have made employees 
more conscious of business realities. 
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Issue of Individual & Team Bonuses. Sovereign encouraged team working within 
the matrix structure but insisted on individual accountability and rewards. 
Confronted with this familiar problem, R&D managers continued to seek ways of 
reconciling the apparent contradiction. The timing of the bonus was viewed as 
very important; immediately after the work done was ideal, not after the yearly 
appraisal as was the practice. 
"As we move towards rewarding people as projects get done, we 
would be more inclined to reward a team. " Organisational 
Planning Manager, ISD 
"I have had a problem with BT's approach to bonuses. It was 
largely individual based.... Some teams have actually pooled the 
individual bonuses. " Divisional Manager, NT 
(4) Pay Policies 
Pay policies were adjusted mostly for personal contracts: greater risk sharing, 
consistency in relation to performance, higher pay secrecy, longer-term 
orientation with shares, and shorter-term orientation with appraisals according 
to goals. For unionised staff, the most significant change was the introduction of 
performance related increments. 
Personal Contracts. With the approach of privatisation (1982-83), personal 
contracts were introduced for 200 senior managers, making their terms and 
conditions of service more comparable with those offered by the private sector. 
External recruitment of skilled executives was facilitated. Within Inland 
Division, the union also agreed to amalgamate most middle managers into one 
managerial and professional structure, removing traditional hierarchical 
boundaries and improving selection and appointment arrangements. 
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Personal contracts were extended to the top 1000 managers in 1983 and another 
4500 in 1988 despite union resistance. In 1991, it was extended to 1300 account 
managers and sales people. It was believed that senior management was aiming 
to impose personal contracts on all middle managers. Periodically renewed, these 
contracts included PRP and a large bonus component, in contrast with the 
tradition of seniority and salary according to hierarchical position. Employees 
have very little negotiation power unless they have skills that are currently in 
great demand. Though employees compare notes, there is low visibility and some 
secrecy. Contract managers expressed general satisfaction with the scheme and 
the levels of compensation. Most MPGs favoured an extension to their levels. 
"It (personal contract) is part of a progressive move towards 
marginalising and perhaps eliminating the Society of Telecom 
Executives. " Corporate Personnel Strategy Senior Manager 
Pay for Performance. Introduced in the late 1980s, PRP has been accepted in 
principle. Many managers believed that the PRP increment (in practice 1-3% 
averaging 1% of salary bill) was too small to influence performance, and has 
given rise to cynicism. Senior managers showed more optimism, believing in a 
cumulative effect. The management guideline suggested that thirty percent of 
employees receive some increase. Managers were not worried because of their 
belief that professionals were driven by the challenging work and their desire to 
achieve. 
"Over time we can use the (PRP) fleidbility we have within the pay 
structure to position people appropriately. " Divisional Manager, 
NT 
"I think it (PRP) is a waste of time. The budget for PRP is 1%, it is 
rubbish in my view. " Division Manager, ASD 
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STRATEGIC USE OF HARD BENEFITS 
Market-sensitive compensation always has been central for the recruitment and 
retention of BT people. In the 1970s, internal consistency of salaries and 
standard benefits was very high because of the dominance of unions and the civil 
service egalitarian influence. The 1980s witnessed the introduction of personal 
contracts and performance-related pay for a growing number of managers. Base 
salary decreased in importance while benefits and incentives increased. 
Compensation became a personal issue focused mostly on the short term. This 
private sector package permitted the external recruitment of experienced 
managers and professionals. These critical recruits would be retained so long as 
opportunities for challenging work existed and their contribution was financially 
recognised. They felt, however, uncomfortable with the pension plan which 
rewarded long tenure and penalised early departures. While some long-tenured 
BT people welcomed the changes, others found it unpalatable and volunteered (or 
were prompted) for the early release schemes. 
The bulk of the unionised staff were only slightly affected by these changes. They 
experienced some increase in incentives and a little risk through profit sharing. 
Pay for performance was introduced but it accounted for only 1-2% of the annual 
pay increase. Within R&D, personal contracts were viewed as attractive and a 
way of obtaining recognition for their contributions. However, there was some 
concern about rewarding individuals and ignoring the importance of the group 
effort. Management was pleased that it could offer "secret" salary adjustments to 
keep critical skills. Not diminishing the importance of hard benefits, those 
interviewed were unanimous that the package was of secondary importance to 
professionals driven by challenging work and skill development and use. 
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The above changes helped to shift the culture towards a focus on the new 
competitive environment and the organisational and personal changes required 
to operate within it. Retention of good performers and e3giting of poor performers 
was considered desirable, and was pursued among the senior and middle 
managers to a greater degree with Sovereign. This was not the case for other 
employees protected by their unions. 
SOFT BENEFITS 
BT introduced goal-oriented performance for managers and professionals, and 
promoted a private sector approach to business. Several soft benefits were 
modified significantly for this purpose: challenging work, employment security, 
and employee contributions. Other significant changes took place to improve 
morale and create commitment to the emerging organisation: employee 
involvement, formal listening/sensing, and career development. 
Teleworking. Some minor changes took place as part of modifying business 
practices. Teleworking was introduced within R&D in the late 1980s to retain 
software female professionals with growing family responsibilities, with the idea 
of reintegrating the person at a later date. With most people opting for part-time 
work, arrangements ranged from simply modifying the days and hours of the 
work week to teleworking from home. Explicitly targeting retention of proven 
skills, teleworking was offered at the discretion of the line manager. 
"If they (professionals) are good, if the skills are the ones we want 
to retain, then we try to come to some arrangement (teleworking)" 
Personnel Manager, NT 
Enhanced informal listenindsenaing by management took place as part of the 
heightened importance of skills for the attainment of high performance goals. 
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Where scarce skills were concerned, middle managers wanted to know their 
people better to ensure retention. 
Improving Com]ýanylmage. Management also attempted to improve company 
image with limited success. With the privatisation of BT, criticism by both the 
public and OFTEL have been sustained. Many employees complained that BT 
internal communications over-emphasized the positive and lagged behind the 
media. The deteriorating company image has had some impact on morale 
especially on younger individuals wanting a publicly responsible employer. 
Modif3ing Challenging Work. Traditionally BT has demanded high performance 
of its professionals and managers, and has given them challenging work. With 
the introduction of personal contracts, thorough financial management systems, 
and a growing market orientation, management performance has become tied to 
specific goals and business requirements. In turn, performance of professionals 
and technical people have been influenced in this direction. In R&D there was a 
decrease in autonomy of researchers in setting the research agenda, shorter 
development cycles, and more specialised management and technical roles. Some 
tenured BT people found these changes unappealing; others have adapted 
readily, particularly the younger employees. The latter was reported by 
managers and confirmed through interviews of younger professionals. New 
recruits fit in easily, but had concerns about too few opportunities to learn new 
skills. In the end, "challenge" depends on individual preferences and willingness 
to adapt. 
All agreed that the single most important retention mechanism was challenging 
work, but the focus lay with performance. Most departures were transfers within 
BT for promotion and responsibility, and opportunities to expand their skills. A 
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few notable researchers were lost recently because of their desire to publish, 
research widely, and have less bureaucracy. Some chose to accept a position at a 
university with lower pay. Their continued recruitment was seen as beneficial 
for bringing in fresh ideas and first class talent, and for their role as "hero" and 
"academic mentor". 
"Unless a (software) person feels good, they can choose to be quite 
unproductive .... You have to make sure that the environment is there to enable them to perform. " Divisional Manager, NT 
Redefining Employment Security. Since Sovereign, senior management has 
repeated many times that employment security could no longer be assumed. 
Early exiting of people was expected for several years. Senior management was 
intent on creating a flexible workforce with the ability to grow some areas quickly 
(eg., sales & marketing, network management) and shrink others quickly (eg., 
technicians, caterers). It wanted to foster a new mentality which placed business 
priorities first. High uncertainty and low morale was created in the entire 
organisation. 
Recent experienced recruits (managers and professionals) had lower expectations 
of employment security and were confident of finding employment in the extemal 
labour markets. A new definition of job security applies: time enough to make 
career progress or make ready for a career move. In the case of MPGs, 2-3 years 
was sufficient; for higher grados, 4-5 years. 
Recognising Employee Contributions. Traditionally line managers were expected 
to recognise individual contributions in the yearly appraisal exercise. With New 
Ideas, and significant bonuses for personal contractors, opportunities existed to 
link financial rewards with public recognition, a combination highly valued by 
employees. Some managers have done so with success and sensitivity to 
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individual and group contributions. They viewed this as important for 
performance and retention. With no management system as such, the use of 
public recognition remained patchy and considerable dissatisfaction was 
documented in the employee survey. Head Office responded by offering a new 
reward scheme (1992) whereby small financial rewards (225) could be given to an 
employee immediately after a job completed. 
Individuals also saw promotional steps as public recognition. The fact that a 
proniotion is accompanied by a financial reward reinforced the idea that the 
individual's contribution was significant. The mutual reinforcement of soft and 
hard benefits was clearly at play. Asking the researcher to give the 
demonstration to customers and presenting at an international conference also 
meant recognition. 
"Inevitably people talk about bonuses. They are very proud of it. 
I've done a good job, I am the best and this proves it. " Technical 
Group Leader 1, NT 
Improving Employee Involvement. With privatisation, the board was committed 
to increasing involvement of employees in the new BT. Direct briefings by 
managers, monthly inhouse newspaper, information telephone service, -and 
letters from the chairman were used for this purpose. Sir George Jefferson used 
the personal written message to staff emphasising the new attitudes and ways of 
working. Ian Vallance continued the practice of formal communications with his 
people. Despite these communication efforts, many employees complained of the 
lack of balance in the information received. - 
"We're not getting a balanced (press) view of things. Sometimes BT 
tries too hard to be positive. " MPG2, Support Systems, ISD 
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Improved communications did not stop the periodic speculation of relocations and 
redundancies fuelled by management statements. Individuals with outside 
experience were inclined to anticipate and job search. Sometimes BT lost people 
with the customer-orientation that it was trying to foster. 
"About every two years, we get threatened with relocation ... It is a 
real shame, we lost some excellent people in this last round-and 
we just moved within London. " Manager, Support Systems, ISD 
ImRroving Formal Listening/Sen ' 
_. 
In the past, sounding out the employee 
took place during the annual performance review and* during individual and 
group work meetings. Recently, the implementation of the one-year career plan 
gave managers an opportunity to raise sundry topics in a non-threatening., 
setting. In 1990-91, BT introduced an organisation-wide attitude (Care) survey 
with a public commitment to listen, explain and change. Management was keen 
to gauge the effectiveness of their programmes (e. g., TQM) and employee 
commitment to the new organisation. Topics covered included use of skills, 
recognition, job satisfaction, training, promotions, appraisals, relationship with 
manager, earnings and benefits, and security of employment. R&D adopted a 
systematic follow-up. The results indicated that people felt that career 
development (skills development and promotions) within the firm was poor. 
These results helped to persuade management of the importance of improving 
this area. Results also highlighted relatively low security of employment and 
pessimism. 
Improving Career Development. Since Sovereign (1991), there has been an 
organisation-wide effort to rejuvenate career development which had suffered 
setbacks in the 1980s because of multiple reorganisations. A concerted effort has 
taken place to install a robust, enduring and standardised approach to career 
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management including a one year personal development plan. In order to remedy 
the low morale caused by the eidting of many colleagues and the continuing 
uncertainty maintained by senior management, new career ladders were being 
devised in engineering, marketing and computing. The focus was on morale and 
persuading BT survivors of a future within the new structure. 
With sustained external recruitment in the 1980s, BT now had a significant 
number of senior and middle managers developed in the private sector. 
Attitudinal and style differences existed between these managers and those bred 
within BT. The "outside" managers were comfortable with a career which spans a 
number of organisations and do not feel wedded to BT. One would expect higher 
turnover among them. Selective exiting of managers who cling to the old ways 
has taken place and planned exiting of more managers was approved by the new 
chief executive (Michael Hepher). Coupled with continuing external recruitment, 
it has achieved a critical size of new style managers, and suggests that a private 
sector management culture will win out, characterised by higher levels of 
turnover. 
Within R&D, projected recruitment problems in the 1990s led to line 
management interest in improving retention of new graduates. The 1990 TQM 
study was followed by improved induction and early training and career 
development activities. This career development focus was provoked by 
Sovereign, not explicitly planned. Previously brought together as a group for one 
day of induction, and thereafter left in the research divisions, the recruits would 
now be treated as a peer group, given an initial day of induction, followed by 
visits to operational sites (e. g., exchange), and some early training and 
development activities. The new programme has been introduced throughout 
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R&D including Belfast and Glasgow. A similar programme has been launched by 
WN Division. 
Though many changes were made to career management, some areas continued 
to be neglected, such as the high potential schemes which lacked consistency, 
visibility and follow-up. While immediate managers took measures to develop 
and retain their best, their career development was not tied to the wider 
corporate needs. 
STRATEGIC USE OF SOFT BENEFITS 
BT has tried to strengthen most of the above soft benefits to enhance 
performance directly (employee contribution, and informal listening), or 
indirectly through improving morale (employee involvement, formal listening, 
career development, and company image). On the other hand, offering 
employment security which had been tied to the value of BT as a good employer, 
has definitely deteriorated. Challenging work to encourage high performance has 
degraded as well in some areas; the work environment remained positive but 
suffered from the climate of low morale. 
Managers viewed some of the soft benefits as retention mechanisms: challenging 
work, employment security, teleworking, employee recognition, and informal 
listening, all of which were being modified for business, not care, requirements. 
Retention awareness and activities of lower levels of management already was 
well established, but very local in perspective. 
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Within R&D, challenging work was more closely aligned to business 
requirements and not everyone was able to adapt to the new performance 
expectations. Introducing teleworking and improving initial career development 
for graduates were tied to skill retention goals. Recent improvements in career 
development followed from changes in work design and the desire to improve 
morale. Recognition of employee contributions and their involvement also 
targeted morale. 
CONCLUSION: COM13INING HARD & SOFT BENEFITS 
Changes in hard benefits were meant to produce changes in performance and 
facilitate the recruitment of absent skills to create this desired performance. 
Retention was given little attention. On the other hand, changes in soft benefits 
served several purposes. Again heightening performance dominated, but 
teleworking served the retention purpose while other benefits targeted morale 
which could influence both retention and performance. 
There was a shift away from linking salary increases to promotions and towards 
linking financial rewards to performance recognition. The new combination of 
hard and soft benefits creates a strong and selective retention impact. Within 
R&D, improving recognition was given serious attention. Some managers were 
encouraging a broader range of rewards: working diner with the wives, all none 
taxable; presenting quality awards (2200) and certificate on a hospitality event 
when the directors were present, or in a bi-yearly assembly of all departmental 
staff. The idea was to give both private and public rewards, and link bonus to 
recognition. One area of difficulty has been the individual bonus which conflicts 
with the basic group unit. 
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In order for this shift to be successful, employees have to alter their career 
concept away from vertical paths and towards horizontal paths emphasising 
performance, not the job per se. However, recent changes in career development 
reasserted vertical paths for professionals and lower management. Though not 
fully articulated, the push on career development and new career paths will help 
to maintain a general retention effect. 
We conclude that management has been pursuing a performance strategy by 
adjusting the package of hard and soft benefits offered. Since Sovereign, greater 
attention has been given to critical skills for business success, and this has 
prompted personnel and line managers to introduce retention interventions for 
specific purposes (ad hoc salary increase to headoff poaching, teleworking for a 
leaver). 
SUPPORTING BUSINESS STRATEGY 
WITH A SKILLS SUPPLY STRATEGY 
The business strategy thrusts impacted on the components of skills supply (see 
Table 5.5). The underlying question is whether the patterns of change represent 
a skills supply strategy. 
Shifting the Management Style (1981) used most skill supply levers available 
with emphasis on external recruitment and personal contracts. Though career 
development was not impacted directly, the notion of career underwent 
redefinition with less emphasis on vertical promotions and more on recognition of 
performance tied to business requirements. 
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TABLE 5.5 
LINKING BUSINESS STRATEGY & SKILLS SUPPLY IN BT 
ComDonents 
of-Skill Supggy 
Initial 
Recruitment 
Initial T&D 
-Job Design 
Perf. Appraisal 
Compensation 
Training 
Career Develop. 
Exiting 
Business Stra teg 
MSO GL MO R&D DEC TQM SOV 
1981 1981 19811981 19841985 1991 
x x xx xx 
x x 
x x xx xxx 
x 
x 
x 
x 
xxxx 
xxx 
MS: Management Style 
GL: Globarlsatlon 
MO: Modernisation 
R&D: Alignin R&D 
DEC: Decen? ralisatlon and districtisation 
TQM: Total Quality Management 
SOV: Project Sovereign 
x 
x 
xx 
x 
x 
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Globalisation (1981) of BT services meant the creation of new jobs and the 
eventual recruitment of nationals in other countries. The pace of changehas been 
very slow throughout the 1980s and few skill levers were applied. 
Modernisation (1981) of the network created new jobs for the digital 
environment, and emphasised job redesign, redeployment and exiting of surplus 
people. Training to maximize skill levels was the traditional policy and was 
expanded to include the new technology and its applications. The new capability 
of the network prompted new ways of operating and job redesign. Though some 
downsizing was targeted throughout the 1980s and 1990s in response to 
efficiencies, this was suspended for two years in the late 1980s to accelerate the 
modernisation programme. Massive recruitment took place followed by renewed 
downsizing. 
Aligning R&D (1981). Senior management had explicitly stated their intentions 
of realigning R&D, and supported the establishment of software centres in 
Belfast and Glasgow. Because R&D was involved at the earliest stages of 
introducing new technology and was the platform from which the modernisation 
programme was launched, it easily attracted the attention of senior management. 
Realignment was supported by several skill levers especially the recruitment of 
software skills, and secondarily retraining from hardware to software. Serious 
effort was made to access new sources of supply (Belfast and Glasgow). The local 
management gave sustained attention to the quality of the working environment 
and to career development to establish the new centres with retention given some 
consideration. 
With the growing emphasis on project management around specific business 
needs, line management concern to retain talent has become widespread, but less 
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attention has been paid to career development. This gap was recentlY addressed 
with the new career paths in response to Sovereign, and the spread of the career 
development plan. 
Total Quality Management (TQMI (1985) was accompanied by the recruitment of 
small numbers of experts to fill the new key positions of a TQM organisation. 
Training of all managers was attempted and management appraisals were linked 
to the Quality Plan in a general sense. Quality awards were introduced. This 
strategy aimed to introduce private sector elements into the management 
culture, that is, improving performance continuously and a customer focus. With 
Sovereign, the merger of TQM into the line functions implied some job redesign. 
Post-Sovereign, a second wave of TQM would involve training for all BT people. 
Restructurine, for Business StraLqgy. Some of the above strategic thrusts were 
supported by major restructuring. Districtisation (1984) increased 
decentralisation and gave the new management style a structure through which 
it could operate. The creation of relatively autonomous large business units 
required the recruitment of many business specialisms (marketing, sales, finance 
and accounting) and the broadening of upper middle managers to integrate all 
functions. Recruitment of experienced managers and professionals and fresh 
graduates in the specialisms was supported by massive training of existing BT 
people. The new flatter structure also meant exiting some senior and middle 
managers. The umbrella agreements with the unions allowed for local job 
redesign. Negotiations at the district level consumed much personnel time. This 
restructuring acted as a catalyst for the 1981 strategic thrusts of Management 
Style and Modernisation which had made limited progress. 
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More recently, Sovereign (1991) launched a dramatic restructuring and job 
redesign in the management ranks, a thorough job reassessment of all positions, 
and a significant downsizing exercise for middle managers. Training programmes 
in leadership and TQM were introduced. Improved induction and career 
development for the specialisms and management ranks followed thereafter to 
support the new structure and improve morale. As in Districtisation, this 
restructuring has acted as a catalyst for shifting the management style, and in 
addition, inculcating TQM. Sovereign may also galvanise the halting thrust of 
globalisation which made little headway in the 1980s. 
In reviewing the above strategic thrusts, one notes that the pace of change 
starting in 1981 was slow. With privatisation and the creation of districts (late 
1984), the pace accelerated. TQM (1985) also took a few years to become 
operative, and was confined to the management cadre. By the late 1980s these 
interventions had matured, and the next restructuring (Sovereign) activated 
rapid change in 1991. Both restructurings were accompanied by a flurry of 
adjustments in skill supply components. But were these changes coordinated and 
mutually reinforcing, that is, a deliberate strategy? 
A strong case exists in favour of Management Style where a sustained 
programme was at work. New types of managers with new skills were desired to 
transform the management cadre. External recruitment of new skills and exiting 
of old skills was the cornerstone supported by other levers. Performance-related 
hard and soft benefits were introduced and maladaptive managers were exited. 
TQM for the management group was sustained over several years (1985-91) 
through a variety of skill supply levers. Both major structural changes 
(Districtisation and Sovereign) mobilised the new management style. 
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Aligning R&D also was supported by a long-term programme to modify the mix of 
skills with high reliance on external recruitment for professional skills, and work 
reorganisation and training for management style. Recent work organisation has 
targeted productivity of professionals. 
INFLUENCE OF HRM CULTURE ON SKILL SUPPLY PATTERNS 
Within BT, five features of the HRM culture are noteworthy: civil service 
inheritance, unions, personnel management style, workforce planning, and top 
management. 
Civil Service Inheritance had a mixed influence on attempts to change the skills 
supply. Because of its defence of employment security, BT has consistently 
maintained high standards of recruitment and training with ample resources 
allocated for these activities. Changes in focus and breadth could easily take 
place. On the other hand, this same inheritance resisted appraisals to specific 
goals and compensation linked to the business value of performance. Similarly it 
opposed promotions based heavily on performance. However it did indirectly 
support broadening of individuals by matching Promotion-ready candidates with 
diverse job openings as they arose. Lastly it opposed exiting people on any 
grounds other than evident incompetence, and ensured that any early releases be 
done according to age and tenure and not performance or skill. 
The Unions have had, in the opinion of this researcher, mostly a negative impact 
on skills management with the exception of supporting broad training. From 
their perspective, the BT leadership was attempting to undermine their influence 
and was attacking many of the long established values of unionism such as 
tenure. The 1980s remained a period of difficult labour relations with two strikes. 
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The unions have succeeded in slowing the pace of most of the changes. It has had 
less success within management ranks where the use of personal contracts has 
increased and where many managers are anxious to adopt the practice. Within 
R&D, the unions involved were not militant, reflecting the professional style of 
researchers. 
Personnel Management Style has been, until recently, one of administration 
reflecting the civil service emphasis on fairness and formalisation. It has had 
mixed impact on the skill supply changes, lacking in flexibility and failing to 
explore and institute novel solutions. Though its recruitment and career 
development policies and practices were sound, even they lacked flexibility when 
confronted with rapidly changing labour markets and career paths that became 
inoperative with repeated restructuring. To be fair, some flexibility emerged 
within the districts when personnel directors reported to the district managers. 
Similarly a division like R&D had developed its own personnel organisation 
giving some support to line managers. It was able to capitalise on the Sovereign 
push and introduced new flexibility in addressing skill issues. Under the 
leadership of Vaughn Young, the HR strategists became supportive and proactive 
advisors to line management and were active participants at two levels of middle 
management. Changes in recruitment, training 'and compensation have taken 
place in a timely manner to meet skill concerns. 
Workforce Planninz has had little influence except for initial recruitment and 
exiting. It was focussed very much on numbers and grades and was practiced 
throughout the organisation and at the various headquarters. In general, the 
skill level of planners was poor and acquired on-the-job. Planning did however 
offer a background against which change agents could indicate more 
sophisticated ways of planning and managing skills. Within R&D, there was a 
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slow adjustment of the skillbase. Substantial recruitment of software skills 
took place in the second half of the decade, yet the proportion of hardware to 
software skills was 50/50 in 1991. Part of the problem resided in the business and 
workforce planning practices which were too "coarse" for skill decisions. The need 
to support existing hardware systems (e. g., System X) for the duration of their 
life span also encouraged slow adjustments 
The arrival of Sovereign has helped to reorient both personnel management 
style and workforce planning towards business requirements and skill issues by 
formalising teamwork between line and personnel management. However in the 
short term, workforce planning continues to focus on numbers and grades to meet 
downsizing targets supporting financial targets. 
Top Management has proved to be the dominant change agent, and did so by self- 
transformation through modifying the management style and radical 
restructuring. The process spanned the 1980s and into the 1990s. Within R&D 
the shift in management style created section managers with broad financial and 
HR responsibilities and with a keen interest in managing the skillbase. Locating 
HR responsibilities at the section level helps to offset the cohesiveness and 
longevity that tends to characterise the research groups. It remains to be seen to 
what extent section managers use the various HRM levers at their disposal to 
support their core business activities. Ifigher levels of R&D management also 
demonstrated an awareness of the skillbase, but as of late 1991, neither they 
nor personnel had a Division-wide strategy for creating and managing the 
appropriate skills mix. 
In conclusion, the HRM culture of BT has been as much an obstacle as a solution 
to a skills supply strategy. Stated another way, the HRM culture needed 
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modifications before significant adjustments in skills supply could be made. After 
a decade of change, much remains to be accomplished. Sovereign does offer some 
promise, and has created a flurry of skill strategy impulses within the divisions 
(eg., WN protected scarce skill groups from downsizing), and some initial 
headquarter moves in this direction within the PPB. Compared to the rest of BT, 
the R&D Division had a less negative HRM culture, but nevertheless remained 
anchored in the wider BT culture. 
.I 
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CHAPTER 6. ROYAL SIGNALS & RADAR ESTABLISHMENT (RSRE) 
The Royal Signals & Radar Establishment (RSRE) case completes the data base 
of this thesis. This military lab underwent the same Thatcher revolution as BT 
(Chapter 5), but at a slower pace. The push on efficiency and customer service 
has culminated in several reforms. 
OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANISATION1 
RSRE is aWinistry of Defence (MOD) establishment with its main sites in Great 
Malvern, south-west of Birmingham. RSRE advises MOD on a wide range of 
technology options and applications around the core technology of signal 
processing, assists in the procurement process, and undertakes strategic research 
in enabling technologies. 
A dozen clients are involved, represented by the Defence Staff, the Procurement 
Executive, and the Chief Scientific Officer (see Figure 6-1). MOD work accounted 
for 90% of the E781 million turnover (1991-92 DRA Annual Report). Other 
customers include the Civil Aviation Authority and the Department of Trade & 
Industry (DTI). Minor customers include the U. S. Strategic Defence Initiative, 
the EEC programmes (ESPRIT), and some firms. With a 75%-25% split between 
intramural and extramural work, the latter takes place in industry, universities 
and institutes with RSRE awarding and supervising the contracts. 
IFor national security reasons, detailed figures on workforce, projects and budgets are 
not available. 
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FIGURE 6.1: 
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In April 1991, RSRE became the Electronics Division of the new executive 
Defence Research Agency (DRA). DRA had 12,000 employees (1500 in RSRE) 
with headquarters in Pyestock. Later that year, John Chisholm from the private 
sector was chosen- as Chief Executive. Plans were made for asset and staff 
rationalisation, and total quality process and a customer satisfaction survey were 
introduced. 
During the 1980s RSRE had Nigel Hughes as Managing Director. This career 
MOD scientist was supported between' 1984-1989 by Steve Robinson as Director 
of Information Systems, an active scientist on secondment from the company 
Philips. When Hughes became interim Chief Executive of the DRA in 1990, 
Robinson replaced him as Managing Director. 
HISTORY OF THE ORGANISATION & ITS ENVIRONMENT 
TIUTCHERISM 
The 1980s saw the arrival of the Thatcher ideology of reliance on market and 
quasi-market forces to discipline the Civil Service and obtain value for money. 
The conservative government diminished the power of the unions over labour 
markets through modifications of the Employment Act in 1980 and 1982 (Sisson 
1989). In 1982 the government introduced the Financial Management Initiative 
giving senior civil servants more responsibility and authority. New management 
systems and budgeting systems were introduced to empower the "managers". 
Reductions in the size of the Civil Service were pursued: between 1979 and 1984, 
by 15%, and an additional 5% by 1987, with continued pressure since then. 
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In the first half of the 1980s, the level of military procurement increased by 15%, 
but staffing levels within both the Procurement Executive and the REs decreased 
by 15% (HMSO, 1989). In 1985, MOD introduced the Cardinal Point System 
which made use of general specifications and readily available technology. It 
consequently increased MOD's need for informed customer capability supplied by 
the REs. 
That same year, MOD introduced the Savings and Enhancement Measures. The 
annual review was to redirect 10% of funds to new priorities. The mechanism 
quickly fell into disrepute because only small isolated parts of the research 
program were reviewed at a time. MOD became suspicious that the REs were 
protecting their vested interests to the detriment of MOD priorities. 
.I 
In 1987, the government launched the Next Steps Program which proposed the 
creation of executive agencies focused on service delivery and a smaller 
manageable civil service (HMSO, 1988a). MOD announced its intention to merge 
the non-nuclear establishments into the DRA. Meanwhile, MOD came under 
attack by the Prime Minister's Efficiency Unit (HMSO, 1988b), and by the 
Advisory Council on Science and Technology (HMSO, 1989). The Council 
supported the view that the REs had lost some of their breadth of expertise 
through repeated rationalisation. 
MOD responded by launching Package Management (PM) in 1989 to sharpen the 
customer-supplier relationship and introduce elements of competition. The main 
points include (1) a transparent link between each military requirement and the 
resources used within the RE to meet that requirement; (2) the creation of a 
Trading Fund where the REs compete with the civil sector for specific work; and 
(3) the creation of package managers within each establishment. 
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The above two thrusts (DRA and PM) impacted on the establishments in 1989-90, 
and complemented each other. DRA was vested in April 1991. Simulated trading 
was scheduled for 1992 with full trading in 1993. Meanwhile the government 
continued restructuring the civil service (HMSO, 1990). By 199150 agencies were 
planned employing 200,000 of the 550,000 in the civil service. 
The amplitude of the changes within the REs was increased by the 1990 MOD 
proposal of "Options for Change" which foresaw the reduction of the armed forces 
by 20% over a five year period, and by extension a reduction of the headcount of 
the future DRA from 12000 to 7000 in the same period. Where these reductions 
would take place remained unclear. In fact, the next few years would see minimal 
downsizing concentrated among the support staff (DRA Annual Report, 1991-92, 
1992-93). 
TECHNOLOGY 
The 1980s witnessed a rapid global expansion in knowledge and technology, and 
the maturing of computing into a science. Equipment with a high technology 
component became progressively more expensive, thus putting pressure on the 
workforce budget. The 1980s also saw the growing importance of the EEC as an 
economic and political force. It supported European R&D collaboration and a 
European market in armaments. The REs became MOD representatives in these 
collaborative cost-sharing ventures. 
The second half of the 1980s saw some growth in RSRE because of Command & 
Control technology. Both the Faulklands and Gulf Wars confirmed the 
importance of surveillance, intelligence, planning scenarios, and command and 
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control for precision warfare and few casualties. This technology also permitted 
the prime minister to exercise a measure of real-time control. 
CONCLUSION: BUSINESS IMPERATIVES & HRM STRATEGY 
The new environment of RSRE imposed customer orientation and accountability. 
With a thin and expert skillbase, RSRE would have to modify its research 
programme more frequently to remain relevant and competitive. Customer 
responsiveness would require adjusting the skillbase, made difficult by pressures 
1P 
for downsizing. This new way of doing business would require multiple 
organisational changes including modifying the traditional scientific culture. 
BUSINESS STRATEGY 
RESEARCH EXCELLENCE 
In 1978, RSRE was created out of the merger of Telecommunications, Radar 
Research & Development and other small establishments. RSRE benefited by a 
dramatic increase in the concentration of expertise within its organisational 
boundary. The 1979 Strathcona (the then Minister of Defence Procurement) 
Report set a new orientation. All engineering development would be done by 
industry, as well as short-term research whenever practicable. The REs were to 
concentrate on longer term applied and strategic research, and the support of the 
Procurement Executive of MOD. 
Throughout the 1980s, all REs reported to the Controller Establishments, 
Research and Nuclear (CERN) within the MOD Procurement Executive (see 
Figure 6.1). As a dedicated service organisation, RSRE was not free to set its own 
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business strategy. However, it did achieve considerable freedom in setting the 
research agenda 'because of expert power and its overview of the research 
process. RSRE's independence from MOD was strengthened through long-term 
costing within the civil service (i. e., predictable funding) and the global budget 
attributed to it. 
With the rapid changes in global technology, the mix of research activities within 
RSRE was adjusted over the 1980s. Management discarded less promising 
avenues and supported new ones. By tapping into the global community of 
scientists through conferences and collaboration with other labs (military, civil, 
and university), RSRE kept abreast of the current developments. With the 
explosion of computing and telecommunications in the 1980s, RSRE relied 
considerably on the civil sector to complement its own modest programme, and 
came to play a project management role in EEC collaborations. Thanks to its 
national and international standing, RSRE easily obtained these contracts. In 
this manner, MOD had access to expensive technology despite its constrained 
budget. 
The gradual adjustment of the technology mix took place during the 1978-85 
rationalisation period. RSRE built on its strengths by reinforcing programmes 
already in operation. New resources became available as of 1986 for Command & 
Control, but RSRE was salary disadvantaged in its competition with the civil 
sector for scarce skills. The growing use of systems in all areas of RSRE research 
compounded the problem. 
Adjustments to the technology mix was not an organisation-wide concern. A few 
key players were concerned with the pull-through of research output from the 
long-term investigations to the application stage. Research programmes were 
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determined internally by the scientists and their managers rather than being 
customer-led. Effectiveness, not efficiency, was the main criterion of success. 
"MOD always wanted breadth from RSRE to construct vast 
electronic systems based on novel and up-to-date platform devices. 
This will always be the case. " Technology Director 
ALANAGING MOD 
MOD had its own modest scientific staff who relied heavily on RSRE and were 
often resourced from the REs. Because of the fragmented project management 
system operating within MOD, RSRE management had a privileged perspective 
overviewing the entire research process from emerging technologies (horizon of 
10+ years) to equipment procurement based on competing civil contracts. They 
were persuasive in defending their preferred research agenda and in justifying 
their rate of progress. 
Following the allocation of a global budget to meet specified military research 
requirements, the funds were allocated within RSRE on a flexible basis according 
to management commitments and research opportunities which emerged during 
the year. With the emphasis on spending the year's allocation, those areas 
spending rapidly were able to absorb any unspent funds in other areas. Care was 
also taken to supplement the modest strategic research budgets with some 
medium-term funds to pursue a promising avenue. The reverse occasionally took 
place in order to demonstrate a promising application. 
The MOD military were irritated when RSRE refused to adjust its research 
programme in response to changing MOD priorities unless additional funds were 
made available. This antagonism between the scientists and the military was 
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acute in the Applied Physics Department, and less so in the Information Systems 
Department where people tended to work more closely with the military on 
projects with shorter horizons and more evident applications. Despite the 
Savings Enhancement Measures of 1985, RSRE management was able to operate 
as usual by negotiating small parcels of the research programme at a time, and 
by making minor savings to the e3dsting programme. The growing dissatisfaction 
in MOD and its shrinking budgets helped overcome the strong inertia to change 
in this ministry. 
"In the past, it was exercised on a resourcing axis rather than a 
programme axis .... People tended to do what we call salami slice, a little there, spread the research programme. " ISSBU 
Superintendent A 
"In the 1980s we experienced reorganisation of the (MOD) 
customer interface, moved from a loose coupling to a tight 
coupling. " Package Manager B 
PACKAGE AMNAGEMENT (PM) 
In 1988, RSRE senior management understood that the ground rules were about 
to change, requiring a radical change in attitude. Customer orientation became 
the guiding value and locking-in the main customer the objective. 
MOD generated a list of 80 military requirements (research and advice). Each 
request was now equated with specific and exclusive resources. The existing 
research activities of the REs were mapped onto the requirements with 
significant cuts planned for 1992. RSRE management complied and tried to gain 
their trust. Despite their concerns over* the tendency for cutting enabling 
technologies, managers fully cooperated while making their views known. MOD 
management came to recognise the problem and agreed to three technology 
packages owned by senior MOD staff. Thus "soft" persuasion proved to be 
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effective, and would be required to persuade MOD decision-makers of the 
dangers of short-termism for the research process. 
"The customer felt he wasn't getting a coherent picture ... wanted a sort of one-stop shopping .... The list of military functions or 
requirements was devised for this purpose. " ISSBU Director 
"If people think that they can judge a programme after five years, 
in many instances they would be wrong. " Technology Director 
"If there is micro management in PM it will not work ... money is 
only good in big lumps. " ADBU Director 
PM removed the budget flexibility previously enjoyed and gave MOD sufficient 
information to control the research programme. RSRE's new strategy (1989-91)., 
included full compliance with MOD's expectations and the rapid installation of a 
commercial accounting system. Package managers demonstrating MOD zeal, 
transparency and customer sensitivity were installed. The senior and middle 
management shaped a new organisation composed of business units (BUs), and 
energies were channelled into making it work while buffering lower levels of 
staff. Staffing levels were matched to assignments within each BU; this meant 
priority recruiting in BUs under strength. 
"At the moment you must not appear to resist the customer and 
you must do his bidding. " ADBU Director 
"We're trying to establish a rapport with the customer which 
hopefully will mean that when we advise him to use DRA he will do 
so. " Package Manager B 
"I have taken the strain of writing the reports and doing the 
interacting myself .. in the transition. " ISSBU Superintendent B 
I have been buffering those below my level. " MEBU PSO A 
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DRA & BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
RSRE attempted to influence the nature of the emerging DRA. The interim 
staffing created an opportunity. Under the leadership of Nigel Hughes at DRA 
(previously Managing Director of RSRE) and Steve Robinson at RSRE 
(previously Deputy Director of the Information Systems Dept., and now a 
member of the DRA board), a decentralised structure was implemented (April 
1991). Opportunities to increase the scope of research were welcomed so long as 
MOD benefits were forthcoming. The BUs were challenged to create business 
strategies for internal and external customers. 
"In the commercial area, we have 10% of our current business, and 
that is the bit we have got to grow. " MEBU Director 
"The BUs have a fundamental problem in that at first sight they 
have lost all autonomy .... They have to work out an internal 
supplier strategy. " Package Manager C 
"We haven't worked out the ethos, our loyalty to RSRE as opposed 
to the BU. " ISSBU Director 
"We lack the private venture cushion, have only external customers 
and dominated by MOD. " Business Development Manager 
The framework document imposed policy from three areas: MOD, Treasury, and 
the Civil Service. It also provided for subsequent negotiations to empower DRA 
as much as feasible. RSRE wanted to include a business development component, 
and in a manner of speaking, return to its roots of serving both the civil and 
military markets. RSRE felt a great need to create new streams of revenue to 
replace the shrinking military budget and thus maintain its present size. A 
critical mass of scientists with sufficient breadth and depth of skills was thought 
essential for high quality science. 
CJL4PTER SM ROYAL SIGNALS & RADAR ESTABLISMVENT (RSRE) 
- 
PAGE 228 
In the past, RSRE often turned down remunerative civil contracts because of 
budget constraints. The establishment ran on gross running costs (includes staff, 
stores, maintenance, travel, but not capital and extramural). Additional revenues 
could not translate into additional resources (eg., hiring additional staff, buying 
equipment). DRA has proposed net running costs with the ability to expand 
beyond the MOD budget. Treasury resisted this solution because of the objective 
to reduce the overall size of the public sector. Negotiations continued with 
Treasury. Experience in other Agencies has indicated the continuation of 
constraints in several areas (Dopson, 1993; Mellon, 1993). 
CONCLUSION: BUSINESS STRATEGY & HRM IMPLICATIONS 
Increasing customer focus took on a structural dimension with the introduction of 
package management and agency status. The new structures would involve new 
work organisation for tighter project management, and new management roles 
with a general business perspective. The breadth and depth of the skillbase 
became an important issue. In order to serve and compete effectively, RSRE 
needed to maintain a critical mass of researchers. Downsizing was viewed as a 
threat to the skillbase. 
RSRE AS AN ESTABLISHMENT 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
RSRE had a primarily functional structure with two large departments: Applied 
Physics and Information Systems. The former specialised in under-pinning 
technologies (materials, signal processing) and the latter in applications and 
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systems which in time included computing and telecommunications. Each 
department was composed of six area groups with each group having about five 
research divisions (30-40 employees per division). Support departments included 
Engineering & Services, and Administration. The Corporate Secretary was in 
charge of finance and personnel. 
The departmental structure was notoriously poor for inter-department relations 
and resource sharing. Over the 1980s, this became more of a problem with the 
growing importance of systems in all areas of research. With PM, it also became 
important to demonstrate the relevance of technology research which could best 
be done through a demonstration or prototype. 
The arrival of PM and DRA gave senior management within RSRE the 
motivation to restructure the organisation (1989). Planning took place 
throughout 1990 with the active participation of middle managers and became 
official in April 1991 (see Figure 6.2). The main innovation was the six BUs: Air 
Defence & Air Traffic Control (ADBU), Communications & Information Systems 
(CISBU), Electro-Optics (EOBU), Micro-Electronics (MEBU), Integrated 
Surveillance Systems (ISSBU), and Electronic Components (ECBU). Both ADBU 
and MEBU combined divisions from both of the old departments. Excess middle 
managers became either package managers or the management cell supporting 
the BU director. Other important elements included a Business Development 
Department for initiating and coordinating non-MOD business, and dedicated 
finance and personnel managers. 
"Prior to the reorganisation, the two departments fought for 
resources. Now the Directors of Technology and Commercial take 
an RSRE view. " Commercial Director 
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"There was a degree of friendly rivalry between the two 
departments or factions .... Now the key position for getting the 
work done is the BU director, whereas before it was more the 
responsibility of the deputy directors. " Technology Director 
In 1991 RSRE became the Electronics Division of the DRA, one of four divisions 
within a decentralised structure. The divisions coincided with the previous 
establishments which had little overlap in products and services, with the 
exception that RSRE supplied electronics support to the other REs. 
SKILLS STRUCTURE 
Of the 1500 employees present in 1991, about 700 were scientists (Scientific 
- Officers and more senior grades). Within the physics-oriented areas, PhDs were 
common. Within the systems-oriented areas, a variety of degrees were present 
including engineering and mathematics. Because of the requirement of national 
security, detailed information was not available. 
WORK ORGANISATION 
A team of scientists with a Team Leader (usually a PSO) may have anywhere 
from 7 to 30 members divided into small groups working on specific problems. 
The Team Leader assigns tasks, monitors progress and coaches as required. 
Informal networks of scientists facilitate the sharing of information; the coffee 
room plays a very important role. 
Individual Merit (IM) Scientists head their'own small team focused on long-term 
research, but advise widely within their division. Often the IM may overview the 
whole team in association with the Team Leader in shared leadership. 
-W 
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Stable teams focus on a specific technology. Some turnover takes place through 
promotions and the spinning off of new groups and teams. Where a research area 
is abandoned, the team members are incorporated in other teams. The coherence 
of a team depends on the culture of achievement and common aims fostered by 
the Team Leader and the IM. This culture easily survives low levels of turnover. 
However, experience has shown that the culture must be regrown if the team is 
disbanded and reformed in a few years. 
The spinning off of new groups coincides with the personal development of a 
scientist who stakes out a research problem, convinces colleagues of the value of 
his approach, and gradually accumulates resources (material and staff) to pursue 
the problem. 
"At first, the person is given minimal support, then if seen as 
promising, more resources are given. This new work would be 
added to his regular workload. " MEBU PSO B 
I try to match the requirement to the skills and interests of the 
people who are doing the job .... I find little point in forcing people to do things. " ISSBU PSO A 
"How we operate here and the way in which I supervise .... growing a local culture with individuals who share those same aims and 
understand that (scientific) perspective. " ISSBU IM A 
"It's important to maintain (group) cultures; they are hard to grow 
back. " CISBU Director 
Since 1985, the polarisation of managerial and technical work has grown 
considerably in tandem with the sharpening of the customer-supplier relation 
and the growth of repayment work (DTI, EEC). Thus Team Leaders now do 
exclusively managerial work with no hands-on technical work. There has also 
.I 
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been growing emphasis on adherence to milestones and decreasing flexibility to 
adjust the work plan. 
With more commercial work expected, a shorter-term orientation will be required 
in order to translate research into commercial products. This means more 
flexibility in work assignments for scientists and less attention to their preferred 
topics. 
"I'm upset a bit about the little technical content in my work, but I 
want control, so I've learned to trade-off. " MEBU PSO A 
"Some will have to learn to let go of pet projects. " Technology 
Director 
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
The interviews demonstrated a widely shared culture of civil service beliefs. As 
part of the civil service, RSRE shares certain basic assumptions and beliefs: 
employment for life, slow and fair promotions, strong link between grade and 
status, hidden agenda of politicians, and contribution to the well-being of the 
country. Anyone can become a manager through accumulated experience and 
some management training. 
The interviews also indicated a variety of beliefs on science, that is, a scientific 
culture. Scientific breakthroughs are uncertain and unpredictable (Anderson 
and Meingartner, 1987). Though science involves both'individuals and groups of 
scientists, one brilliant scientist is worth ten good ones. Researchers are 
internally motivated by their desire to achieve and externally by their need for 
recognition; the two are inseparable (NEller, 1986). They respond better to 
rewards than to punishment. A scientist can best manage other scientists, and 
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management skills are obtained through experience and some training (Miller, 
1986; Hill and Collins-Eaglin, 1985). Regular hands-on experience is necessary to 
remain an expert. Managers become progressively less technically able As they 
climb the management ladder, while maintaining a broad understanding (Allen 
and Katz, 1986). 
Within a world-wide collegiate, scientists are guided by professional standards of 
achievement and excellence. Intelligent persuasion of one's colleagues is seen as 
legitimate; most other forms of influence are considered illegitimate and counter- 
productive (Miller, 1986). Expert advice is given to customers with the 
expectation that they will (and certainly ought) to listen. 
Within RSRE, informal networks abound based on common scientific interests 
and friendship. Sharing of expert advice is highly valued. Some mutual support 
also takes place within work groups and teams, with indirect individual 
competition against standards of excellence. Regular coffee breaks and 
gatherings in the coffee room facilitate exchange of varied information on 
individuals and the organisation. 
Two sub-cultures were anchored in the two departments and their different 
approach to research. Applied Physics had a significantly higher status because 
of its deep scientific roots, and its ability to recruit excellent scientists. 
Information Systems was seen as engineering related with a shallow foundation 
in science. Systems experienced regular difficulties in hiring premium skills 
sought by the civil sector. With the growth of repayment work, pockets of a new 
culture were being created where the distinction between applied physics and 
systems was less strong and where the two were seen as complements. 
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"We are trying to merge two distinct cultures .... 
A systems designer 
cannot really afford to sit and wish. " ISSBU Superintendent B 
"The applied scientists saw the other side as ivory tower with their 
feet off the ground, and these lot saw the others as Philistines 
concerned with dirty things like communications systems and 
computers. " Technology Director 
The arrival of PM, DRA and projections of rapidly shrinking budgets created the 
momentum for a culture shift. Applied Physics was more vulnerable than 
Systems because of its relative distance from the customers. Senior management 
seized the opportunity to restructure the organisation with complementary 
integration of applied physics and systems. Participation of middle managers was 
prominent. 
The actions of multiple change agents have quickened the transition. The three 
package managers and some BU directors have repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of the stakes at risk (organisational survival), and the need to put the 
customer at the centre of a manager's preoccupations. BU directors are taking 
more risks to secure nqn-MOD contracts. They argued that more collaboration 
should take place across BUs to harness the possible synergies of talent and 
technology. 
CONCLUSION: BUSINESS STRATEGY & SKILLS SUPPLY 
Solidly anchored in a civil service and scientific culture, RSRE responded slowly 
to the growing pressures of the 1980s. Only with the contiguous introduction of 
PM and DRA did senior management mobilise the management cadre and 
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reorganise the establishment. The new BUs called for general managers and 
flexible research teams. Customer orientation, shorter projects, competitive 
bidding, and more rigorous project management characterised the new 
organisation. The new skills required would be difficult to recruit because of 
downsizing pressures and external recruitment competition. Reskilling the 
existing workforce was the only option. 
SKILLS SUPPLY & THE INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET 
CURRENT SKILL NEEDS & SUPPLY 
Between 1980 and 1985, strategic skills included science-based skills, system 
skills, innovation, project management (within RSRE and in collaboration with 
other laboratories), financial and administrative skills, and communications and 
persuasion (within RSRE and at the interface). Between 1985 and 1991, these 
skills grew in importance, and the list has expanded: quality assurance, 
negotiation (within RSRE and at the interface) and bartering (managers within 
RSRE exchanging tangible and intangible resources), business development, and 
strategic planning. Many of the required skills were thought to be present in 
RSRE, but have to be exercised more rigorously. However, skill shortages do 
exist. Within management ranks, there have appeared new groupings of skills for 
Supers, BU Directors and Package Managers around strategic business thinking, 
negotiation/persuasion of customers, suppliers and collaborators, and planning of 
capability and deliverables. 
Civilian and military organisations serving the military market depend heavily 
on the university graduate market (Lovering, 1991). In the past, RSRE has been 
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able to appeal more to the graduates' need for intellectual challenge and for 
opportunities to develop their skills. Civilian competitors usually offered better 
salaries, and recently offer relatively improved employment security. The greater 
emphasis on short-term work within RSRE has diminished the gap in 
challenging work that can be offered. 
Science-Based Skills. Throughout the 1980s, in order to deliver the broad range 
of services required by MOD, a broad range of science-based skills was called for: 
.1 
- materials science, 
device physics, math, electronics engineering, and frequencies. 
A fast growing need was found for software, system engineering, and 
telecommunications, with acceleration in the second half of the decade. Chronic 
shortages were experienced. Also, a shortage of circuit skills (bridge to systems 
engineering) and assessment skills (evaluating proposed systems through 
computing) has developed. 
There has been little success in hiring computing and communications graduates 
because of the premium paid by industry. These graduates became more 
attractive with the maturing of computing as a science. 
"We have a shortage of circuit skills. It is the bridge to systems 
engineering .... got to take them (ideas) to demonstration. " MEBU Director 
"There is a degree of amateurism in the way we run computer 
systems and large simulators .... That comes from not having a 
culture of understanding software engineering. We don't have the 
critical mass of that expertise. " ISSBU Director 
"We have skill shortages in software and system engineering 
skills .... 80 positions not filled or filled by lower skilled people. " Commercial Director 
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Innovation was sought primarily through long-term research with procurement 
horizons beyond 10-12 years. Brilliant scientists spear-headed the process. RSRE 
has maintained a high proportion of IM scientists who in turn have attracted 
other accomplished scientists and ambitious starters. A few departures in the 
last year has created some amdety among management. 
Project Management Skills. Team leaders (PSO) require a variety of skills: 
coordinating the contributions of small teams into a coherent research effort, 
guiding individuals in their work, listening for work and career problems and 
consequently adjusting the teams and work assignments, report writing to plan 
for the year and document progress, and some customer skills. Team leaders are 
also obliged to defend their assignments verbally and in writing. With the advent 
of PM, the administrative load had increased substantially. 
Though no shortage of team leaders exists, the depth of skills remains shallow 
because of a regular though modest poaching of experienced PSOs and the low 
level of recruitment which has taken place throughout the 1980s. Shallow skills 
is particularly prevalent in computing and systems. Those team leaders involved 
with repayment work have had little difficulty in adapting to the PM 
requirements. 
Quality Assurance. With shrinking resources and contract obligations of "doing 
things right the first time", each BU has assigned a quality manager to establish 
a process, with the expectation that, in time, operational managers (Supers and 
PSOs) will integrate quality requirements into their on-going activities. The 
skills involved are absent. 
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Financial Manaffement. With the introduction of a commercial accounting 
system, all managers (Grades 5 to 7) have had to acquire a working knowledge of 
financial management through training. No skill shortages exist but their 
exercise has been superficial until the arrival of PM. 
Persuasion & Selling to MOD. PM has formalised the informal working 
relationships. Adjustments have taken place smoothly in the applied areas. 
Listening to customer preferences and demonstrating customer responsiveness 
have increased. In contrast, scientists working in materials and enabling 
technologies were distant from procurement needs, and MOD staff often could 
not relate. Under PM, Supers tied to the technology packages and with no direct 
link to users seek to interest a variety of decision-makers within RSRE and 
MOD. A shift has taken place from justifying research with soft data on research 
impact to presenting hard data. 
"In the past we were tactless .... We have got to be far better at 
persuading people. " ADBU Director 
"Superintendents must present their work in a way that is 
comprehensible by the customers. Before we referred to the 
scientific community. " MEBU Superintendent A 
Business Development. This new department has a pressing need for new skills: 
competitive bidding in new markets (e. g., U. S. military market) and commercial 
presentations; persuasion of MOD customers and senior RSRE management of 
acceptable risks and benefits; venture management skills such as intellectual 
property and licensing negotiation, and development planning. 
Entrepreneurial people are sought with action bias, good technical and 
managerial skills, and a market focus. Within BUs, similar skills are required to 
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a lesser degree. Traditionally not needed in RSRE, entrepreneurs would often 
pass through in their late 20s, early 30s after acquiring a track record. The 
current skills supply remains uncertain. 
"The supply of entrepreneurial people is short in RSRE. 
Traditionally not needed. Entrepreneurs often pass through the 
establishment in their late 20s. " Business Development Manager 
Business development has increased the importance of planning and 
collaboration in the BUs. Harmonizing the work plan on the basis of aims and 
objectives, deliverables, and milestones must satisfy a variety of customers. 
Though not a set of new skills, greater expertise is required given the low 
tolerance for slippage and vague milestones. Increased participation in consortia 
(industry, universities and research laboratories) imposes considerable 
interaction of Grades 5,6, and 7 with managers in other organisations for 
integrated workplans. 
'Tmeliness is the biggest change .... Before if you didn't do it, well the job waited until you could do it. Now if you don't do it, the 
opportunity goes to waste. " Package Manager B 
"The role of BU director has become more demanding. He must 
produce a business plan with revenue goals, staff needs and 
deliverables. " Commercial Director 
INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET (ILM) 
Recruitment & Promotions. As part of the civil service, recruiting typically takes 
place at the entry level of Scientific Officer (SO) or Senior Scientific Officer 
(SSO). Senior positions are filled by internal promotions and transfers within 
RSRE and MOD. Similarly, some RSRE employees leave for positions within 
MOD or the wider civil service (e. g., embassy). 
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Promotions were -managed centrally within CM in MOD. As part of career 
planning, CM strongly urged high potential PSOs to take an assignment outside 
of RSRE and within the MOD organisation (most likely CERN headquarters). 
RSRE and the other establishments were also viewed as an important 
recruitment source for scientific personnel for the civil service. 
With constricting and inflexible budgets under PM, BU directors are seeking new 
ways of augmenting research productivity. Doctoral studies and post-doctoral 
work on site are being considered: RSRE would put laboratory resources at the 
disposal of these outsiders and the university or some other funding agency 
would cover their salaries. Decades ago, RSRE was considered a campus of 
Birmingham University. The relationship was not exploited, but the idea has 
resurfaced. 
Consultants are occasionally hired on short-term contracts for bringing in absent 
skills such as quality assurance and commercial accounting. Occasional exchange 
agreements take place with firms. Contractors are also used for short-term 
unpleasant and routine work that regular researchers are reluctant to 
accomplish. 17ypically consultants receive higher compensation than regular 
employees. 
Turnover. Aside from the rationalisation which took place in 1978-85, turnover 
figures remain very low (2-3%) and leavers; include scheduled retirees. Within 
RSRE, professional turnover varies from negligible to 5% (Engineering). These 
low figures mask two different problems: skill shortages and the need for new 
blood. 
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Retention of new graduates has consistently been excellent, though recruitment 
levels in some areas (eg., systems engineering) has remained inadequate with 
some improvement in the 1990-91 recession. In the opinion of managers, aside 
from universities, there are few competitors for the physics and mathematics 
graduates that are attracted by the research excellence of RSRE. 
In many areas, employees are spread thin, and the loss of a key PSO or IM can 
jeopardize a project. PSOs in mid-career are sought by large electronics-based 
laboratories in the private sector in the UX and the U. S.. IMs receive offers of 
chairs from U. K. universities and cash-rich opportunities in U. S. labs. On the 
other hand, because of the low turnover and slow growth since 1985, little 
recruitment has taken place, and often recruitment fails to fill the available 
positions. With little new blood coming in, the skill and training limitations of 
some of the older loyal employees became evident. The desire to stimulate the 
departures of these people was expressed, but the methods were uncertain. 
Mobilit . Below the PSO grade, transfers to other divisions was discouraged in 
order that the scientist achieve a high level of excellence within a narrow area. 
Thereafter, movement into other divisions was encouraged to broaden employee 
scope and as a preparation for a senior position. 
In the Systems Department, -senior management always tried to shift people 
from the Applied Physics Department to their area where skill shortages were 
chronic. Signal processing had a national reputation and recruited the best 
graduates; it could be used as an entry port. Their efforts were passively resisted 
by AP management such that little transference took place. Attempts by 
Personnel to encourage mobility in the late 1980s did not succeed. With the 
creation of BUs, some sharing of human resources was taking place. 
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"Over the last three years, we have tried several things to try and 
move people from physics to systems with very little success. " 
Principal Personnel Officer 
In summary, thoughtful skills deployment was mostly within and between 
divisions, with a variety of influences constraining deployment across units: skill 
building considerations, centrally defined career path for management, and local 
loyalty. To some extent, MOD and the civil service consider RSRE as part of their 
labour pool of scientific skills. The strengthening of scientific ILMs within the 
civil service was one of the achievements of the Fulton Report (1968). 
HUALAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AS CONTEXT 
ADJUSTING LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT 
One of the cornerstones of the civil service was the belief in a career generalist 
made possible by competitive recruitment and life-long employment (Fulton 
Report, 1968). Supported by a centralised civil service personnel administration, 
employees were highly valued, and loyalty and dedication were the norm. Within 
the scientific establishment, these views were complemented by others generated 
by scientific research, in particular the dedication and talent of individual 
scientists as the source of excellence nurtured over long periods of time. Within 
RSRE, the researchers were considered the principal asset. The reforms of the 
late 1980s and 1990s altered this view by adjusting the time horizons and the 
liberty of research agendas, emphasising the managerial approach, and 
diminishing employment security. Some decentralisation of personnel 
responsibilities took place but at a slow pace. 
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HRM WITHIN THE CIVIL SERVICE 
The Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1854) established competence in the civil 
service through fairness and equity in recruitment and promotions, a uniform 
system of recruitment, class division of officials, and the central power of 
Treasury (Tyson, 1988). The Civil Service Commission (1855) ensured open and 
competitive recruitment. More recently, the Fulton Report (1968) recommended 
the modernisation of the Civil Service within life-long employment. Deficiencies 
found included classes of officials that were out of date with the work done, 
specialists with no authority, lack of general management skills, and weaknesses 
in personnel management. Though research establishments benefited from 
fle3dbility in task assignments, the multiple classes created inequitable career 
prospects and recruitment problems. On the positive side, the Scientific Officer 
Class attracted scientists of great ability, and was reinforced by the following 
arrangements: 
Fluid Complemen "in . Numbers of posts at SO, SSO, and PSO are not 
determined by inspection and evaluation of each job but in terms of agreed 
percentages of the total complement of posts at the three levels. Its main 
effect is to permit the promotion of an officer who remains engaged upon 
the same work; his personal contribution is expected to be greater but the 
job itself does not change. 
Individual Merit Promotion. An outstanding member of the Scientific 
Officer Class can be promoted to a higher grade (e. g., PSO to SPSO) and 
continue to undertake individual research work instead of undertaking 
the responsibilities of managing scientific work normally allocated to jobs 
at these levels. 
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Some of the recommendations of the Report were gradually implemented in the 
1970s through the collective machinery of Whitley Councils and staff 
associations. Greenwood and Wilson (1989, ch. 6) have summarized the changes. 
The "managerial" concept of the civil servant was rejected, and the "generalist" 
maintained. The unified grades structure was adopted for only the three top 
grades (referred to as the open structure), and mergers took place within classes. 
A single class was instituted for scientists, and career management was extended 
to all members of this class. However, much of personnel management continued 
to be centralised within MOD divisional headquarters. 
In the 1980s, the Thatcher government increasingly challenged the Civil Service 
to improve services and to demonstrate value for money. The government 
diminished the power of the unions over labour markets by modifications of the 
Employment Act in 1980 and 1982 (Sisson, 1989). The 1980 negotiations and 
1981 strike led the government to set up a Committee of Enquiry into Civil 
Service Pay (Megaw Report, 1982). The government decided to put more weight 
on its ability to pay and labour market conditions. 
The Report went on to propose that civil service pay be enough (but not more 
than enough) to recruit, retain and motivate the employees while reconciling the 
national, economic and financial considerations of the government. It concluded 
that job security had a general effect, similar to career prospects, in attracting 
and retaining employees. The Report studied the question of whether pay 
negotiations should be decentralised to enhance managerial responsibility and 
involvement. It concluded this to be unwise unless it was accompanied by 
delegation of matching. financial authority and appropriate measures of 
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departmental performance. It also argued that service-wide pay grades 
facilitated staff mobility within and between departments. 
The Report encouraged the introduction of personnel practices common in the 
private sector, notably performance related pay, to give management a focus on 
performance improvement and help in recruitment and retention (strong 
performers attracted and fitting-in). However, tailored compensation packages to 
occupations or regions was discouraged. 
Most of the Megaw Report recommendations came to be implemented. 
Accountable management made additional progress with the Next Steps 
Initiative (1987) which launched the creation of executive agencies and the 
devolution of general management responsibilities to the Executive Director. The 
transfer of responsibilities was done in principle, and details were left to 
negotiations with the Civil Service and Treasury. 
CENTRALISM PERSONNEL FUNCTION 
WITHIN THE CIVIL SERVICE 
The changing structure of Personnel within the civil service is presented in 
Figure 6.3. Over the last two decades, the structural changes of the civil service 
represented two stages: centralised management of all HRM policies within the 
Civil Service Department (CSD) (1970s), followed by decentralisation among 
three central functions (1980s). First, Treasury reasserted the primacy of 
budgeting in personnel considerations. Second, the Efficiency Unit focussed on 
management improvements, and a residual third (presently the Office of the 
Minister for the Civil Service) grouped the remaining personnel functions. 
Government departments were very uncomfortable with the CSD and resisted 
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any erosion of their responsibilities and their role of coordinating and adapting 
these policy areas. and their practice for that department's particular needs and 
circumstances. See Metcalf & Richards (1990) and Tyson (1988) for a general 
discussion of the issue of departmental autonomy and centralised control. 
"The civil service remains centralist and restrictive. The personnel 
director (of RSRE) implements the volume of regulations. " 
Corporate Secretary 
CENTRALISM PERSONNEL FUNCTION WITHIN 
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
The personnel structure within MOD remained relatively unchanged in the 
1980s (see Figure 6-4). RSRE (as part of CERN) was serviced by the Civilian 
Management (CM) Organisation. With close ties to Treasury, CM undertook all 
personnel activities MOD-wide: recruiting, monitoring probation of recruits, 
setting conditions of service, industrial relations, promotion, retirement, and 
career management. Up to late 1990, CM(S) recruited through the Civil Service 
Commission for new graduates. Recruitment of junior administrative positions 
was delegated to local units. 
"Civilian Management (CM) is very old and at the centre of 
MOD ... it undertook all personnel activities 
for MOD. " DRA 
Personnel Officer 
"The personnel department was a skeleton plugging into the 
central organisation. " Principal Personnel Officer. 
Training was the responsibility of both CM(Specialists) and another unit called 
CM(Training). CM(S) set training policy and organised a training programme for 
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FIGURE 6.3: 
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE CIVIL SERVICE 
1968 - November'81 
CIVIL SERVICE DEPT 
TREASURY 
CIVIL SERVICE PAY AND MANAGEMENT 
COMMISSION GROUP I 
November'81 - 1987 
CABINET OFFICE TREASURY 
EFFICIENCY MANAGEMENT& 
UNIT PERSONNEL OFFICE PAY & MAN 
I GROUP 
I 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
1987 
CABINET OFFICE 
TREASURY 
EFFICIENCY OFFICE OF THE 
UNIT MINISTER FOR THE --*PAY & MAN 
CIVIL SERVICE GROUP 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
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senior managers. CM (Training) offered training on general management topics 
(eg. project management), and would arrange for specialty courses as required 
with an outside provider. 
On obtaining qualification from the Civil Service Commission (through its 
commissioners) and brought on board, an employee obtained an automatic yearly 
increment on the salary scale unless there was a discipline action. Pay was set by 
Treasury. 
Promotions were managed through a CM(S) promotion board addressing MOD- 
wide candidates. The IM Scheme was structured by Treasury and coordinated by 
CM(S). The panel would have people from within MOD and from the community 
outside. 
The relationship between CM(S) and RSRE Personnel was effectively that of 
headquarters and skeletal branch office. All employee files were kept at CM(S). 
From management perspective in RSRE, CM did not offer a coherent and 
responsive personnel service. 
The McGraw Report and the Financial Management Initiative led to changes in 
1983-88 which also impacted on RSRE (HMSO, 1988a): 
some fle3dbility in recruitment pay to attract outstanding talent by 
moving up the salary scale by a few increments. It remained up to 
local management to argue its case to centralised personnel. 
expansion of the open structure down to Grade 7 throughout the 
service, thus standardising the grades and pay structure for almost 
all management and professional positions. 
a more open appraisal system based on reviewing performance 
against personal objectives. 
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FIGURE 6.4: 
PERSONNEL STRUCTURES WITHIN AND 
AROUND RSRE 
UP TO 
1990 
CIVIL SERVICE 
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NB Personnel policies and practices are effectively centralised 
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FIGURE 6A (continued) 
April 1991 - DRA 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
FOR DEFENCE 
TREASURY 
OFFICE OF THE 
MINISTER FOR 
THE CIVIL 
SERVICE 
PERSONNEL 
E LECTRONICS 
DIVISION (RSRE) 
PERSONNEL p p j --- --f --- ---f 
NB. DRA becomes an MOD budget holder until a trading fund is established. 
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DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY 
performance-related-pay and increments for outstanding 
performance. 
PERSONNEL WITHIN THE DEFENCE 
RESEARCH AGENCY (DRA) 
The need for a stronger HRM role for managers had been argued by previous 
government studies ( Fulton, 1968; Megaw, 1982), but without radical structural 
change, little progress was made. With DRA, general management 
responsibilities were devolved to the Executive Director, but negotiations with 0 
the Civil Service and Treasury were required. DRA created a structure which 
deletes CM in the personnel equation (See Figure 6.4), and is currently 
negotiating with Treasury and the Office of the Minister for the Civil Service to 
flesh-out the policy framework. 
Distancing from centralised civil service organisations has already taken place. 
Before, the Civil Service Commission would do all graduate recruitment. When 
the Commission became an agency and began charging for its services, DRA set a 
policy of doing its own recruitment. 
The extent of decentralisation to Divisions like RSRE and their personnel 
departments remains uncertain. The DRA management agreed to develop local 
personnel functions with more responsibilities. The new RSRE Secretary was 
chosen foT his mix of skills including personnel and organisational design. The 
department has initiated some manpower planning and continues to strengthen 
its role in Grades Reviews, a development appreciated by line managers. To 
ensure relevant policies, a scientific staff committee was created reporting to the 
Technical Director, not the Corporate Secretary. 
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The gradual decentralisation of HRM likely will accelerate. The DRA framework 
document specifically provides for agency-specific personnel policies, and existing 
agencies have taken steps in this direction (HMSO, 1990). Several ideas were 
being discussed: improvements in starting salaries, premiums in some 
disciplines, slower growth of salaries at the top end, and stimulating selective 
turnover to bring in new talent. However, RSRE managers remain sceptical that 
they will achieve the desired independence from the civil service. 
"With the DRA reorganisation, personnel now has flesh and blood. " 
Principal Personnel Officer 
"Agency status was the worse option for personnel management 
because of continued controls by Treasury and the Manpower 
Office. It represents delegation without fle)dbility. " Corporate 
Secretary 
RECRUITMENT 
Recent graduates are recruited from universities across Britain through career 
fairs and national advertisements. Recruiters have noticed a reluctance of young 
people to work for the military establishment, and therefore emphasise the 
exciting nature of the work. In the last few years, RSRE ads have been placed 
instead of MOD or civil service ads, thus using RSRE's profile as a quality and 
achievement oriented laboratory. 
Recruitment is supported by personal networks which operate through work 
contracts, visiting professors (RSRE staff), and IMs searching for promising 
talent to support their research programmes. RSRE designates a few line staff to 
liaise with a particular university. Extramural contracts are used to solidify 
relations with the universities and serve as a platform for the identification and 
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recruitment of talented individuals. Early targeting of talented individuals takes 
place, and personal and research support may be provided. 
Lack of Timeliness. RSRE managers complained that it took between 3 and 12 
months after the initial interviews to obtain entry. Multiple steps were involved: 
obtaining the qualification certificate from the interview board; centralised 
confirmation of the availability of an opening; written confirmation of the 
candidate's interest; obtaining security'clearance; offering an RSRE employment 
contract. Several candidates are lost to competitors during this period. - 
In order to retain candidates during this uncertain period, each candidate is 
matched to an employee who maintains contact and reassures as much as 
possible. Fellowships (1-2 year contracts) are offered while the recruitment 
process takes place. However, few fellowships are available and this solution is 
frowned upon by the Civil Service because it undermines open competition. Both 
the timeliness problem and the short-term contract solution were mentioned by 
Fulton (1968), implying no significant change in 20 years. 
In April 1991, all government departments and agencies were authorized, to do 
their own recruitment and employment below PSO (Grade 7) level. However, the 
recommended procedures were stipulated and only a little flexibility was 
obtained. 
"A great many were lost during the recruitment because our 
system turns people off. It is cumbersome and slow compared with 
industry. " ADBU Director 
"For quick entry, we have used term appointment or fellowship. 
Later we invite to apply to a board. " Principal Personnel Officer 
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TRAINING 
Several sources of training operated: centralised civil service, CM in MOD, and 
courses organised by local management. Whereas employees have free access, the 
offerings tend to be ad hoc with a weak linkage to career concerns. Managers 
emphasise on-the-job learning. The content of the courses have a high technical 
content with less attention to transfer in the workplace and adaptation to 
- change. 
Training of recruits involves on-the-job training and spans up to five years 
- depending on the learning curve. All scientists are expected to learn to use a 
personal computer and a variety of programmes to assist them. Formal training 
is offered by CM and by RSRE line management, complementing on-the-job- 
training with the individual employee coordinating the two. Recently, BUs have 
helped to focus training to business requirements. 
"For scientists, the main thing is to gain more experience in their 
field: training on the job and by attending conferences. " Technology 
Director 
"We do mostly retraining on the job ... I am now looking to 
standardise on a reduced number of languages so that we can get 
people trained on all of them. " ADBU Director 
"There are certainly opportunities for training if you want to take 
them up .... Typically you have to use your initiative. " ISSBU PSO A 
DRA & Trainin . CM transferred its 1991 training budget to DRA headquarters. 
To the consternation of the divisions, the personnel director committed all of the 
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funds without divisional input. This action contradicts the stated aim of 
devolving responsibilities to the division. 
CAREER AIANAGEMIENT 
Upon entry, researchers are encouraged to define their interests and carve out an 
area of investigation. Self-tasking is seen as the driving force and strongly linked 
to retention; employees develop high commitment when they have defined work 
priorities. Organic growth takes place over 5-10 years as researchers expand 
their skills and apply them to new problem areas. PSOs stretch their promising 
scientists and encourage breadth of skills to satisfy promotion criteria. Supers 
reinforce this process by linking into the Annual Performance Report and 
identifying opportunities across teams within the division. 
Through on-the-job experience, employees are prepared for management 
positions with mixed results. Management learning is considered incremental: 
running small projects, managing extramural contract work, and gradual 
accumulation of more responsibility. Both skill groups (technical and managerial) 
are developed at the same time as part of fluid complementing. 
"You do a certain amount of moving ... to get through the next 
promotion board ... preferably learn another skill. " ISSBU Superintendent A 
Career planning as such takes place through the Grades Review which 
determines promotability ratings. For middle management positions (above 
PSO), scope of experience is emphasised. For promising PSOs, CM advises a 
transfer or secondment to London Headquarters of CERN or to some other 
posting in MOD. Centrally-managed promotion boards were criticised by RSRE 
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management, echoing the Fulton Report (1968): undue importance attached to 
the candidate's performance before the promotion board in comparison to past 
performance and suitability for the job. 
As of 1989, RSRE (rather than CM) became responsible for the Grades Review for 
up to SSO. The BU director and Supers meet with the Principal Personnel Officer 
(chair) to discuss the employees of each grade at a time. The review focuses on 
readiness for a promotion and a move for greater scope. It also makes training 
recommendations which are sent to the Super and the training office. The 
Principal Personnel Officer saw his role as linking internal recruitment, training 
and career development, and acting as a counterweight to line managers desiring 
to keep their staff. 
In practice, each employee receives 10 minutes of attention at the Grades 
Review. Despite the quick reviews, line managers have come to appreciate the 
advantages of the reviews. They supply helpful information for adjusting job 
assignments and determining the timing of a promotion request. 
"These (new) grade review boards work well. At first managers 
were unsure, but they came to see the advantage. " Principal 
Personnel Officer 
The Review accesses employee confidential data concerning their long-term 
potential rating which is kept from the employees themselves. The potential is 
estimated three grades in advance in order to plan for development measures. 
Employees come to guess what their rating is by the overtures made to them. 
RSRE managers control task assignments, development through on-the-job 
training, and performance evaluation, influence merit increments, and contribute 
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to career development through the Grades Review up to SSOs. However, they 
lack control over the salary scales and promotions. The latter are centrally 
determined and serve the wider MOD and civil service needs. Some managers 
are reluctant to propose their talented employees for promotion for fear of losing 
them or of failing to deliver a promotion. Managers also complained about slow 
response. If a talented employee comes to his manager with news of an offer from 
outside, the manager is unable to counter with an immediate prospect of 
promotion. The dates for the review process are set centrally, and it takes one 
year from application to an uncertain promotion. Faced with limited openings, 
"ticketing" has been introduced, that is, a promise of a promotion for those with 
successful boards. 
"We have a promotion system that is a labyrinth. " ISSBU PSO B 
"It takes twelve months for a promotion and it happens once a 
year. There is no flexibility to respond to an offer someone has just 
received. " MEBU PSO A 
"He could easily be posted out to a job that is totally unsuited to 
him rather than allow me to say I will just pay him more and 
promote him internally. " MEBU Director 
With the continuation of shrinking budgets and the introduction of PM, some 
PSOs have become reluctant to risk stretching their people because of the 
importance of succeeding at this early stage. Thus employees with high potential 
have new work stacked on (highly enriched) while those with less obvious 
potential have little stretching. Prior to PM, Supers varied in the extent of 
delegation they practiced with their PSOs. With the advent of PM, Supers are 
more inclined to delegate more budget and administrative responsibility to the 
PSOs in preparation for senior positions. 
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CAREER PATHS 
Fluid complementing provided for flexible degrees of technical and managerial 
responsibility for the lower technical grades (up to PSO). In the early 1980s, it 
was possible to become a PSO without managerial experience or knowledge, and 
higher managerial grades continued to have some contact and influence on 
technical work. PSO also was the platform from which a person wishing to 
remain in the technical area could pursue IM status for technical excellence 
where several grade promotions were possible. 
4 
In the 1980s, fluid complementing began to degenerate in response to the 
growing administration required of managers. By 1985, with the introduction of 
more rigorous reporting and monitoring by the MOD customer and the increasing 
repayment work, Supers (and PSOs to some degree) became administrators with 
little direct lab contact. 
As part of this polarization, becoming a PSO required some management 
awareness and preferably experience. It was still possible to become a PSO on 
technical merit, but only if the employee had demonstrated exceptional 
performance. In a sense, researchers were required to make an earlier choice 
about their career path, whether it be in the management or IM stream. Though 
fluid complementing remained, the number of positions using this option was 
controlled centrally. 
"People seem to be required to make decisions about going into the 
managerial stream well before they have reached the point where 
they feel they have done enough, contributed as much as they 
could. " ISSBU IM A 
"In the past we had fluid complementing and people really moved 
where their aptitude led them .... Now you have promotion on ticket 
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to PSO. There has got to be a slot for you to go in .... The available 
positions are almost totally managerial. " ISSBU IM B 
The few positions created blockages for aspiring IMs. On the IM side, a 
corresponding change took place where the researcher was expected to 
concentrate fully on long-term research and academic achievement. IM status 
depended on successful evaluation of the researcher's quinquennial plan by the 
IM Committee composed primarily of outside academics. Every five years, a new 
plan must be presented, and loss of renewal means in principle loss of status and 
degrading to level 7 (PSO). In practice, the researcher usually obtained a 
management position at the equivalent grade occupied under IM. 
In 1989, the IM scheme was transferred to MOD but remained unchanged. 
Meanwhile, RSRE had a growing need to integrate the applied physics to the 
systems area. The IMs operated in the area of strategic research as approved in 
their plan and with local management guaranteeing the needed resources. But 
management would ask them to assist work in shorter term work requested by 
the military customers. Though IMs did not object to addressing shorter-term 
problems (some enjoyed bringing their ideas to the concrete application stage), 
they tended to resist. 
With the advent of PM and DRA, there has been wide recognition that the terms 
of reference of the IM committee should be adapted to the new business 
environment and serve DRA! s interests. DRA Headquarters assumed 
responsibility for the IM scheme but postponed making any changes. 
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POTENTIAL CAREER PATHS 
With the advent of PM and DRA, a variety of new positions have materialised at 
RSRE and at DRA headquarters. The management career path was straight 
forward before (PSO -> Superintendent -> Group Head -> Department Director -> 
Managing Director). In the new organisation, a variety of positions exist at the 
superintendent level (Package managers, Manager of Business Development, 
Line and staff Supers depending on the internal structure of the BU). Group 
Heads became either BU directors or the director of business development and 
planning. Senior positions are also available at DRA Headquarters. 
New positions within Business Development also will open up, and employees 
with entrepreneurial drive or those wishing for a more dynamic environment will 
be attracted. The desire to hire people from the outside with business experience 
could create a problem in that their relatively low sophistication in research 
would preclude their ability to benefit from career opportunities within the 
remainder of RSRE. 
The mobility (and development) of staff across MOD, DRA Headquarters and 
RSRE remains to be defined, though the framework document clearly indicates 
maintenance of the MOD link. 
CONCLUSION: HRM & SKILL SUPPLY PATTERNS 
Centralised personnel within the civil service imposed standard policies and 
practices on RSRE which were viewed by managers as unhelpful to manage the 
workforce. They compensated by doing their own recruitment informally, 
developing close ties with certain universities and their promising students. The 
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work organisation emphasised self-tasking and on-the-job development; 
individual preferences in careers were possible through fluid complementing and 
IM status. Customer and administrative pressures grew in the 1980s and 
polarised to some extent the technical and managerial roles, thus causing some 
deterioration in career flexibility. The possibility of sustaining long periods of 
focused research diminished as customer power grew and customer 
responsiveness became essential. Some decentralisation in personnel activities 
took place, but ASRE did not control recruitment salaries and most promotions. 
The arrival of PM and the DRA raised many questions about what shape HRM 
would take. 
INTENTIONAL SKILL SUPPLY PATTERNS 
WORKFORCE PLANNING 
Workforce planning was an additive process which depended on the financers. 
Operating under long-term costing, the government contributed most of the 
funds and imposed a salary budget and headcount controls. The number of IMs 
was also controlled. These funds and positions were distributed downward within 
RSRE in response to lower management justifications and with considerable 
continuity. 
Other sources of funds such as repayment work and international collaborations 
had separate budgets and staff tied to them. In practice, management attempted 
to pool resources to stabilise a variety of research projects. The inability of the 
applied areas to recruit specialists in high demand led to shifting resources into 
the theoretical areas which never lacked ideas or recruits. Thus some divisions 
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were overstaffed and others understaffed. Turnover rates were low, and 
management concern was limited to talented individuals with scarce skills. 
"We prepared a yearly Stewardship Report for the CM: 
resignations, retirements, promotions. Recording only. " Principal 
Personnel Officer 
"Never had a big problem, low wastage rates ... What worries us is loss of high quality people in key areas. " Commercial Director 
TRANSITION FROM WORKFORCE PLANNING 
TO SKILLS PLANNING 
With the arrival of PM and DRA (1989), RSRE Personnel, in conjunction with 
senior management and with the approval of the centralised personnel function, 
tried several ways to encourage movement into areas of shortages with little 
success: facilitated promotions, shadow portfolios, and trouble-shooting roles. 
These initiatives coincided with the arrival of the new Secretary and the 
devolution of grades reviews (for promotion purposes) to the establishments. 
The full implementation of PM and the DRA meant that staffing levels must 
match the work assignments and their schedules. Overstaffed divisions have 
instigated measures to bring the numbers down (e. g., In MEBU, no recruitment 
until retirements and departures help achieve the targeted level), Understaffed 
divisions have made a concerted effort to recruit to strength and with some 
success. Thus manpower planning has been introduced at the level of BUs. The 
Staff Committee headed by the Technology Director fosters an organisation-wide 
view of the issues, with Personnel in a supportive and implementation role. 
"The Staff Committee takes an RSRE-wide view of mobility. " 
Commercial Director 
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"First, the Director of Technology must define the requirements. 
We interact directly and through the Staff Committee. " Corporate 
Secretary 
BU directors and their Supers have also given more attention to the skillbase 
within the unit. In MEBU, the mix between material and circuit skills may have 
to be adjusted in order to demonstrate applications to customers. In ISSBU, the 
concern for a critical mass has emerged; a critical minimum of scientists are 
needed to create a supportive and expert environment in which a project can be 
achieved in a timely and quality manner. All BU directors have joined a skills 
audit commissioned by one of them. 
"I'm concerned with skill balance, recruitment issue, flexibility and 
deployment, some training concern. I've only started doing this. " 
MEBU Superintendent A 
11 ... outside contractors .... You not only lose the opportunity of developing your staffs skills ... but also you give those to your 
competitors, the system houses. " ISSBU Director 
BU directors are considering ways of making better use of their shrinking human 
resources. Recently, ADBU and ISSMU have pooled resources and created a five 
person team. These two BUs focus on the same signal processing technology, and 
joint ventures are being considered with ADBU as resourcer and ISSBU as skills 
source. ADBU is seeking a transfer of skills. 
In the 1980s, expert skills were spread thin to maintain a broad scope of research 
activities. Some people began to worry about the critical mass of leading 
researchers and supporting networks required for excellent research. On the 
other hand, the consistently low turnover rate tended to lull these worries away 
such that no concrete retention objectives were formulated. Though each 
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departure of outstanding talent was mourned, experience had shown that a 
research programme could adapt and succeed; the essential contribution of the 
brilliant scientist remained uncertain. 
Currently, management remains unconvinced that special efforts need to be 
made to retain employees, though some efforts are deemed appropriate to 
improve morale. With the recession extending further, employment opportunities 
outside remain limited with uncertain advantages. Furthermore, in the more 
competitive environment, some managers are inclined to stimulate the 
departures of the less productive scientists and managers in order to bring in 
more achievers. 
Middle and senior managers wanted to increase the mobility of skills within 
RSRE. They demonstrated high interest in establishing only two science grades: 
junior scientist (SO, HSO) and senior (SSO, PSO, SPSO), thus moving people up 
on an extended scale of performance and responsibility. 
I have not developed a retention policy because there is no evident 
need. " MEBU Superintendent 
"There is not enough turnover, need a minimum of 5%. We are 
considering ways to increase the flow. " Corporate Secretary 
"I would like to see a much more mobile population. It is a much 
more innovative environment when people are coming in and going 
out more quickly. " MEBU Director 
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HARD &SOFT BENEFITS 
Continuity in hard and soft benefits was high in the 1980s, but incremental 
changes were taking place. The 1990s have the potential of triggering more rapid 
change. 
HARD BENEFITS 
Base Salary, Benefits & Incentives 
The base salary was the most important component of the compensation package. 
Intentionally pegged to the average of the national labour rates, salary flexibility 
was minimal; RSRE was unable to match high salaries offered for scarce skills of 
early and middle-career individuals. Management made continuous 
representations to be allowed to place outstanding candidates higher on the 
salary scale. In the mid 1980s, some flexibility was obtained. However, no 
incentives existed except for small bonuses which management rarely used. 
Under the DRA, management would like to offer competitive salaries for scarce 
skills. 
Benefits were comprehensive and described as "cradle to grave", but included no 
luxuries such as a -company - car or enriched health plans. The government 
pension was highly rated by older employees. 
"We can give a one-time yearly bonus of 150 to 2500... It should be 
used more often (instead of the additional increment). " Principal 
Personnel Officer 
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Pay Policies 
Operating within the civil service organisation, RSRE had little fle3dbility in 
employment offers. Full-time permanent positions were typically offered. 
Contract positions reflecting the standard salary scales were offered as a quick 
way of entry, followed up with the standard hiring procedure. This timely 
solution has been practiced for decades (Fulton Report, Vol. 2, para. 223). More 
short-term and lucrative contracts have been given to satisfy critical skill 
shortages. 
Life-long employment was the rule, and any downsizing was done at the expense 
of the organisation. Fairness and equity were high and valued by employees. 
Salary scales were visible, and the compensation package arrived at by national 
collective bargaining. Few perks (e. g., separate dining room) were available for 
managers. A rudimentary form of pay for performance was introduced. The 
annual increment was automatic and long-term performance emphasised. 
However, an additional "merit" increment became possible in mid 1980s for 
consistently high ratings on the performance review. Management sometimes 
used it to compensate an employee for low salary or loss of a promotion. Salaries 
were job-based and encouraged a long-term focus through the automatic annual 
increment. 
"If you receive box 2 for two consecutive years or box 1 for one year, 
you can go beyond the top of the scale. " Principal Personnel Officer 
"The system does not allow withholding of rewards. " Technology 
Director 
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FUTURE MODIFICATION OF HARD BENEFITS 
The implementation of PM and the DRA, and the expected empowerment of 
management, prompted a rethinking of pay policies. Rationalisation from 12000 
to 7000 would take place over five years. Pay would be determined by direct 
negotiations with the unions but within civil service constraints. The 
involvement of divisions such as RSRE was uncertain. Managers were willing to 
sacrifice some consistency to bring-in scarce skills. Senior management 
considered making budget allocations to BUs partially on success in obtaining 
contracts. 
RSRE management wanted the ability to recruit critical skills, notably system 
skills and commercial experience. The current salary scale was unable to bridge 
the significant gap in salaries paid by the civil sector for computing and 
telecommunication skills. Similarly, the civil service recruitment rules did not 
place a premium on commercial experience, and high salaries could not be 
offered. Therefore, commercial skills were hired for short-term consultancy. 
RSRE also tried short-term commissions through the civil service and MOD 
recruitment but without success. Civil service rules permit rehiring but at the 
same grade as when the person left the service. 
"Industry does not put much money into those people (over forty). 
It puts its money into the people it wants ... and recruits. " ADBU Director 
"The signs are that people are looking in a way not present in 
preceding years .... We are unable to reward people for the work they do. " Package Manager B 
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SOFT BENEFITS 
Important changes took place in the content and organisation of work for 
researchers and managers which were reflected in career development. Other 
soft benefits were constant: informal listening (within RSRE and in the 
community) by all managers of employee complaints and dissatisfactions; 
pleasant community (Malvern) and quality of life (large houses reasonably 
priced, beautiful natural surroundings, opportunities for spouse employment in 
schools and nursing homes, and tolerable distance to Birmingham for spouse 
employment). However, young singles were reluctant to situate in this isolated 
town. The general recession and the hard hit UJL electronics industry (recession 
and military cut-backs), as well as contraction of work in universities, diminished 
alternative employment opportunities in the early 1990s. 
Challenging Work. In the early 1980s, the research programme was internally 
driven and thus ideal from the researcher's perspective of long-term skill 
development and recognition by peers. Whenever possible employee work 
preferences were given priority, even when this caused sub-optimal use of the 
skills in the group concerned. 
By 1985, a noticeable shift took place with the MOD customers insisting on 
determining the research agenda. The introduction of PM and the DRA (1989- 
1991) greatly strengthened customer power. Researchers in long-term research 
have had to revalue their work accordingly and accept that fle. -dble work 
assignments were necessary for customer responsiveness and employment 
security. 
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The shift to shorter-term contracts also was taking place within the wider 
military industry which was becoming more export oriented (Lovering, 1991). 
Changes in employment practices were introduced such as redistribution of tasks 
between engineers and technicians to make better use of available skills and 
create a leaner organisation. 
0 
Within RSRE, the polarization of managerial and technical work centrally 
imposed since the mid 1980s was meant to improve project management and 
research output. Managers felt burdened with administration but continued to 
enjoy decision-making. They quickly adopted broader management roles in the 
1990s. Team Leaders, on the other hand, felt somewhat isolated by their 
separation from general management responsibilities. 
"Scientists thrive on recognition. It takes five to ten years to obtain 
it .... We are unable to separate science from recognition. " MEBU PSO A 
"Almost every week we get a new thing that we have got to account 
for and PM has been nothing but pain and grief for everybody. " 
ISSBU IM B 
Career DeveloDment. Fluid complementing worked well for both gradual 
increases in project management and administrative responsibilities. It also 
made possible a variety of team structures around the project leader and the IM. 
Additionally, two career paths were well articulated: technical with some people 
achieving IM status, and managerial. In the 1980s, the paths became polarized 
and impacted on more junior positions. The arrival of the DRA was seen by some 
as an opportunity to rejuvenate fluid complementing and create a career 
development system serving the DRA instead of the civil service. 
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"Most people are willing to tolerate some unpleasant work to 
pursue pleasant work. If you get the ratio wrong, you lose them. " 
Package Manager C 
"The accountants running of the thing, deciding which research 
should be done and not done .... It just gets to a stage where people (IMs) jump, they have had enough. " ISSBU IM B 
"The biggest thing that might make me leave is that nobody knows 
what we are supposed to. be doing .... The fact that we have not seen 
a customer is daft. " ISSBU PSO A 
CONCLUSION: COM13INING HARD & SOFT BENEFITS 
Very few changes have taken place in recruitment and retention practices 
because of the general success in these areas (with the exception of recruitment 
of some skills) and because most of the decision-making in HRM was centralised 
outside RSRE. Management believed that a critical mass of expert researchers 
was required to maintain the highest level of professional excellence. This 
applied in each technology area, and in particular applications with proven value 
(eg., surveillance) or potential value (eg., speech recognition). With increasing 
budget pressures and the need to create new streams of business, the adjustment 
of the skillbase has caught the attention of senior and middle managers (1990). 
So far, no coordinated adjustments of hard and soft benefits have taken place; 
DRA headquarters has yet to articulate a strategy for rationalising the 
headcount from 12000 to 7000 for its four divisions (RSRE being one of them). 
Senior management in RSRE are engaged in actively influencing the strategy 
formulation and the likely restructuring. They favour a decentralised structure 
with regrouping of skills. 
RSRE has relied on graduate recruits who have been socialised to strive for 
professional excellence by relying on self-drive and self-direction according to 
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peer standards. These characteristics were valued by RSRE and its scientific 
culture. Consequently, the extensive use of challenging work, and career 
development closely tied to challenge, are consistent with the characteristics of 
the labour market accessed for most entry positions. 
Though not the leaders, and offering no innovative rewards, civil service 
compension standards are comparable with the average of other large employers. 
Those interviewed seemed reasonably content with their hard benefits, especially 
the more senior people, but little emphasis was placed on them. 
In the new environment of PM and the DRA, greater attention is being given to 
hard benefits, but until the DRA has attained a level of independence, RSRE 
management are unable to adjust the benefits package. 
"If some of the satisfiers disappear, some of the dissatisfiers come 
to the surface, like money .... If the bureaucracy goes too far, why 
should he be here instead of in industry? " ISSBU Director 
"The reason they stay is they like the working environment. If it 
changes to a more commercial approach, they may expect more 
commercial rates, but so might DRA offer them. " Technology 
Director 
SUPPORTING BUSINESS STRATEGY 
WITH A SKILLS SUPPLY STRATEGY 
Prior to the mid 1980s, RSRE dominated MOD through research excellence and 
effective control of its budget. The long-term orientation of the scientific 
researchers and managers and the careful recruitment and development of 
talented individuals assured research excellence. Downsizing pressures were 
CHAPTER SIX- ROYAL SIGNALS & RADAR ESTABLISHMENT (RSRE) 
_ 
PAGE 273 
managed through minor adjustments to all programmes, thus maintaining 
development opportunities. 
The creation of the DRA and the imposition of PM obliged RSRE management to 
increase customer responsiveness and develop a fle. Nible skillbase more 
appropriate to meet customer demands. Tight project management and flexible 
research teams would address both short-term and long-term research 
requirements. The creation of BUs gave middle managers more scope to act as 
general managers and to adjust their skillbase within difficult resource 
constraints. Elements of skills planning were beginning to emerge, and modifying 
hard benefits was considered essential for future success. 
INFLUENCE OF HRM ON SKILL SUPPLY PAWERNS 
The scientific culture of RSRE was at odds with customer requirements for more 
short-term and systems-oriented work. The more traditional scientific areas 
continued to command the attention of senior management, receiving more than 
their fair share of resources. These actions supported traditional scientific 
careers and disadvantaged the information systems area. The 1980s push for 
accountable management and the accompanying polarization of management and 
professional roles damaged the existing career paths. 
Highly constrained by centralised bodies within the civil service (e. g., TTeasury), 
RSRE obtained some HRM responsibilities in the 1980s; managers successfully 
pushed for improved recruitment salaries. Most of the HRM flexibility is 
attributable to line managers and IMs: localised manpower planning, 
recruitment through personal networks, tailoring task assignments and 
maintaining contact with employees. 
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Modifications of the HRM culture were taking place in the late 1980s in response 
to PM and the DRA. The narrow view of science was being replaced by a broader 
one embracing systems science and the legitimacy of the customer. Career paths 
were being reconsidered, and modifications of hard and soft benefits were sought 
to shape and influence the skillbase for the new performance requirements. 
Meanwhile, the military and related civilian industries have introduced 
individualised pay, performance related pay with significant financial rewards 
and fast tracking, and have doubled their efforts in targeted recruitment 
(Lovering, 1991). RSRE faces a significant catch-up problem, and obtaining wide 
fle3dbility remains doubtful so long as core government remains unchanged 
(Dopson, 1993; Mellon, 1993). 
'p 
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CHAPTER 7: SKILLS SUPPLY STRATEGY 
In this chapter, the case studies (IBM, BT & RSRE) presented in the preceding 
chapters are compared and contrasted in order to explore the variety of skill 
patterns. Candidates for an explicit skills supply strategy are evaluated: 
A: Modifying management style (BT) 
B: Increasing graduate recruitment salaries (RSRE) 
C: Decentralising recruitment and operations (R&D in BT) 
D: Introducing a 100% software mission (in Hursley Lab, IBM). 
CRITERIA FOR SKISS 
.I 
In Chapter 2, it was proposed that a recognizable pattern of changes in HRM 
policies, progranunes and practices would qualify as a SKISS if four criteria were 
satisfied: 
(1) an identifiable link with the changing business strategy; 
(2) managerial intentions to create and maintain HRM support for the 
business strategy; 
(3) a coherence among the HRM elements which are mutually 
reinforcing in terms of supporting the business strategy; 
(4) a consistent managerial effort to achieve and exploit the desired 
linkage to business strategy. 
The notion of SIUSS lies in the relationship between business strategy and the 
skills required to translate the strategy into business practices and internal 
management systems. As the business strategy changes, one would expect to find 
coordinated changes in skill supply components which together would modify the 
skillbase. In some cases, modifying, a single key supply component - might 
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constitute a strategy. But if only single-lever examples are found, we would 
conclude that tactics rather than strategy were present. Business strategy 
linkage and coherence of HRM components aside, SKISS presumes that senior 
management, with the help of middle management, deliberately and consistently 
seeks skill advantages that support the business strategy. The process is 
assumed to be primarily top-down unless demonstrated otherwise. 
The application of the above criteria to four promising skill supply patterns will 
determine whether these patterns qualify as SKISS. 
SKISS CANDIDATE "A". - 
MODIFYING NUNAGEMENT STYLE IN BT 
A small group of senior managers initiated and sustained the transformation of 
the management group. Consistent external recruitment of private sector 
managers and exiting of senior public sector managers took place in the period 
1984-91 in the form of voluntary resignations and voluntary redundancies. The 
initial trigger to this skills supply pattern was evidently the change in status for 
BT into a publically-traded private enterprise. Senior management was 
challenged to create a business strategy appropriate for the new environment. 
Skill gaps within management ranks were obvious, and a new organisational 
culture was required focused on markets, customers, competitors, and profits. 
Senior management orchestrated a pattern of repeated downward pressure 
through a variety of levers: a change in recruitment policy and employment 
contract, restructuring for competitiveness (1984 and 1991) with voluntary 
resignations and voluntary redundancies, and an organisation-wide culture- 
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change (TQM) programme. The rapid introduction of these changes and their 
consistent application thereafter created, after a five year period, a growing 
upward pressure from lower levels of management to expand the new 
management style. Eight years after the introduction of this skill supply pattern, 
the transformation continues. 
In contrast, both RSRE and IBM were noted for a slow and normal renewal of 
senior management through retirements and promotions from within. The pace 
of change did accelerate in RSRE in 1991 with the creation of the Defence 
Agency, but internal promotions remained the primary mechanism. All three 
organisations relied on training to introduce and strengthen a variety of 
management skills (especially financial management). Only BT exhibited a clear 
skills supply strategy which was catalysed by two major restructures , and was 
supported by a variety of levers. Interestingly, both RSRE and IBM recently have 
restructured and support what appears to be a skills strategy, but not enough 
time has passed to satisfy the criterion of "consistent effort". 
The transformation of the management style within BT was initiated through 
multiple changes in hard benefits in order to recruit, reward and retain private 
sector managerial talent. As a performance-related pay package, base salary was 
made less important while benefits and incentives became more important. 
Individualised personal contracts introduced pay secrecy and pay differences. 
Performance in relation to business objectives and future contribution to business 
success became the basis on which compensation would vary. 
This compensation package was introduced at the top and was gradually pushed 
down to middle management, and some elements were introduced within 
unionised ranks. Initial impact was limited, but as the number of participants 
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increased and numerous BT veterans were e3dted, a new'hard-nosed managerial 
style emerged. The transition saw a deterioration in the work environment and a 
sense of insecurity in the management ranks as longtime companions and 
colleagues were prompted to leave and career options in the changing 
organisation were unclear. As the new managerial style became established, it 
won the adherence of numeroua lower and middle managers who appreciated the 
dynamic approach, and understood that their own careers depended upon 
obtaining a personal contract. Career success was noticeable more in the car that 
a person obtained than in their official title. This bottom-up pressure was 
welcomed by senior management who proceeded to include all of middle 
management in the new arrangement. Thus, the pacing of change was responsive 
to the emergent situation. 
It is noteworthy that changes in hard benefits created a deterioration of certain 
soft benefits (career development and employment security). Management 
responded to the low morale by renewing career development which was 
presented as a "road map" to understand and progress within the new 
organisation. However, the deterioration in soft benefits somewhat corrected 
itself over time as managers came to redefine'their relationship with the 
organisation. Performance-related pay was viewed as desirable and rewarding if 
you could join the club. In both cases, a clarification of exchanges took place, 
reflecting the human capital interpretation of the ILM (Siebert and Addison, 
1991). 
Management's inability to overcome union objections slowed down compensation 
changes in unionised ranks. This did not prove to be a serious problem because 
many managers and professionals wanted to join the select club. The small sums 
allocated to performance-related pay- caused some dissatisfaction, but no 
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questioning of its legitimacy. The wide introduction of incentives (eg., profit 
sharing, quality awards) helped to keep the focus on the new business style and 
the real rewards that came with it. 
Changing the management style in BT, as an organisation-wide change, affected 
the R&D Division. The strengthening of financial and project management skills 
within the R&D function relied on wide training over a number of years. 
Competitive bidding was strengthened in the late 1980s with the arrival of a new 
lab director externally recruited. Potential competition was introduced 
deliberately to improve added value and productivity in serving primarily 
internal customers. With the introduction of "competitive bidding", middle 
managers studied their area skillbase more closely and planned for development 
through recruitment, training and on-the-job development. Assembling strong 
research teams also meant pooling people across organisational boundaries. 
Similar conditions in R&D were noted in all three cases. While competitive 
bidding and financial and project management skills were present in IBM 
throughout the 1980s, competitive bidding was introduced in RSRE with package 
management in 1990-91 while the other skills were strengthened starting in the 
mid 1980s. In all cases, the pooling of skilled researchers across organisational 
barriers was a very recent phenomenon. It would appear that the. changes in BT 
management style were a complementary stimulus to the general industry trend 
of questioning the R&D contribution and controlling value-added (Whittington, 
1991). 
The above evidence strongly supports the existence of a SIUSS linked to the 
strategic transformation of BT's management style. The skill supply pattern was 
introduced deliberately and management efforts were consistent over an eight 
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year period of time. However, the pace of change appeared to be emergent and 
depended on achieving a critical size in the new management culture and on 
overcoming union opposition. Rewards and career success within the firm came 
to be viewed as tied to the new management style. Changes in HRM components 
and in hard and soft benefits were coherent with the exception of career 
development. Changes in the latter took place as an emergent tactic to deal with 
low morale caused by the massive organisational restructuring taking place. 
While many employees wanted a sense of direction and progress in their 
employment, others understood that career within the flatter organisation was 
based more on performance than seniority. 
Within the R&D area of our three organisations, there were other skill supply 
patterns as candidates for SKISS: attracting graduates in RSRE by increasing 
compensation (Candidate "B"); increasing the supply of critical skills in BT 
through decentralisation (C); and changing the mission at IBM-Hursley (D). 
SKISS CANDIDATE IS": INCREASING 
GRADUATE RECRUITMENT SALARIES IN RSRE 
As part of the civil service, RSRE compensation and conditions of employment 
were set by Treasury which, in the early 1980s, introduced a new pay policy. 
Previously among the market leaders, the government now pegged compensation 
within the civil service to the average national labour rates for comparable jobs. 
At the same time, salary offers for graduates in key skill areas were spiralling 
upward in the IT industry. RSRE management found that they became 
disadvantaged in what they could offer graduates at the time of recruitment. 
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Meanwhile MOD, RSRE's main customer, continued to emphasize broad research 
excellence. Thus began the consistent upward pressure that RSRE management 
exerted on the T! reasury to adjust graduate salaries upward. Ample justification 
was presented regularly, and little by little, RSRE management obtained the 
ability to place graduates on a range of base salaries. Other actions were also 
taken by lower levels of management to ensure that people had challenging work 
from the beginning of their employment. However these additional measures 
represented continuity with the past. 
This simple skill supply pattern attacked a key component of recruitment (initial 
pay), critical from the perspective of management. It also demonstrates the 
isolation of RSRE management from the decision-making centre, and how 
constant upward pressure (1985-91) was exerted to obtain a key gain. Within this 
centralised structure and centralised planning, RSRE management reacted to 
inflexible pay policies but in a consistent manner. With the introduction of 
performance-related pay increments by T'reasury in the late 1980s, RSRE 
management also had the ability to recognize outstanding performance, but this 
change of hard benefits was unrelated to increasing recruitment salaries. 
This bottom-up and emergent strategy used only one lever and targeted 
recruitment, not retention. Recruitment also was addressed by well-established 
hard and soft benefits. The organisation's reputation for outstanding research 
and the promise of challenging work were important attractions. However, they 
represented continuity with the past, ' not a coherent package of changes 
targetting research excellence. In contrast with BT changes'in management 
style, this skill supply pattern (isolated adjustment of the base salary) did not put 
into question the work organisation of RSRE and all that flows from it, that is, 
challenging work, positive work environment, and employee recognition. 
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One concludes that this pattern does not satisfy the criteria for SKISS. The link 
with business strategy is diffuse (control of salary budget versus research 
excellence). RSRE management actions were as much reactive as they were 
deliberate, and their consistent efforts were sustained by the continued presence 
of constraining centralised pay policies. While the HRM components appeared 
coherent, there was no concentrated effort to introduce other adjustments to 
improve recruitment. 
SKISS CANDIDATE "C": 
DECENTRALISED RECRUITMENT & OPERATIONS IN BT 
Another example of a single-lever pattern is the establishment of software 
centres in Belfast and Glasgow by BT. Corporate office saw the modernisation of 
its proprietary network as a critical part of a strategy to compete effectively in 
the soon to be deregulated telecommunications industry. Software skills were 
essential to exploit the digital capability of the modernised network for internal 
effeciency and for the creation of value-added services. ' Overdependence on the 
London market and the growing importance of software prompted management 
to tap other labour markets. Decentralisation of operations to Belfast and 
Glasgow permitted the access of labour markets with a relatively immobile 
workforce, and diminished the over-reliance on the Greater London market 
where the density of employers permitted high inter-firm. mobility. The software 
centre in Belfast was opened in 1981 and in Glasgow in 1986, and were gradually 
grown over time. The success of Belfast encouraged the opening of a second 
centre in Glasgow. Local managers acted as entrepreneurs eager to build and 
expand their organisation, and put upward pressure to increase availability of 
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resources and to increase hiring. Consistency was demonstrated over a decade 
and addressed the skill shortage which affected the entire IT industry. 
This top-down recruitment strategy involved geographic decentralisation and the 
e3dstence of distinct parcels of work easily coordinated and integrated across 
distances. Both recruitment and retention were important to maintain the 
growth rates of these centres. Quality of the community was the principal soft 
benefit and issue addressed. The other critical soft benefit was the positive work 
environment created by the managers attached to and recruited for these centres. 
The growth phase of these centres were managed in an entrepreneurial style 
with strong bonds forming among the professionals and the managers. The 
enthusiasm and caring attention of the managers was manifested in all of their 
HRM activities. This managerial activity became a bottom-up push to acquire 
more resources and work for the centres. 
In this case, three criteria for SKISS were satisfied: there exists an evident link 
with the business strategy (modernisation and competitiveness); senior 
managerial intentions were deliberate; and managerial efforts were consistent 
over a decade. The criteria for coherence also was satisfied, but was achieved by 
local management actions which targetted rapid growth of the centres. This 
entrepreneurial style was valued by the researchers and set the pace of change. 
This bottom-up emergent phase developed rapidly as part of the operations of the 
workplace. As in the case of BT management style, we see an emergent process 
which determines the pace of change after the initial strategy implementation. 
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SKISS CANDIDATE "D": 
HURSLEY SOFTWARE AUSSION 
IBM had made slow progress in penetrating the lucrative markets of software 
and computing services in the 1980s. In the late 1980s, corporate office tried to 
accelerate the redeployment of resources to obtain a larger share of these 
markets. In 1989, corporate office decided that Hursley would adopt a 100% 
software mission with a focus on communication systems. The following year, the 
drop in revenues meant that downsizing would take place. The plan for Hursley 
was for redeployment and early releases with careful attention to keep those 
people with skills supporting the new mission. The Lab's managers were 
mobilised to restructure the Lab with a concern for skills. In terms of levers, 
work reorganisation through redeployment, and skill-sensitive releases were 
applied. 
The software mission introduced in 1990 benefited from the greater integration of 
the Lab's hardware areas with the manufacturing plants. It became realistic to 
spin-off these areas and merge them formally with the plants. The structural 
separation was opportunistic and emergent, and fit well with the preoccupation 
to increase IBM's activity in software. The absence of hardware missions proved 
to be very beneficial for the rapid mobilisation of management, around the 
software mission. 
A business downturn and a productivity push the following year (1991) prompted 
Hursley management to introduce a variety of interventions within a downsizing 
environment. Little or no recruitment was accompanied by some outflow from the 
Lab and by massive redeployment within the Lab. Recruitment and internal 
movements were carefully controlled to support the new mission; career 
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development was oriented towards business requirements. At the same time, 
relatively autonomous teams were introduced experimentally to increase 
productivity and skill levels. 
The strategic push in IBM for greater productivity made explicit use of several 
skill supply levers with the main ones being recruitment, controlled internal 
movements, focused training and work organisation. Coherence of HRM 
components and clear linkage with the business strategy (software mission) were 
evident. Corporate management deliberately sought to exploit the skill strengths 
of the Lab in communication systems. As for the fourth criteria, no opportunity 
was available to demonstrate consistent management effort beyond two years 
because the Lab's software misssion was launched recently. Caution appears 
appropriate in that IBM remains a sophisticated organisation that in the past 
periodically made skills a "strategic" concern only to have these interventions 
disappear or serve limited purposes. 
This top-down skill supply pattern modified soft benefits only. Because of the 
short lapse of time, we cannot report on whether there was a subsequent bottom- 
up response. The initial top-down phase was protracted and accelerated 
dramatically in 1991 as part of the wider IBM crisis. Interestingly, the software 
mission was preceeded by the protracted separation of the hardware missions 
and activities, a primarily emergent process. 
SKISS AS AN EMERGENT PROCESS 
The two sldll supply patterns which passed the SKISS test both began as a top- 
down intentional process, and followed eventually with upward pressure by 
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middle management to adjust the strategy, in particular, the pace of change. 
Where the effort was organisation-wide and involved repeated restructuring (BT 
Management Style), the upward pressure was slow to develop. In contrast, the 
R&D specific change (BT Decentralisation of Recruitment & Operations in R&D) 
the initial top-down phase was followed quickly by bottom-up pressure from 
middle-managers adopting an entrepreneurial management style. In both cases, 
the emergent phase had high middle management involvement. Schilit (1990, 
1987) reported similar results in the U. S.: middle managers were more likely to 
influence the strategic process at the implementation stage through rational 
persuasion, persistence, and their image of critical expertise. Wooldridge and 
Floyd (1990,1992) also found that these managers actively identified strategic 
problems and proposed solutions. Our findings resemble Kanter's (1983) change 
masters who exercise political skills to create incremental innovations in 
products, work methods and structure. However, our findings clearly designate 
middle managers as the agents of change. 
The existence of an emergent phase in SKISS supports the positions taken by 
Bulter (1988) and Wright and McMahan (1992) in their modelling of strategic 
HRM. The two examples of SIUSS, both taking place within BT, resemble more a 
socio-political process, rather than a rational or bounded rational process 
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992), with self-interested middle management 
influencing the pace of change through their control of the operationalisation of 
the business strategy. 
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SKILL SUPPLY PATTERNS 
& THE OUTER CONTEXT OF THE ORGANISATION 
Actual or potential competition and "perceived competition" provoked a multi- 
lever skill supply pattern in both BT and IBM-Hursley which involved broad 
changes in organisational structure and management systems. In contrast, a 
relatively steady outer and inner context, with the exception of labour market 
pressures, was noted for a simple, single-lever pattern of adjustment such as 
decentralised recruitment and operations, and recruitment salary adjustment. 
One concludes that competitive pressures in the environment are triggers to 
multiple changes within the inner context of the firm which in turn create a new 
multi-lever pattern of skill supply. Labour market changes alone provoke little 
change, and are dealt with by single-lever skill supply solutions. This conclusion 
coincides with the dynamic training model proposed by Pettigrew et al. (1989) 
and the findings of Hendry et al. (1991). Note that in all cases, pressure for 
change was sustained over the decade. 
EMBEDDED NATURE OF SKILLS STRATEGY 
Having argued in favour of SKISS as a relevant concept for large high technology 
organisations, the researcher admits having had difficulties in- recognising the 
pattern. The evidence for a intended, coherent and consistent plan and 
programme of change in skills supply was not easily gathered. Most of the 
managers interviewed had to be prompted repeatedly to discuss the strategic 
importance of skills. They lacked a vocabulary to articulate their skill needs and 
concerns. They often relied on indirect indicators of skill such as formal 
education, experience with a particular technology or computing language, and 
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project management experience in a specific area. They discussed skills indirectly 
by attending to the work organisation and by their frequent reference to the need 
to grow skills. One is reminded of Hendry's (1993) caution that managers have 
difficulties in abstracting themselves from the operations of the organisation. 
While the evidence for SKISS within BT was the strongest, all three 
organisations seemed to be on the threshold of a clearly recognisable SKISS. 
Three interpretations come to mind. First, we could give them the benefit of the 
doubt and hope that several years hence a consistent effort will be evident. 
Second, we may argue that, in the same way that HRM as a strategic activity is a 
relative newcomer to British organisations (Storey, 1991; Hendry and Pettigrew, 
1986), SKISS is indeed a new activity. Whether it thrives or not may be linked to 
the general fortunes of the HRM "movement". Third, the evidence of the periodic 
rise and fall of skills planning and systems within IBM, the most sophisticated of 
our three organisations, suggests that SKISS can be thought of as episodic, that 
skill issues rise to the surface of the management agenda as an episode. Once a 
solution is found and implemented, strategic attention to skills disappears. 
The third interpretation points to the difficult topic of embedded and tacit skills 
which pervade the organisation. While specific skill requirements may be 
provoked by external circumstances (skill shortages, new customer service), the 
chosen solution quickly becomes part of the existing work organisation and 
systems, and becomes relatively invisible. The episodic nature of SKISS operates 
from a background of regular attention to the embeddedness of skills. Thus the 
apparently discontinuous attention to skill issues masks the on-going 
adjustments of the work organisation where a skills-related topic, such as 
technology and management systems, predominates. 
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With major restructuring, work reorganisation takes place and attention to skills 
is heightened because the skills context itself is being modified. The evidence of 
the three cases supports the importance of restructuring as a trigger that obliges 
managers to focus on skills. The new structure calls for new ways of organising 
the work and achieving productive performance. Managers use explicit though 
simple notions of skill, and continue to refer to the work context to make their 
discussions relevant. 
The tacit foundation of skilful problem-solving and innovation operates at the 
individual, group, and larger unit. At the organisational level, we may speak of 
firm-specific assets. Evidence in our three cases documents the nature of tacit 
skills in the R&D environment. A continuum of embeddedness was found. An 
example of low embeddedness is where an external organisation is given a piece 
of work with standards to achieve. The knowledge and skill becomes codified in 
the product, but the Lab must still incorporate the product into a larger process 
leading to a larger product. A higher level of embeddedness was present when 
contracted experts were brought on-site to work with regular employees. This has 
the advantage of equipment availability and diffusing some of the external skills 
through close collaboration. While the collaborators are expected to adopt the 
expert's ways of working, the expert must learn to adapt to the organisational 
setting and management systems. 
An even higher level of embeddedness can be attributed to the regular practice of 
formal and on-the-job training of regular employees who are subsequently 
expected to incorporate their new skills into their work routines. 
Tacit Computing Skilla. In his visits to R&D sites, the researcher witnessed 
relaxed conversations of groups of two researchers on the work taking place on 
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their respective screens. Occasionally, one of them would peer over the other's 
shoulder, either in response to an invitation or unsolicited. Brief exchanges 
appeared common. In the IBM lab, groups of four persons were seen discussing 
avidly around a screen. Thus, at the group level and aside from formal meetings, 
interactions were free-flowing, but framed by the active computing screen and its 
setting (Zuboff, 1988; Beanstein, 1975). 
Managers in all firms frequently referred to the importance of growing research 
skills internally. Generally researchers stay within a given area for several years 
to become expert. Movement among groups in the area take place as project 
requirements vary as individual interests develop. Movement outside of the area 
is less common, and reflects the importance of the common skill context built 
through the nature of the work and the personal networks. Within IBM, the 
recent work organisation experiments prompted management concern that 
people may have difficulty moving among the distinct work settings. 
Group embedded skills were prevalent in a variety of situations. The traditional 
group was characterised by propinquity and a strong sense of achievement 
motivation. RSRE discovered that disbanding such a group and reconstituting it 
at some later time, when funds were again available, meant that the group was 
unable to attain rapidly the high performance previously achieved. The tacit skill 
foundation was easily disrupted but not easily recreated even with most of the 
same people present. 
Physical proximity (or some approximation) appears to be essential for creating 
skill depth. However, once achieved, it becomes possible to expand the skill use 
with a larger dispersed group or network of groups. Yet IBM found that rapid 
start-up of a new team on mainframe operating interfaces was difficult when the 
CHAPTERSEVEIV. SJULLS SUPPLYST)UTEGY& ITS MUf CONTEXT 
, 
PAGE 291 
entire group did not begin at the same time. Sending three professionals to the 
U. S. for initial collaboration was of little benefit for subsequent team members 
who continued to lag behind in levels of performance. 
In our three cases, there existed a high awareness of the importance of 
computing skills in the R&D area, though articulation in strategic terms 
remained poor. At the same time, a production orientation has been introduced, 
with more emphasis on channelling innovation for greater productivity through 
the explicit techniques of project management. Recently, an overlay of marketing 
control has been introduced. These control systems have tried to standardize the 
research process, and in doing so, have created new skill requirements which are 
explicit and more amenable to control (Winters, 1987). 
Tacit Managerial Skills. BT's strategy to increase private sector managerial skills 
over an eight year period demonstrates an effective (though slow) method of 
reorienting the management team. In the opinion of this researcher, the 
recruitment of these skills from the top-down translated into a slow process of 
change partly because the new managers were not understood by many of the BT 
career managers who continued to operate in the old political culture of judicious 
"disobedience". A significant impact was made only with the exiting on many of 
these resistors and the accumulation of a large group of external recruits. The 
scale effect of the latter was important for BT managers excited by the changes 
but requiring models of private sector individual and group behaviours to modify 
profoundly the skillbase that hitherto had guided their actions and interventions. 
IBM presents another interesting example of the robustness of the managerial 
skillbase. Despite the repeated signals from a business environment growing 
more dangerous, IBM managers seemed unable to modify their traditional, slow 
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and complex decision-making process where internal negotiations and 
persuasiveness played a large role. This inward-looking culture was fostered by 
decades of dominance in the computer industry where IBM set the standards. 
External recruitment was not accessed because it would have been a violation of 
lifetime employment and the internal career development that renewed the 
management ranks. The case of BT differed in that the changes in competitive 
environment were clear, dramatic and according to the government timetable. 
Tacit Networking Skills. The reality of R&D in the three high tech organisations 
studied resembles that of a network of organisations and persons closely 
integrated, with many outside participants playing an essential business role not 
easily substituted. International in scope, R&D benefited from joint ventures 
with firms, institutes and university labs. IBM also has an extensive internal 
network of laboratories and science centres within which knowledge transfers 
take place. 
Within the U. K, the above international dimension was evident. But all three 
organisations also called on consulting firms to tap skills in critical shortage. 
Generally demanding ever higher compensation, these experts could not be 
attracted by the average wages of leading firms offered by these organisations, 
hence their regular though limited use under tailored contracts. 
Both RSRE and Hursley Lab contracted out for convenience, RSRE to keep the 
more interesting basic research work for its permanent people, and Hursley to 
meet project requirements on an ad hoc basis. In both cases some managers 
thought that such skills should be within the core workforce, but that other 
considerations weighed more heavily. Recruitment flow also took place between 
the organisation and the contracting firms. Current employees could join a 
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consulting firm and offer their services back at higher rates. Similarly, 
contracted help was a recruitment source for permanent positions within the 
organisation. 
We conclude that within the UX, the R&D network involved the external labour 
market to access scarce skills but also to support a variety of short-term business 
and people management goals. The idea that a network would encourage a 
strategy for managing the skills supply of the "expanded" organisation was not 
supported. The absence of an expanded SKISS echoes the difficulties of 
recognising a SKISS within the more traditional boundaries of the organisation. 
.I 
CHANGING THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT 
Our findings suggest that changing the operational context (including the work of 
R&D) of an organisation takes place over a protracted period of time. The 
relationship between the pace of change and the operational context has 
additional significance in that tacit skills are embedded in the work organisation. 
The introduction of a single-benefit pattern of skill supply does not disturb the 
skillbase, whereas a multi-benefit pattern does so. The passage of several years 
may be required to modify the skillbase and its context in a controlled manner. 
At some point modifying the skillbase becomes accelerated and deliberate as part 
of restructuring. These findings are consistent with those of Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1991) in that linking strategic and operational change was complex, additive and 
characterised as both an intended and emergent process. Our findings 
demonstrate how adjustments in hard and soft benefits contribute to the process. 
In contrast, Pettigrew and Whipp presented modifications of the reward system 
as a secondary mechanism which builds on primary conditioning features, 
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notably building capacity for appropriate action. In our example of modifying the 
managerial style within BT, changes in hard benefits acted as a conditioning 
feature by assisting in the recruitment and the building up of a critical mass of 
new managers with a new vision. The relationship between conditioning features 
and secondary mechanisms appears to be highly permeable. 
The upward influence of middle managers in R&D refers to the type of linkage 
between technology and strategy proposed by Itami and Numagami (1992). They 
argued that emergent cognitions about the existing technology operating could 
guide future business strategy. The authors described how deep knowledge (both 
articulated and tacit) in a particular technological area stimulated the generation 
of ideas which would cluster around a common base of knowledge, and could lead 
to well articulated strategic proposals. Our findings point out that part of the 
process of nurturing and sustaining this evolving skillbase takes the shape of 
managerial cognitions on how to exploit existing and developing technologies 
with the researchers at hand. These cognitions lead to measures which middle 
managers take to shape the existing professional and managerial skills within 
the organisation. 
CONCLUSION 
Of the four skill supply patterns evaluated, only Modifying BT Management 
Style, and BT Decentralisation of Recruitment & Operations within R&D, fully 
satisfied the four criteria of SIUSS. It is not surprising that RSRE failed to 
achieve a SKISS given its dependent status within the civil service and MOD. It 
is more curious that IBM-Hursley lacked a SKISS. Operating within competitive 
markets and possessing a large internal market, IBM had the opportunity to 
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seek competitive skill advantages for its R&D. Our findings suggest that the 
market dominance of IBM in the 1980s encouraged an inward-looking culture 
where management became insensitive to market signals. However, in the 1990s, 
the "awakening" of management and the consequent Software Mission at 
Hursley did stimulate a SICISS-like pattern. Intense competition and 
management cognitions on the urgency of the situation appear to be the critical 
features for the creation of a multi-lever SKISS. 
Of the four criteria, the most difficult to satisfy was that of coherence of HRM 
components. This criterion appeared to . involve an emergent process which 
sometimes addressed the strategic skill initiatives and sometimes dealt with 
secondary effects or with unrelated matters. The fact that the HRM context 
(discussed in Ch. 8) involves many features may explain the difficulty of 
achieving a skills-oriented coherence. 
The evidence supports the view that research skills in high technology 
organisations are deeply embedded in the operational and social features of the 
work context. Lower levels of management naturally pay attention to the 
management of individuals and work groups under their immediate supervision, 
but until recently, middle managers also spent considerable time in managing 
these local efforts and paid less attention to division-wide issues. Top-down 
strategic thrusts do not immediately and automatically bring middle managers 
on side unless there are structures which ensure their involvement. The 
embeddedness of management skills means that any top-down effort for radical 
change encounters resistance of the management group, partly because their 
cognitions and behaviours are anchored in the existing operational context, and 
partly because their self-interest may not be served well by the intended changes. 
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Until they can make the corporate strategy their own, middle managers will slow 
down the pace of change. 
Because of the embedded nature of skills, the strategic concept of core 
competencies proposed by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) is found wanting: they 
emphasised corporate-wide skill synergies, but minimise the involvement of 
business units and lower levels of the work organisation. Mein et al. 's (1991) 
concept of core skills comes closer to capturing the embedded nature of skills in 
relation to equipment and organizational culture. Mein believed that the 
skillbase underwent continuous change as part of innovation and learning. In 
other words, the skillbase is built from the bottom-up in the on-going 
management of the professionals. We would add other skill supply levers besides 
challenging work which can influence the incremental adjustment of the 
skillbase. 
The embedded nature of skills makes it difficult to achieve a SKISS because 
modifying the operational context requires tremendous energy to deal with this 
level of complexity and maintain the effort over time. Episodes of skill concern 
are more likely. As suggested by Winters (1987), heightened skill awareness 
helps to make some skill aspects explicit and more manageable. In order to 
sustain the effort, much has to be at stake and ample resources must be brought 
to bear on the situation. The introduction of private sector managerial skills at 
BT is such as example. 
One wonders under what conditions would a multi-lever SKISS become possible 
in R&D where operational and social features anchor the skills. Our findings 
indicated that middle management was concerned about transferable skills for 
the purpose of redeployment and the creation of project teams. They were also 
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interested in building skills that took time and group stability. We can surmise 
that while managers focus on both issues (transferability and building), these 
efforts would become a SKISS if and when middle management shared in the 
process of strategic formation and nevertheless remained grounded in the basic 
work organisation. 
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CHAPTER 8: SKISS & ITS HRM CONTEXT 
In Chapter 7, the four criteria for SKISS covered two dimensions of analysis: the 
content of change (business strategy link and coherence of HRM components), 
and the process of change (top managerial intent and consistent efforts). The 
concluding section began the task of interpreting the findings by adding the 
dimension of context. The importance of intense competitive pressures in the 
outer context was considered a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
developing a multi-lever SKISS. Features within the inner context (e. g., 
managerial culture, organisational structure) of the organisation could channel 
these pressures to create a SIUSS or could resist change, thus favouring the 
established policy of lifetime employment. 
In this chapter, the influence of the HRM context on skill supply patterns is 
evaluated fully to complete the analysis of change using the contextualist 
framework outlined in Chapter 2 and applying the concept of SKISS as a focal 
point surrounded by the larger HRM context. HRM is discussed in terms of the 
policy of lifetime employment, top management values and perceptions, 
managerial and professional cultures, the personnel function, and workforce 
planning. Hard and soft benefits attached to these HRM features are discussed. 
The chapter ends with an assessment of the features of HRM as facilitators and 
inhibitors of SKISS. 
LIFETIME EMPLOYMIENT UNDER ATTACK 
In all three cases the dominant skill supply pattern was a long-standing corpus of 
policies and practices built around the lifetime employment philosophy. Key 
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elements included consistently low levels of recruitment of the best graduates, 
high levels of training, workforce headcount control, voluntary exits, 
redeployment and retraining, and a significant peripheral workforce. Hard 
benefits included competitive entry salaries for graduate recruits, low risk, high 
internal equity, and rich pensions for mandatory and voluntary retirements. The 
main soft benefits were a steady stream of challenging work, positive work 
environment, enriched training, employment security, promotion from within, 
and continuity of community Cob transfers to nearby sites without disrupting 
community links). Each firm had a recognizable internal labour market (ILM) 
composed of managers and professionals with some segmentation by function and 
division. Some authors have argued that this pattern constitutes a skills supply 
strategy, called the Salaried Pattern by Osterman (1987) and Lifelong 
Employment by Beer et al. (1984). In our cases, lifetime employment maintained 
the dominant pattern of skills supply, but in the 1980s and 1990s, it constituted a 
tradition of well established practices resistant to change. 
Within the R&D division of our three cases, lifetime employment was considered 
very important in order to develop researchers over long spans of time. This was 
crucial in RSRE which operated with horizons of up to ten years. All 
organisations were confronted with skill shortages for experienced project 
managers and professionals in all areas, and especially in the networking and 
advanced computing areas. All organisations relied on external recruitment and 
the development of project managers internally for computing and networking. 
Redeployment and retraining took place to some degree to grow these new areas, 
but the pace was slow and was opposed by researchers wishing to remain within 
their preferred field. The coordinated use of recruitment, training and 
development was the continuation of best practice, and did not have strong links 
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with business strategy. However, restructuring in 1990s by BT and IBM was 
accompanied by greater skill awareness and measures to address skill concerns. 
Private Sector. Large high technology firms were noted for the lifetime 
employment pattern. IBM adopted the pattern in the 1950s, but contrary to the 
public sector, it included individual contracts with performance-related pay for 
all of its employees. Lifetime employment was offered with the clear 
understanding that employment security was offered, not job security. Effective 
deployment and redeployment of the workforce required people and skill 
flexibility. Within IBM, lifetime employment was a corporate philosophy based on 
the belief that full commitment of people was only possible from people who saw 
their future and careers as linked to the fortunes of the firm, and whose dignity 
was respected by the firm. Employee flexibility was expected. 
In the 1980s, business critics and shareholders repeatedly challenged the 
appropriateness of lifetime employment for the battered IBM, and senior 
managers continued to defend the pattern as responsible for IBM's past successes 
and a necessary part of future successes. But as IBM's fortunes declined, senior 
management clarified their support. The possibility of mandatory redundancies 
continued to surface. By 1991 the basic pattern remained intact but had been 
chipped at the edges. Voluntary redundancies targeted younger persons and 
reached some people in their early forties. Term contracts 'were offered to 
graduates instead of permanent contracts. These incremental changes addressed 
short-term issues provoked by the business downturn and the age profile of the 
firm. 
Public Sector. Lifetime employment or tenure was introduced in the civil service 
in the 19th century as a solution to patronage. By removing the fear of job loss 
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and institutionalising competitive and open recruitment, it became possible to 
create a professional workforce with on-going training and development, and 
promotion from within. This pattern has been maintained with few changes in a 
hundred years. It was extended to the growing civil service, and covered both 
RSRE and BT. What originally started as a coherent and intentional SKISS 
became an institutionalised pattern. Only in the 1980s was there growing 
pressure to modify this pattern. The rise of Raynerism and efficiency concerns led 
to the privatisation of crown corporations, and subsequently the creation of 
executive agencies in the late 1980s. The impact on RSRE was slow and 
incremental, and led to a customer-focused budget system which prompted a 
reorganisation and had some impact on skills. Computing and networking skills 
gained in importance, and basic scientific disciplines decreased in importance. 
The Defence Agency was created in 1991, and was expected to radically change 
operations and the basic employment contract. 
In the 1980s, lifelong employment had become somewhat maladaptive for RSRE 
as it struggled to attract and retain researchers with scarce and key skills. As 
part of the wider civil service, RSRE management did not control fully the HRM 
levers which were conceived for service-wide equity and the development of broad 
professionals. Similarly, BT was immersed in this tradition as part of the Post 
Office. With the privatisation of BT in 1984, lifetime employment was viewed by 
senior management as an impediment to transforming the organisation from a 
public to a private concern. BT also lost the obligation and role of good employer 
portrayed by the civil service. It was now free to choose its values, and the push 
of competition and regulation encouraged viewing the workforce as a cost. 
External recruitment from the top-down in the management ranks violated the 
pattern, and the introduction of individual contracts based on performance- 
related pay emphasised the new orientation. 
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It is interesting to note that performance-related pay did not prove to be the 
mechanism for eidting managers unable to cope with the new management style. 
Instead, "resisting" managers were persuaded that the new structure had no 
place for them and that early retirement was appropriate. 
In the late 1980s, senior BT management expanded the theme of private 
enterprise and competition to include a basic modification of the employment 
contract for all of its employees, that is, "no more employment for life". While the 
new theme was repeated consistently, radical downsizing only took place in 1991. 
Clearly the unions had a moderating effect on contract adjustments for both 
- management and professional/technical ranks. Mandatory redundancies were 
entertained by senior management, but were never realized. However, voluntary 
redundancies for people in their forties did take place. 
Conclusion. We can draw the conclusion that lifetime employment is under 
attack in the 1990s, and contrary to the recommendations of Consensual HRM 
(e. g., Beer et al., 1984; Keep, 1991), this core policy is being weakened. The past 
dominance of lifetime employment has meant that the key levers to influence 
skills supply were relatively unavailable to other supply efforts. Any changes in 
the key levers (recruitment, training, development, and e3dting) and key benefits 
would be questioned as either appropriate or not appropriate in light of this key 
policy. Whereas Beer et al. (1984) and Keep (1991) proposed lifetime employment 
as an essential policy for organisational success, our findings emphasise its 
maladaptive feature in an environment of g. rowing turbulence, and its blockage of 
needed changes. 
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Lifetime employment was supported by the view that HR assets were important 
and improved with time if consistently and broadly developed. In the public 
sector (RSRE and BT), it was believed that employment security ensured 
professionalism by removing unemployment fears and giving employees the right 
environment to invest in their skills. ]Professional expertise was highly valued in 
a changing and modem world. Within the private sector (IBM), employee 
security supposedly guaranteed high employee commitment and a willingness to 
grow and adapt with the firm. 
The attack on lifetime employment was taking place at the same time as the 
convergence between the public (BT and RSRE) and private sectors (IBM) with 
the former copying the latter, especially in the greater emphasis on incentives 
and performance-related pay. Yet each organisation confronted a different 
context and responded differently over time. RSRE changed very slowly in 
keeping with centralised programs. With performance-related pay and personal 
contracts already well established, IBM introduced incremental changes as of the 
mid 1980s in response to deteriorating business performance. BT explicitly 
recruited and retained private sector managers by adopting a compensation 
package mirroring the current practice in the private sector. 
With the greater involvement of line management, RSRE and BT were exploring 
ways of offering competitive salaries for recruiting and retaining people with key 
skills while maintaining global control of the workforce budget. Interestingly, 
market sensitive salaries could be higher or lower than average national wages. 
Management was willing to trade-off internal consistency for recruitment and 
retention advantages. IBM, on the other hand, adjusted to self-imposed 
recruitment controls in the 1990s by expanding the use of fixed-terin contracts 
with graduates so as to maintain the supply of key skills. 
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The policy of lifetime employment was under pressure in the 1980s (BT and IBM) 
but was strongly supported by the HRM context. This policy served the interests 
of several groups, and was consequently defended. However, support did 
diminish somewhat as small and additive changes in certain features took place, 
namely, within top management and the professional and managerial cultures, 
and within the personnel function. 
TOP MANAGEMENT VALUES & PERCEPTIONS 
In all three cases, top management traditionally supported the lifetime 
employment pattern. Individual managers toyed with the idea of operating as a 
"lean and mean machine". These musings gave rise to no concrete action, but 
they indicated that management saw definite advantages to subordinating people 
concerns to business concerns. Only in BT did a SKISS take root to introduce 
private sector managerial skills at a fast pace with external recruitment and 
exiting of resistors. Once freed from government ownership, the executive and 
board of directors used their concentrated power to sustain the renewal of the 
management ranks from the top. With local, national, and international 
competition clearly on the horizon, a small group of top managers (about one 
third of the board) were convinced that a new management style was critical to 
future business success. Breaking with the past, they proceeded to minimize 
internal senior promotions, maximize external recruitment into their ranks, and 
increase early retirements. 
Within RSRE and IBM, top management was noted for continuity and 
inbreeding. Their set views were obstacles to broad changes which questioned 
their tenure and their prospects for promotion. RSRE top managers originating 
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from the applied physics area continued to insist on the pre-eminence of applied 
physics over information systems despite growing customer dissatisfaction and 
the industry trends. IBM top management remained captive to the entrenched 
managerial culture of shared decision-making and change champions reinforced 
by the commitment to lifetime employment. IBM careerists dominated the top, 
supported only small incremental changes to business strategy and practices, and 
continued to share in the belief of market dominance as their destiny. As late as 
1992, consistent increases in competition and poor business performance were 
not sufficient to stimulate a new vision. The focused software mission at Hursley 
Lab was a difficult admission that IBM lagged in offering computing services. 
The above analysis suggests that only when top management perceives 
competitive pressure as overwhelming (with some prodding from discontented 
stakeholders) can it initiate a paradigm shift and subsequently introduce a multi- 
lever SKISS to modify the skillbase over time. The BT example demonstrates 
how the new frame of reference makes it possible to drive change over a decade in 
the face of high resistance of senior (and middle) managers who saw their 
interests satisfied in the status quo. 
PROFESSIONAL & MANAGERIAL CULTURES 
Two dominant cultural mindsets were evident: professional excellence, and 
business performance. As high technology firms with important R&D activity, 
management considered the excellence of their professionals as essential for 
business success. Excellence achieved through depth of expertise could only be 
fostered over long periods of time assuming recruitment from among the best. 
Thus employment commitment through the lifetime employment pattern was 
considered appropriate. 
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From the perspective of professionals in the early 1980s, this approach was very 
satisfactory. Traditional scientific researchers wanted a secure environment in 
which to pursue their researh interests and become expert in a specific area. 
Becoming managers was also satisfactory because the persons would remain in 
the same area and would continue to have some involvement in the "lab". 
The significant change in the 1980s was the rising dominance of computing and 
networking over engineering and the basic sciences, and increasing customer 
demands for these new specialties. The maturing of computing science made it 
difficult for existing employees to outperform new recruits who could contribute 
significantly to customer responsiveness. Also, computing people generally were 
more comfortable with a business orientation involving customer contact, and 
letting the business potential of technology rather than theory or technical 
wizardry guide the research agenda. While customer pressures favoured the 
ascendency of IT skills over engineering and physics-based skills, the historical 
dominance of the latter group slowed down efforts to reshape the organisational 
skillbase. Within RSRE in particular, the cultural conflict gave rise to serious 
under and over-staffing problems. 
With stiff market competition for these skills, new supply patterns were sought, 
but reliance on graduate recruits and some redeployment continued. The growing 
number of software professionals within the organisation helped to create a 
positive environment for customer responsiveness. While BT underwent a 
gradual reshaping of its workforce in favour of software skills, both IBM and 
(potentially) RSRE underwent rapid reshaping in the 1990s in response to 
mission and status changes. In all cases, competitive pressures and the need for 
greater productivity stimulated managers to evolve a hybrid view of professionals 
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as both excellent and business minded, a trend noted by the the British 
Computer Society (1990). At the organisational level, the appearance in the 
1980s of hybrid technical and managerial roles in R&D has coincided with the 
shift from professional and bureaucratictmanagerial forms of control to market 
control within U. M organisations (Francis and Winstanley, 1988; Whittington, 
1991). In effect, a power shift has taken place from researchers to managers 
which has left traditional researchers and managers uneasy. 
Scarbrough and Corbett (1992) have argued that the commitment to knowledge 
and innovation becomes diluted by the new and somewhat incompatible 
commitments to business performance. This incompatibility of orientations does 
not appear to be a problem for younger professionals and managers and for those 
working in the applied areas where short-term horizons and customer contact are 
common and where the technology itself guides the research agenda through 
"playing with the computer". A hybrid role has emerged characterised by broad 
responsibilities with less distinction between business functions. These new roles 
have been a difficult transition for some as new cognitions are needed on the 
nature and purpose of research. This cultural change was accompanied by new 
expectations by researchers on appropriate hard and soft benefits for high 
performance and for their presumed value on the labour market. In keeping with 
this change at the professional and lower management levels, middle managers 
began to shift to a broader'notion of performance closer to organisational 
capability and business strategy, and consequently, closer to managing a wider 
skillbase. 
From both perspectives (research excellence and business performance), R&D 
management viewed skills through the "lens" of work performance -a focus on 
achieving desired results. 7be growing emphasis on business performance has 
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diminished the importance of innovation per se and increased responsiveness to 
customer and market requirements which may or may not require innovative 
work. The greater articulation of performance outcomes has encouraged 
managers to focus on the usable skills of the researchers instead of solely on 
research efforts and long-term potential, and to use more performance-related 
benefits to achieve these outcomes. 
INCOHERENCE OF ELARD & SOFT BENEFITS 
The greater emphasis on business performance guided many of the change in 
hard and soft benefits. At the same time, downsizing requirements and skill 
shortages also prompted changes in benefits. However, these isolated changes 
were constrained by the policy and practices of lifetime employment and other 
traditional practices (e. g., individual accountability). From a skills management 
perspective, hard and soft benefits can play a significant role in the recruitment 
and retention of employees. However, the cases revealed that changes in these 
benefits sometimes served skill purposes and sometimes other purposes. "These 
cross-purposes made HRM coherence around skill issues difficult to achieve and 
maintain over time. 
HARD BENEFITS 
In keeping with the positions of Milkovich (1987), Bamberger et al. (1989), and 
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990), compensation was found to be central in the 
recruitment of high tech employees in our three main cases. However, our results 
give qualified support to their argument that compensation is crucial to 
retention. These authors reported that a compensation package demonstrating 
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market leadership and flexibility played an important role in the recruitment and 
retention of key employee groups in start-up firms and growth-oriented business 
units. Our three organisations contained growth-oriented units, but retention 
was achieved through a competitive compensation package and pension penalties 
for early departures. These organisations experienced low levels of turnover (less 
than 5%) and practiced lifetime employment. A competitive compensation 
package was maintained by regular adjustments, but market leadership was not 
the desired standard. Equitable treatment of professionals was more important 
than flexible rewards, though the latter was growing in importance. We 
concluded that adequate hard benefits act as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for retention upon which soft benefits build attachment. This 
conclusion resembles the work of Herzberg (1968) with hygiene factors (e. g., 
money) and motivating factors (e. g., recognition), but does not correspond in 
detail with his classification (see Wilson and Rosenfeld, 1990, for criticisms of 
this theory). Consistent with Sparrow's (1988) findings, performance-related pay 
was introduced extensively. However, innovative compensation and inducements 
found in relatively small fast-growth entrepreneurial U. S. firms (Mi1jius and 
Smith, 1987) were not practiced. In particular, group-based bonuses (Gomez- 
Meija and Balkin, 1989) were absent despite our findings that researchers 
preferred them and that groups were the basic work unit. 
The literature on high technology organisations has given little attention to 
pensions. The on-going creation and growth of small entrepreneurial firms has 
kept the focus on ways of recruiting and retaining mobile high flyers, and 
graduates and experienced professionals in the face of external labour shortages 
Weingartner and Anderson, 1987). It is reasonable to assume that only 
surviving firms launched in the 1950s and 1960s have had to address the issue of 
older employees as both the firm and its employees have matured together. In 0# 
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our three cases, large mature high tech firms benefited from low turnover rates. 
As part of downsizing, removal of penalties for early departures and significant 
lump-sum payments were necessary to stimulate voluntary retirements. These 
practices are found among large firms throughout the economy (Schell et al., 
1989). 
SOFT BENEFITS 
Challenainz Work meant that professionals had the opportunity to use their 
skills and had the discretion to choose the specific work done. Within R&D, this 
benefit has been widely cited as essential, echoing the position of Raelin et al. 
(1985), Miller (1986), and MiIjius and Smith (1987). Kanter (1985) and Schuler 
(1986) have emphasized intrapreneurship as the challenge that high flyers are 
searching for. There was evidence of such in our cases, but typically the activity 
was integrated with the other work. 
Positive Work Environment was considered very important, and composed of two 
elements: friendly, supportive and talented colleagues, and supportive managers 
(Turbin and Rosse, 1990). Colleagues played a crucial role in making the work 
more stimulating through group work and personal networks. Managers helped 
by guiding researchers in defining their research projects so as to obtain 
organisational support and by protecting them from administrative tasks and 
worry. 
Recognition for Employee Contributions was another important retention 
mechanism, confirming the findings of MiIjius and Smith (1987). Researchers 
and managers thrive on recognition of their skills and accomplishments. Failure 
to obtain recognition is equivalent to being de-valued and can lead to exiting the 
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firm. These organisations were multiplying the ways in which recognition could 
be given. 
Enriched Training for professionals broadened and deepened their skills and kept 
them current (Turbin and Rosse, 1990). Both formal and on-the-job training were 
valued. Training was considered helpful to career development, but usually the 
linkage was weak. Ample rather than focused training was typical, but a shift to 
the latter was taking place. 
Teleworking was valued by some managers to retain female software specialists. 
But it was practiced by few, contrary to the growing trend reported by Sparrow 
(1988) and Yeats (1987). 
Informal Listming by managers helped them to identify morale problems and to 
addresses sources of dissatisfaction before they became serious (Sherman, 1986; 
Parden 1981). Retention of employees was an explicit concern. 
Formal Listening Systems such as opinion surveys and interviews were used to 
gauge employee satisfaction and identify sources of dissatisfaction (IBM and 
recently BT). The need to measure morale and its consequences were the driving 
force. 
Employee Involvement through communications was meant to improve morale 
and commitment to the firm. Researchers have argued that when management 
regularly shares information on the changing business strategy, its 
implementation and adjustments, employees respond constructively (Salancik, 
1977; DeCotiis and Summers, 1987; Miller, 1986; Raelin et al., 1985). 
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Emplo=ent Security was valued by employees, especially those over 35-40 years 
of age. Management was becoming aware that the younger generation had a 
relatively short horizon in mind (4-5 years) when seeking security. Also, assertive 
private sector managers (BT) saw their own security as anchored in their skills 
and accomplishments, not necessarily bound to one firm. 
Career Development gave people a future orientation with the organisation. 
Though researchers are agreed on the importance of this benefit to retention 
(MiIjius and Smith, 1987; Sparrow, 1988), our cases gave mixed support. Career 
development and its management had repeated cycles of improvement and 
degradation, and were given more attention when morale sagged. Concern was 
centred on performance first and retention second. 
Successful and Responsible Image of the firm was widely appreciated, as noted 
by Yeats (1987) and Cascio (1990). Morale was at issue. Though both RSRE and 
BT tried hard to improve their image, IBM accepted some deterioration in order 
to emphasize the crisis in which the firm found itself in the 1990s. 
Quality of the Communit . Geographic proximity of multiple sites made 
employment transfers and forced relocation possible without disrupting 
community links. Yeats (1987) found that employees often chose to leave the 
organisation rather than move to a new community. Participants described 
quality of the community as involving family, friends, schools, leisure activities, 
attractive surroundings, weather, and cost of homes (Turbin and Rosse, 1990; 
Cascio, 1990). Being married and owning a home were considered strong 
retention elements. Many employees have a holistic view centred on their person 
instead of the firm. While managers recognise this new view, they treat the non- 
work component as either a constraint or a chance facilitator of recruitment and 
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retention. Several authors have broadened the notion of career to include both 
work and non-work spheres of activity in response to life phases (Levinson, 1978), 
multiple needs (Schein, 1978), diversity of views and peoples (Deer and Laurent, 
1989; Weick and Berlinger, 1989), dual-career families (Sekaran and Hall, 1989), 
and the growing importance of women in the workforce (Gallos, 1989; Marshall, 
1989). Management practice appears to be reluctant to adopt this broader view of 
career which gives less attention to the organisation. 
In general, changes in soft benefits took place for retention of key skills rather 
than for recruitment advantages in a context of employment insecurity and 
generally low morale which potentially could impact on performance. Within BT, 
retention of key skills explicitly centred on fresh graduates. R&D had some 
concern about supply in the 1990s, and internal surveys had indicated 
dissatisfaction among the graduate employees. In order to ensure retention, a 
coordinated programme was introduced including cohort planning, induction, job- 
relevant training, and challenging assignments. In contrast, IBM was more 
concerned with focusing their training for business requirements and channelling 
them into areas where their skills could be best used. 
IBM used Skillbase Inc. to retain access to mature specialised skills. Only BT 
introduced teleworking, and did so in'a limited fashion to retain female software 
professionals. On another front, informal listening by BT middle managers was 
expanded in order to understand the skillbase on which business performance 
depended, and to identify needed retention efforts. 
Among the soft benefits noted for giving a retention advantage, changes to career 
development proved to be particularly incongruent. While the literature gives 
considerable importance to this HRM lever in organisations with a policy of 
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lifetime employment (Beer et al., 1984; Osterman, 1987; Sonnenfeld, 1991), it 
emerged as a peripheral and reactive activity in our three organisations. The 
strong focus on performance and performance-related pay appears to have 
diminished the importance of career development. Within flatter organisations 
where horizontal career paths become more prevalent, career and its 
development takes on a new meaning. With the urgency to improve business 
performance, the concern with productive use of employees displaces in great 
measure the traditional caring attention to career development. The latter comes 
into play to absorb the pain caused by the business-oriented changes. These 
results support Miller's (1986) argument that there exists an inevitable conflict 
between the development requirements of professionals and the organisation's 
use of technology (and related skills) for changing business requirements. 
f 
PERSONNEL ALANAGEMENT FUNCTION 
During the 1980s, all three organisations had a traditional personnel 
administration style with centrally determined policies and practices. Personnel 
followed prescriptions for best practice and was less driven by labour relations 
(Sisson, 1989a). Line managers were expected to implement the policies without 
modification, and corporate personnel was viewed as the enforcer. This situation 
supported the existence of the corporate-wide culture of lifetime employment. 
The personnel managers saw themselves as defenders of the policy and practices 
of lifetime employment, and kept line managers in check. Change was taking 
place at a slow pace with some noticeable acceleration in the latter half of the 
decade. Some decentralisation of HRM responsibilities took place, and line 
managers played a larger role. Generally, personnel continued to hold firmly to 
lifetime employment, but had less power to resist changes which line managers 
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sought to improve performance of their area. Unions have played a minimal role 
because changes in the top managerial ranks and in R&D were supported by the 
absence of a union or the presence of a collaborative professional union. 
With restructuring, changes in centralisation-decentralisation of the personnel 
function proved to be complex, but generally made personnel less of an obstacle to 
SKISS. The value added by personnel was questioned, and line managers with IT 
and expert support were considered an economic alternative. Centralisation of 
routine personnel matters and loading first-line managers with more 
administration pursued economy goals (BT and IBM). These managers also 
obtained the ability to use a wider range of performance-related rewards 
(monetary rewards And recognition) in a timely manner. In contrast 
decentralisation of non-routine matters sought to give middle and senior line 
managers within the division more autonomy (RSRE and BT) in order to improve 
business performance. HRM planning and control roles for middle line managers 
have strengthened the consistency between HRM activities and business 
performance concerns. This consistency has increased the likelihood of achieving 
synergistic economies (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). 
The development of explicit HRM responsibilities at middle levels of line 
management was not innovative, but the expansion, explicit recognition, and 
integration in the general management systems likely will facilitate the 
achievement of operating synergies across teams and research areas. Both Tyson 
(19$7) and Sisson (1989b) have discussed the shift from personnel to line 
managers of personnel matters. Our findings add specificity in that routine and 
non-routine matters were found to gravitate to different levels of line 
management. Furthermore, it was found that, within the same organisation (BT), 
shifts towards efficient personnel administration (Clerk of the Works) and 
f 
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strategy-oriented personnel (Architect) could take place simultaneously, thanks 
to a matrix structure, instead of a shift to one or the other (Tyson, 1987). 
In summary, the personnel function has lost power to line managers with the 
greater emphasis on performance and economy. Personnel continues to play an 
important supporting role which is subordinate to line managers, especially in 
non-routine and strategic matters. 
WORKFORCE PLANNING 
Within the personnel function, workforce planning has the potential to generate 
a skills supply strategy (Timberley and Sisson, 1989). Achieving a SKISS 
depends on moving beyond jobs and grades and on translating the business needs 
of the organisation into skill needs. The case evidence demonstrates that 
workforce (or manpower) planning has been unable to go beyond traditional 
practice. 
Consistent with its history (Timberley and Sisson, 1989), workforce planning did 
not offer a favourable context for the creation of a SKISS because it was a 
servant of the financial planning and control systems. The focus remained on 
macro conceptions of skill Qobs and grades) that were anchored in the 
organisational structure, and right-sizing, whether downsizing or upsizing, the 
organisationwas the main objective. Personnel would ensure that the transitions 
took place in an orderly fashion respectful of the policy of lifetime employment. 
IBM was no exception, but there, workforce planning was closer to the business 
plan. The firm also had a rich history of skills planning for specific line concerns 
of variable horizon. Though these systems and solutions were offered by 
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personnel within an area, corporate personnel did not value them enough to 
integrate them into the corporate-wide systems. 
On a more favourable note, local and lab-wide skills planning was increasingly 
exercised by middle line managers as they pursued more demanding business 
goals. These managers received some training in planning techniques (as 
recommended by lKinnie, 1991), but leaming-as-you-go was the dominant 
process. 
The existence of the lifetime employment policy did not exclude downsizing the 
organisation because of an actual or expected downturn in sales or as a 
preparation for more intense competition. A general pattern was recognizable 
across the three cases. Initially changes in benefits (enriched exit packages) took 
place to increase the outflow of employees so as to downsize the organisation. 
While this took place over a number of years in BT and IBM and intensified in 
the 1990s, the threat of such action became prominent in RSRE in that decade. 
This top-down intervention was accompanied by top-down communications 
meant to increase employee involvement in the organisation-wide business 
change, and help redefine the employment contract and the underlying belief in 
employment security. Despite consistent attempts by management to improve 
the company image, employees responded by devaluing the organisation's 
reputation either in terms of its success or its caring responsibilities. In time, the 
work environment deep within the organisation began to suffer as employees fed 
on each other's uncertainties. In order to deal with deteriorating morale, 
management augmented formal and informal listening. Greater listening 
identified dissatisfaction with career development; management introduced 
measures to persuade employees of a future with the organisation. What emerges 
is a sequence of changes that begins with a top-down decision to modify the hard 
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benefits, and evolves into a deterioration of soft benefits. The ensuing morale 
problem puts pressure on management to monitor and understand the problem 
(bottom-up). Better informed, management responds by improving a soft benefit 
(career development) which had deteriorated through neglect. 
The decline in morale can be explained by reference to the informal and social 
organisation. The exiting of employees in ever increasing numbers impacted on 
the daily lives of the remaining employees who were expected to change their 
ways of working, of doing more with fewer hands. Disruptions in social networks 
became evident, and the increasing amplitude of departures may not have given 
enough time for the networks to be reorganised and return to functionality. 
Social groups felt threatened, and negativity set in (Homan, 1950,1974). Offering 
better career development signals that management foresees a period of stability 
which would give personal and group networks time to consolidate. 
With the deterioration in the work environment also came a weakening of 
organisational commitment. Employees questioned the value of the organisation 
as successful and responsible employer, and consequently the value of their work. 
These multiple sources of commitment (Reichers, 1985; Coopey and Hartley, 
1991) appeared to interact. 
CONCLUSION: HRM INHIBITORS & FACILITATORS OF SKISS 
As the main determinant of the entrenched sldlls supply pattern, the policy of 
lifetime employment benefited from a consistent set of positive HRM features. 
However, both top management and the professional and managerial cultures 
were becoming less supportive over the 1980s and the 1990s. Personnel and 
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workforce planning remained strongly positive. That is, personnel function and 
systems were lagging behind leadership and cultural changes. As context, 
lifetime employment generally was unfavourable to developing other skill supply 
patterns and other uses of hard and soft benefits, but became slightly less 
negative over time as its meaning was gradually modified. 
Top management was a strong positive feature for change which was reinforced 
by the evolving professional and managerial culture. Top management succeeded 
in driving change quickly when there were no negative HRM features in 
opposition. When negative features existed, the pace of change slowed down and 
management expended effort to broadly improve the context while 
simultaneously implementing changes in skill supply patterns. Top management 
also acted as a block to change when its industry and world framework was out of 
touch with the changing environment. 
Most HRM features operated as conditioning features to SKISS and became more 
positive to supply patterns other than lifetime employment. Several broad 
changes were noted. Two conditioning features included: 
Breaking with history through a new organisational status and mission; 
Achieving broad consensus on the urgency of new policies and practices. 
These conditioning features were operationalised through the following 
secondary features: 
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Breaking with the practice of in-bred top management thanks to a 
perceived crisis; 
Empowering line managers to pursue higher business performance by 
diminishing the power of personnel; 
Focusing HR assets to specific business requirements, supported by new 
hard and soft benefits which are performance-related; 
Giving champions opportunities to argue for change and trying out skill 
experiments. 
The above findings are consistent with those of Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) who 
identified five factors for successful change, among them leading change, linking 
strategic and operational change, and treating human resources as assets and 
liabilities. The findings also indicated that the personnel function and its 
systems operated as a strong stabilizing factor, and generally impacted 
negatively on any supply pattern that threatened lifetime employment. It 
required massive structural change, new management systems, and a shift of 
HRM responsibility in favour of line managers to diminish this block to change. 
Sustained competitive pressures and the view that organisational survival was at 
stake led to changes in top management values and perceptions, and in the 
managerial and professional cultures. The pace of change was generally slow and 
awaited a major organisational restructuring and work reorganisation to have a 
broad effect. The example of IBM suggests that restructuring only acts as a 
catalyst if the management cadres are convinced that organisational survival is 
at stake. The BT SKISS on management style was successful because it set up a 
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repeated sequence of mobilising HRM followed by structural change, followed by 
HRM change, and so on, over an eight year period. 
The maturing of computing science and the growing number of business-minded 
software researchers, due to slow but sustained recruitment, also helped to make 
the HRM context more supportive of the new business and work practices that 
were needed. 
We conclude that improving the HRM context through skill supply patterns and 
the enhancement of certain HRM features leads to subsequent improvements in 
other HRM features. This improved context can support more ambitious skill 
supply patterns. At the same time, coherence of HRM components was shown to 
be achievable for a targetted group (top management group and graduate 
recruits), but difficult to achieve for the entire workforce. Changes in hard and 
soft benefits were introduced at different times and for different reasons, 
sometimes as a deliberate package, at other times as a reaction to restructuring 
and local skill shortages. These findings add specificity to the broader HRM work 
of Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) and Beer et al. (1990). 
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CELAPTER 9. CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION 
This concluding chapter summarizes the purpose of the thesis, the empirical 
findings based on the three case studies, and the development of the concepts of 
SIUSS and retention mechanisms. A model of the top-down and bottom-up 
processes influencing skill supply patterns is elaborated, and the influence of the 
HRM context is evaluated. The findings are informed by the strategic literature, 
and the new HRM management roles are situated in the literature. The chapter 
ends with policy recommendations for managers, limitations of this study, and 
avenues for future research. 
.I 
CONCEPTS OF SKISS & RETENTION MECHANISMS 
Skills supply strategy or SKISS is defined as the intentional shaping and sizing 
of -the organisation's skillbase (composed of technical, interpersonal, and 
managerial skills) for the purpose of supporting the business strategy. The 
literature indicated that within large high technology organisations, the internal 
labour market is considered an important resource; through the recruitment, 
development and retention of knowledge workers, we ensure innovation. Through 
appropriate structure and work organisation, the skillbase becomes productive 
and purposeful. This broad model summarised in Figure 2.1, guided this 
research endeavour, subject to modifications in the light of the findings. 
This dissertation argued, at the outset, that SKISS offers the conceptual 
advantage of disentangling the management of skills from the broader concept of 
HRM which impacts on all aspects of the organisation. and its people. SKISS is 
complemented by the more narrow concept of recruitment and retention 
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mechanisms. The rewards offered to attract and influence employees can be 
thought of as hard and soft benefits, where hard refers to compensation and 
benefits, and soft refers to job characteristics and more general factors to do with 
work, organisation and social environments. This concept helps to focus on the 
motivational aspects of the workforce and managerial attempts to influence 
organisational entry and exit. 
From this starting position, we must now ascertain whether SKISS remains a 
promising concept in light of our findings. Specifically, what did the findings 
reveal about the strategic and non-strategic dimensions of skill supply 
management within R&D? 
SKISS AS A TOP-DOWN & BOTTOM-LJP PROCESS 
This researcher established four criteria to satisfy in order that a skills supply 
pattern be considered strategic: 
(1) an identifiable link with the changing business strategy; 
(2) managerial intentions to create and maintain HRM support for the 
business strategy; 
(3) a coherence among the HRM elements which are mutually 
reinforcing in terms of supporting the business strategy; 
(4) a consistent managerial effort to achieve and exploit the desired 
linkage to business strategy. 
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The discussion below ignores the single-lever SKISS because, as our findings 
demonstrate, it is a specific response (accessing external labour markets) to a 
specific problem (competitive recruitment for scarce professional skills) which 
leaves untouched the remainder of the organisation. Such a SKISS raises few 
issues of interest. On the other hand, the multi-lever SKISS is a good test for 
strategic activity as defined by the four criteria above. 
SKISS AS A TOP-DOWN PROCESS 
Summarized in Figure 9.1, our findings support the existence of SKISS as a top- 
down process, but as a rare occurence which depends on intense and prolonged 
competitive and customer pressures in the outer context. Inevitably, top 
management undergoes a profound perceptual/cognitive shift concerning the 
environment and the organisation's position within it. The leadership adopts a 
new mission and a radical change in business strategy which calls for significant 
technical, structural and product-market changes. These latter changes reveal 
skill gaps in top and middle management which inhibit the strategy's 
operationalisation. 
Top middle management also become aware of skill gaps in response to changes 
in management systems and changes in the work organisation which they 
implement as part of operationalising the business strategy. These gaps have 
more to do with performance levels which first-line managers and researchers 
can achieve in the modified work context. Several authors have noted the 
relationship between work organisation and the corresponding horizontal and 
vertical balance of professional and managerial skills (Shenar and Thamhain, 
1994; Griffin, 1987; Boyatzis, 1982; Katz, 1974). However, from a change 
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perspective, management awareness of skill imbalances and gaps comes through 
their concern for improving business performance. 
Both sources of awareness of skill gaps (initial strategy formulation vs 
subsequent elaboration) lead to changes in skill supply patterns and form a 
coherent package of changes in hard and soft benefits. However, in the process 
some of the existing spft benefits deteriorate and cause low employee morale. 
Management responds by improving some of the soft benefits such as career 
paths and formal listening systems. Both initial and subsequent adjustments of 
benefits take place within the larger HRM context where other benefits are 
determined by the lifetime employment policy and adhoc skill interventions. 
Complete coherence in benefits is not achievable during a period of sustained 
change. 
Compared with the original model (see Figure 2.1), this empirically-based model 
indicates that skill concerns emerge later in the operationalisation of the 
business strategy when business performance gaps point out skill gaps. The 
strong and sustained top-down process helps to translate these skill gaps into 
new management roles. 
SKISS AS A SECONDARY BOTTOM-LJP PROCESS 
Despite the strong top-down process, managerial awareness of skill gaps remains 
a reactive and emergent process, a secondary stage in the strategy process. The 
well-established business strategy elements of products and markets, technology, 
and organisational structure set the stage for skill considerations. There is no 
evidence of using skill audits to create a forward looking set of core skills as 
recommended by Mein et al. (1991). Though the management group realize that 
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certain professional and managerial skills are critical for business suceess, the 
idea of obtaining a competitive advantage through skills remains outside the 
realm of practice. The secondary importance of skills leaves the task of creating 
an overall coherence in HRM components to personnel which tends to perpetuate 
the package determined by the policy of lifetime employment. 
New Roles for Managers. A second emergent process involves the emergence of 
new management roles. Again, this situation is closely intertwined with the 
operationalisation of the business strategy, but the intentions of top management 
are too broad to determine the actual roles which emerge. Downsizing of non-core 
activities (e. g., middle management, personnel, marketing) accompanies the 
structural change, and with the industry trend of aligning R&D to the business 
strategy (Whittington, 1991), new roles for management are gradually defined. 
While the strategy intentionally introduces the guideline of devolving 
responsibility to lower management, it is the surviving middle managers who 
bring the idea to reality. These middle managers also see themselves pushed 
away from the technical work and encouraged to tackle the productivity issue for 
the smaller workforce. Gradually, a skills planning and management role 
emerges. Meanwhile, the greater emphasis on more direct contributions to 
business performance prompts lower levels of management to take a broader 
view of the skills of their local workforce, beyond individual preferences and 
research interests. 
Team leaders, first, second and third line managers have always played an 
active role in managing people. Now, new a nd more specialised roles emerge with 
the creation of business units (or their equivalent) and formal mid-level strategic 
mechanisms. Team leaders become technical managers, and first line managers 
take on broad but routine HRM responsibilities. In contrast, second and third 
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level managers are distanced from the technical work and to some extent from 
the detailed aspects of technical planning, and adopt a broad HRM strategic 
roles. Managing and influencing the skillbase become explicit responsibilities, 
and are reinforced by their participation in formal mid-level committees with a 
broad HRM mandate. 
Zuboff (1988) has recommended similar role changes in order that an 
organisation obtain the full benefits of computerization. Our findings do not 
support the hypothesis that computurization acts as the trigger to new HRM 
roles. These organisations have used computers for research for over a decade. 
However, improved computerized management systems did encourage the 
devolution of routine HRM duties to first-line managers. 
Storey (1992) also found that large U. K. manufacturing firms had created new 
middle line management roles which fused HRM responsibilities with business 
management, but that difficulties e3dsted in achieving a coherent package of 
interventions. He also reported that first-line managers were given HRM 
responsibilities in communications, employee involvement and development. 
Thus, outside the IT sector, management is also being transformed. 
SKILLS SUPPLY AS PRIMARILY A BOTTOM-UP PROCESS 
If $KISS is a rare occurrence, what happens the remainder of the time? 
Adjustments to the business strategy occur periodically in response to usual 
pressures in the environment as perceived by top management (see Figure 9.2). 
Most of the time, only minor changes are called for in the technical, structural 
and product-market aspects of the organisation's operations. Within this non- 
v 
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turbulent inner and outer context, R&D managers are driven by non-strategic 
preoccupations and interests. The social and operational context (e. g., budgeting 
and project allocations) favors continuity in the relative importance of research 
areas and the pursuit of traditional research and management careers. Both 
middle and lower managers monitor skill gaps which may affect "adequate 
performance" and which have only a loose link with the business strategy. 
Recruitment of managers and professional with skills considered critical for the 
success of the strategy does take place, but at low levels and often with new 
resources. 
Managers actively buffer their areas from any top-down change which could 
upset their on-going interests defined in terms of access to resources and 
maintenance of preferred research projects. Buffering gives them time to adjust 
their on-going operations in a manner consistent with corporate intentions and 
without disrupting their skillbase. They translate the strategic intentions into 
something familiar and non-threatening. If translation seems impossible, middle 
management actively blocks change. 
The literature supports the importance of maintaining safe and stable 
environments for researchers in order to foster expertise and high performance 
(Badaracco, 1991; Zuboff, 1988; Schon, 1987,1983). Even in a manufacturing 
context, continuous application of skills is required for high performance (Nelson 
and Winters, 1982). So long as middle line managers are focused on their 
immediate areas of responsibility, they are likely to slow down the pace of 
change. 
Under conditions of usual pressures in the outer context, this bottom-up 
domination of the labs leads to adequate performance of the R&D division. It 
CHAPTER NINE. CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION PAGE 331 
gives somes support to the business strategy, but also pursues it's own 
technological vision composed of a multitude of diverse views and innovative 
impulses. The introduction of improved financial and project management 
systems also reassure top management that improvements in research 
performance are taking place. When the outer context becomes progressively 
more hostile and the business -horizons become shorter, this bottom-up process 
hampers the attainment of high business performance. 
SKISS WITHIN R&D 
The transition from a skill supply pattern which has a strong bottom-up process 
to one which is dominated by a top-down process takes place only when key top 
managers have come to terms with the new environment through a paradigm 
(Kuhn, 1962) or interpretive (Daft and Weick, 1984) shift. They respond through 
downsizing and emphasising the need to achieve rapid productivity and 
performance improvements. Gilmore and Hirshhorn (1984) have commented on 
the relationship between retrenchment and a productivity drive among white 
collar workers, but confined their discussion to managing interpersonal relations. 
Schneier et al. (1992) went further and proposed a variety of strategies to achieve 
white collar productivity after downsizing, including work reorganisation. Our 
findings confirm those of Sullivan and Hogge (1987) that the R&D workforce 
undergoes less contraction than the remaining organisation. However, it was 
found that downsizing acts as the trigger to broad changes in structure, 
management practices, and work organisation within R&D. Figure 9.3 situates 
SIUSS within these broad changes, and incorporates elements from the more 
generic Figures 9.1 and 9.2. 
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The surviving middle managers come to share top management's sense of 
urgency, and support the devolution of broad responsibilities to first-line 
managers as a way of coping with the large spans of control they have been given 
in the new structure. They also take up the challenge of enhancing the 
performance of their area by careful planning and management of their area 
skillbase as part of matching limited resources to projects. With the introduction 
of tighter financial and project planning systems, and the threat of competitive 
sourcing for R&D services, middle managers adopt a more disciplined approach 
to people management. An important shift in emphasis takes place away from 
servicing existing employees to actively planning projects. Flexible teams and 
transferable skills become more important. This shift in emphasis conflicts with 
middle management's traditional loyalties and ways of reconciling corporate and 
local interests. Yet, these managers show considerable enthusiasm as they grow 
into broader business managers and redefine their role of 'survivor' in a 
downsizing context. 
With growing short-termism in projects, managers strive for a flexible and 
evolving skillbase (Kosnik, 1990). However, creating such a skillbase proves to be 
a slow process in large R&D divisions. Top management assists the above 
changes in roles by clearly designating a few key principals of restructuring and 
encouraging middle line managers to create formal mechanisms with real powers 
over HRM policies. As these managers grow comfortable with the exercise of 
their new responsibilities, they pay more attention to the emerging performance 
gaps which indicate skill gaps. The top-down process does not eradicate the 
bottom-up process which continues to have a strong influence through personnel 
and first-line managers. It does channel and align the bottom-up process with 
requirements of the new business strategy. Note that this alignment is 
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maintained by sustained top management involvement, and favorable changes in 
the HRM context which are gradually created. 
Storey (1992) reported on a similar transformation within the mainstream 
manufacturing sector in the 1980s, starting with competitive pressures (e. g., 
globalization of markets), followed by downsizing and the emergence of a "crucial 
fusion" of business and HRM concerns in the form of broad roles in middle and 
first-line management. This parallel industry development may be accounted for 
by vicarious learning (IT leadership observing the manufacturing leadership) or 
by the impact of organisational size as the critical contingency factor (Child, 
1975). 
.I 
The model outlined in Figure 9.3 indicates that with a downsizing context, the 
surviving middle managers are seeking a new role. Fulop (1991) complained that 
the literature on downsizing has failed to describe what happens to surviving 
middle managers. Dopson and Stewart (1990) also were critical of the literature 
on middle management, and concluded that empirical studies demonstrated job 
enrichment for many middle management jobs after IT restructuring. Too much 
has been attributed to the effect of IT as cause of downsizing and as decimator of 
middle management ranks (Applegate et al., 1988; Leavitt and Whisler, 1958) 
and not enough on other causes of restructuring and the emerging roles for the 
numerous survivors. Our findings help to fill this gap by identifying a HRM role 
for middle management in a downsized (or potentially downsizing) R&D division. 
A broad mandate of skills management (sizing and shaping) for middle line 
managers is an expansion of their previous HRM duties and can become more 
division-wide. This development takes advantage of the embeddedness of the 
skillbase in the work organisation and the social networks. Middle managers in 
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R&D have typically risen from the ranks and, until recently, many have kept 
some involvement in the technical side of projects. They are likely to have a 
detailed understanding of the work organisation, and have extensive horizontal 
and vertical networks made easy by the collegiality of researchers. 
We can expect that the greater involvement of middle managers in skills 
management will lead to more upward influence and strategic conversations with 
senior managers (Westley, 1990) focused on this area. Upward influence would 
become more pronounced if senior management concentrated on creating the 
strategic context and empowering middle managers (Fulop, 1991; Westley, 1990; 
Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). Other facilitating factors would be the creation of 
business units and a personnel function which helps line managers to solve 
business problems. With these additive positive factors, the management of skills 
may become more tightly woven with business strategy. 
THE HRM CONTEXT 
Lifetime employment remains the dominant skills supply pattern of these large 
organisations, and can best be described as a traditional cluster of HRM policies 
and practices, namely, controlled entrance and exiting of small numbers of 
university graduates, broad training and development, redeployment and 
retraining, and a significant peripheral workforce. The linkage with business 
strategy is diffuse. Lifetime employment inhibits the development of SKISS 
because this policy framework is used to evaluate any deviations from standard 
HRM activity. 
Because of its dominance, lifetime employment acts as part of the HRM context 
for other skill supply efforts, and is strongly supported by other features, namely, 
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top management values and beliefs, professional and managerial cultures, the 
personnel management function, and workforce planning. Recently, some of these 
features have become less supportive, under the influence of changes in skill 
supply patterns that responded to top management intent and the growing 
importance of software in the merging IT industry. The sizing and shaping of 
senior and middle management (top-down process) helped to emphasise a new 
paradigm which placed more emphasis on competitive and customer forces and a 
responsive and performing workforce. Downsizing also affected personnel, the 
guardian of traditional HRM policies, which found itself smaller and with a clear 
role of supporting line managers in a flexible and business-first manner. Storey 
(1992) also reported that personnel had lost the initiative to line management. 
Sustained recruitment of IT people (bottom-up process) reflecting the scientific 
and industry shift in favour of IT created an alternative culture more 
sympathetic and responsive to business requirements than the traditional 
engineering and and physics culture. 
The above changes in the HRM context responded to both top-down and bottom- 
up efforts to meet performance requirements, and over time, came to be mutually 
supportive to the new business orientation, and at the same time, less supportive 
of the policy of lifetime employment. 
REVISITING STRATEGIC HRM 
This investigation of SKISS has brought to light broader managerial roles 
integrating HRM concerns with business considerations. These line managers 
are aware of the importance of skills to the performance of the R&D division and 
their specific area. While these findings are supportive of the resource-based 
theories of strategic HRM (Wernerfelt, 1984; Schuller and MacMillan, 1984; 
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Ulrich, 1991), they demonstrate that skill interventions pass through the 
performance "lens". This focus closely resembles the emphasis of strategic 
behaviours (e. g., innovation for a growth-oriented firm) of the behavioural 
theories of strategic HRM (Miles and Snow, 1984; Schuler, 1991; Schuler and 
Jackson). Unfortunately, these theories fail to explain how these strategic 
behaviours come about, and remain distant from actual work roles. Our findings 
call for elements of both groups of theories, with attention to human resources as 
a consequence of performance goals, and not as its antecedent. 
Butler (1988) was more specific in describing how middle management could 
contribute to both the intended and emergent strategy through corporate 
selection and rewarding of behaviours which were consistent with opportunity 
recognition as an on-going management activity. Our findings do not support this 
view for the R&D division which has high continuity in its mission and projects. 
Furthermore, our findings contradict Mintzberg and Water's (1985) linkage 
between strategy' and environment. They argued that in a turbulent 
environment, an emergent strategy was appropriate; in a stable environment, an 
intended strategy was the best. Our findings for R&D were the opposite, with a 
turbulent environment leading to a shift towards a more intentional strategy in 
these large firms. 
POLICY RECOAUVIENDATIONS 
Heightening Awareness of Skill Issues. Future organisations are expected to be 
heavy users of knowledge workers, and this certainly will be the case within 
R&D. In sympathy with the quick-fix technology bias that exists in western 
culture, Applegate et al. (1988) propose that in the next century IT will shape the 
organisation peopled by large numbers of mobile knowledge workers. Short-term 
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projects and high employee turnover will be the norm, with corporate history, 
experience and expertise maintained by the IT systems. Project teams are 
managed by highly valued project managers busy assembling and disassembling 
skills. These authors suffer from naive assumptions about the ease of creating 
and maintaining group cultures. Their model of skills as standardised and fully 
encapsulated by artificial intelligence has appeal but lacks a concrete 
organisational and work context. It ignores the embeddedness of people working 
with and around computer screens. Their vision may be appropriate for areas 
where standard and explicit solutions and contexts exist, but would not suit R&D 
despite the shift towards short-term and market-driven work. Strategic decision- 
makers would benefit from a better understanding of the complex nature of 
human skills and their embeddedness in the work and social organisation 
(Mahoney and Pandian, 1992). 
Enhancing Middle Managers as Skill Strategists. Accepting that middle 
managers can share in strategy-making is not easy for many senior managers to 
accept as legitimate (Guth and MacMillan, 1986; Kay, 1974), and may be 
particularly difficult in organisations emerging from the public sector. Schilit 
(1987) found that middle managers in the private sector exercised upward 
influence more frequently than their counterparts in the public sector for both 
low risk and high risk situations. Interestingly, low risk issues were typically 
related to organisation, labourand staffing. 
0 
Wooldridge and Floyd (1990) suggested that limiting their involvement may arise 
for several reasons: politics (limiting potential conflicts), competition (quick 
response and controlling information leakage), and costs in managerial time and 
energy. On the other hand, their greater involvement is consistent with the high 
social and operational embeddedness of R&D activity. Macdonald (1992) has 
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argued that firms need not worry about knowledge leakage because the flow of 
information across firms through informal networks in the community of 
researchers enhances the individual firm's R&D. 
0 
Developing Middle Managers into Skill Strategists. The embedded nature of the 
managerial skillbase and their involvement in the strategic process argues for 
careful development of middle managers (Pelikan, 1989; Eliasson, 1990). Keer 
and Kackofsky (1989) proposed that for a clan-type culture as one finds in R&D, 
management development (as opposed to management selection) is more effective 
for aligning managers with strategy and its implementation. They viewed such 
an organisation organically with both managerial abilities and strategic demands 
evolving over time. Extended socialisation and learn-as-you-go should be 
complemented by succession planning, mentoring and training. Exposure to the 
difficult topic of embedded skills would prepare them for careful shaping of the 
skillbase. The above suggestions nevertheless must reflect the reality of a flatter 
organisation which may experience additional reorganisations in a turbulent 
future. Horizontal development within R&D and with other internal and external 
partners becomes the guideline, not vertical development. Our recommendations 
concur with those of Weick and Berlinger (1989) and their concept of career 
improvisation, but conflict with Kanter's (1984) emphasis of inter-firm career 
mobility which was attributed to managers in high tech organisations in general 
rather than in the R&D division. Kanter ignored the issue of embedded skills and 
how they are fostered. 
Vollman and McAuliffe (1968) and Cone (1969) pointed towards embeddedness by 
identifying several causes of obsolescence including new forms of organisation 
and social developments. Unfortunately, the current trend of isolating middle 
managers from technical work will accelerate the misfit. There comes a point 
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where the work context has evolved and the middle manager plans and acts with 
poor grounding. This degradation can be compensated to some extent by the 
regular involvement of technical managers, and some kind of job rotation. The 
challenge resides in creating strategic HRM roles for middle managers while 
retarding the inevitable effects of obsolescence. 
While embedded issues require the subtle skills of line managers through 
networking, the greater use of rigorous financial and project planning systems 
calls for more generic skills (Hosking and Fineman, 1990). The absence of key 
generic skills are corrected easily with some external recruitment of experienced 
managers and the systematic training of the management cadre. These generic 
skills are more easily articulated and make the task of monitoring and fostering 
them an easier task (Winter, 1987). 
LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY & FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
This investigation defined and supported the concept of SKISS, and 
demonstrated its usefulness and limitations for the study of strategic 
management. The empirical data collected and the relevant academic literature 
accessed has given a solid basis for future research on this area. However, the 
thesis does suffer from some obvious limitations. The in-depth study of three 
organisations has revealed certain findings which may or may not be relevant for 
other organisations. The choice of organisations was both fortuitous and 
constraining. IBM was the sophisticated private enterprise "par excellence", yet 
BT proved to be the most profitable choice for revealing the top-down process of 
SEJSS. In contrast, RSRE helped to confirm the pervasiveness of embedded skills 
and the bottom-up influence of managers, but had little experience pursuing a 
business strategy in a competitive environment. The single perspective of the 
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researcher has led to an intensive intellectual effort helpful to his development, 
and counterbalancing measures were taken to minimise personal bias through 
feedback from participants and academic supervisors. Only through additional 
case studies and other types of data (e. g., surveys) can one hope to generalise the 
findings with confidence. The absence of top management participants is some 
cause for concern, but the presence of professionals, lower and middle level 
managers strengthen our conclusions concerning middle managers. 
Several areas would benefit from additional research. First, efforts are warranted 
in clarifying the nature of embedded skills (both professional and managerial) in 
particular organisational contexts and how they change over time. Second, such 
investigations would also elucidate the transfer of skills and the conditions which 
make this possible. Presumably, core capabilities across organisational units and 
across organisations may have commonalities which facilitate skill transfer 
(Nelson, 1991). 
Third, more empirical work is needed on SKISS and the HRM context, in 
particular in other industries with growing use of knowledge workers. Our 
findings suggest that line managers can rise above the social and technical 
embeddedness of work to address skill issues by gradually changing the HRM 
context that locks-in the lifetime employment policy. 
Fourth, it would be worthwhile to continue to document the changes to lifetime 
employment as the dominant skill supply pattern in large organisations in the 
private and public sectors. What factors are facilitating or inhibiting the changes, 
and what other skill supply patterns emerge? 
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Fifth, researchers could add to the small empirical base which e2dsts on the new 
roles of middle managers and how these managers alter their actions when 
dealing with each other. In the past, they focused on a clearly defined 
departmental boundaries and treated each other as both territorial allies and 
foes. Strauss (1962) enumerated ways of managing fellow middle managers: 
creation and evasion of rules, the "old boy" network, educating others about their 
function, and interaction tactics. Do their methods change when they are given 
broader HRM responsibilities? How do they reconcile the competing claims of 
their "territory" and those of the entire Division? 
Managing knowledge workers for competitive advantage will continue to be a 
worthwhile topic for the foreseeable future. Whether researchers accept the 
challenge will depend, in part, on whether the tools of an appropriate conceptual 
language and framework eidst. This researcher believes that skills supply 
strategy or SKISS has made some contribution. ' 
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1.0 COMPANY& STRATEGIC OVERVIEW 
1.1 Locations 
1.2 Company origins and age 
1.3 Ownership (and independence) 
1.4 Business and Markets 
products and services 
major customers, location, and quality of relationship 
relationship with suppliers 
with business and academic partners 
1.5 What does business success depend on in this industry? 
1.6 Size of company (with trends) 
Employees by job groups 
Investment in R&D 
1.7 How has the competitive situation evolved in the 1980s? 
1.8 Major developments in recent years (10 year period) affecting: 
size, rate of expansion/contraction, product-market orientation, number of 
employees, revenues, profits 
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1.9 How is the company organised, eg major depts, work organisation, major 
tasks and skills, etc? 
Have the above recent developments affected company organisation and 
structure in any way? 
1.10 What are the current business challenges? The current business strategy? 
1.11 What changes are taking place (or will) in the firm to meet current 
business challenges: structure, work organisation, major tasks and skills? 
1.12 Which are the key groups of employees for meeting these strategic 
challenges? Explain and locate within the organisation. 
1.13 What is the management structure, senior managers' ages background, 
time with company? 
2.0 SKILL REQUIREMENTS 
2.1 What is the mix and variety of skills? 
Number of employees by occupational groups, levels, or skill categories (as 
defined by the company) 
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2.2 Employment distribution by 
chronological age 
length of service 
sex 
2.3 What skills are in short supply (including senior management skills)? 
2.4 What have been the major 'triggers' to skill requirements in recent years? 
Has the skills level risen or fallen? 
3.0 SKILLS AVAILABILITY 
3.1 For what levels of the organisation do you recruit externally? To what 
extent? What skills are readily available? 
3.2 How does the nature of the following affect the supply of skills? 
the sector 
the size of the firm 
being part of a larger group (if applicable) 
the occupational groups concerned 
the local labour market 
unions or professional bodies 
3.3 Have You noticed any changes in characteristics (skills, values and life 
goals) in new employees? In your regular employees? 
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4.0 SKILLS SUPPLY STRATEGY 
4.1 What sources of supply are used for recruiting the key groups of 
employees (local/regional/national/ intemational)? Are they adequate? 
Have any changes in sourcing taken place? 
4.2 For the key/problem employee groups, what employment practice is 
pursued (full-time permanent, full-time temporary, part-time permanent, 
part-time temporary)? 
4.3 How does your firm assess skill needs? 
-4.4 Does the firm have a short or long-term perspective on skills 
development? 
4.5 Have you changed your approach to skills supply at all over recent years 
(e. g. are you recruiting from different age groups, from different product 
sectors, or relying more on training? ) Do you foresee further changes, and 
if so, why? 
4.6 What is the lead time for developing or acquiring key skills and why? 
4.7 How far do you rely on 'poaching' skills? 
4.8 Which skills do you see as vulnerable to being poached away by other 
companies? What do you do about this? 
4.9 How far are skills in this company firm-specific. and therefore easier to 
hold? 
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5.0 MANAGEMENT OF AN INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET 
5.1 Do you treat all or some the firm's business units as one large pool for 
skills deployment? 
5.2 What facilitates/hinders skill redeployment across business units 
(geography, specific skills, core skills, transferable skills, work settings, 
employee preferences, career paths)? 
6.0 TURNOVER 
6.1 Wbat is your current turnover rate? Are you concerned about certain 
employee groups? Explain. 
What was the turnover rate during the 1980s and how did it change? 
What prompted these changes? 
6.2 How is turnover monitored (employee groups, business units, etc)? 
What does turnover mean for the firm (avoidable vs unavoidable costs)? 
Have any steps been taken to influence turnover? What was the purpose 
and the effect? 
What steps were taken to control the severity of losing people (i. e., 
retaining most valued employees through measures such as development 
programs)? 
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6.3 How do you capture and use turnover data? How detailed is the 
breakdown in information? 
Who makes use of the information and for what purpose? 
Have there been any changes in this information system? 
What prompted the changes and how did they come about? 
7.0 HUAL4. N RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
7.1 Who sets HR policy (division, UK head office, corporate head office)? How 
are HR policies harmonized? 
7.2 Does the HR department play a strategic role (part of senior management, 
liaising with senior operators on business objectives and people 
development (success and issues)? 
In terms of a HR planning system? Links to business planning? 
When did this begin? What prompted it? How did it's role change in the 
1980s? 
7.3 What role do line managers play in HRM? How are they assisted (tools, 
training)? How are they evaluated/rewarded? 
7.4 What unions cover managerial and professional/technical stam. How is 
this relationship managed? History of relationship (good/poor, 
collaborative/antagonistic)? 
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7.5 What methods of recruitment are used for key employee groups (campus 
recruiting, newspaper advertising, professional networks, employment 
agencies, executive search firins)? 
7.6 Describe the different types of employment contracts that you offer? To 
whom are they offered? 
How much fle3dbility is there in the terms and conditions offered? Are 
exceptions made for key employee groups? 
7.7 What changes took place in employment contracts in the 1980s? What 
prompted the changes? How did the changes take place (as exceptions, for 
specific groups only, region specific)? 
7.8 How does the pension plan work? And benefits? What changes took place 
in the 1980s? What prompted them and how did they come about? 
7.9 Do you (or did you) offer early retirement? When was it introduced and for 
what reason? How did employees react? 
7.10 Describe the compensation program. How are pay levels determined 
(local/regional/national/intemational comparisons; industry/cross-industry 
competitors)? 
What changes have taken place during the 1980s? What prompted these 
changes and how were they introduced? 
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7.11 How are salary increases given (COL, merit increment)? 
Is pay linked to performance? How are targets set and progress 
measured? 
Are poor performers pqnalised? What opportunities are they given to 
improve? Encouraged to leave? 
7.12 Describe the benefits program. How is it determined? 
What changes have taken place in the 1980s? What prompted these 
changes and how were they introduced? 
7.13 What fleiibility eyists in working hours and conditions? When were they 
introduced? what prompted them? Were other changes required to 
accommodate these changes? 
7.14 How does communication take place within the firm (formal and informal 
mechanisms)? What changes have taken place in the 1980s and how did 
they come about? 
7.15 What relations do you maintain with the outside system of 
trainingleducation/development, and how do you use it to help retention? 
7.16 What level of success do you have in retaining key employee groups? 
Problem groups? How do you explain it? 
Has it changed in the 1980s? If so, what accounts for the change? 
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7.17 What are the current issues involving these key employees? 
7.18 Does the firm have a long standing philosophy and commitment to its 
employees? Concerning retention? 
To what extent is it implicit or explicit? 
What influence did it have on defining critical skills for business success? 
7.19 Is there an explicit retention objective which the firm pursues? If yes, how 
is it defined? 
How is it linked to the business strategy (maintaining market share, 
productivity objectives, costs, flexibility)? 
7.20 What changes in HRM activities have taken place to reach this retention 
objective? (If no, how do you think changes in HRM activities have 
influenced retention? ) Where does fle3dbility eiist? 
7.21 How do you prepare/support managers to adjust and manage these 
fleidble work arrangements? 
7.22 How do you monitor the effectiveness of the HRM systems? Their 
contribution to reaching the retention objectives? 
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8.0 HUAL4N RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
8.1 What is the company philosophy concerning the development of your 
employees beyond training for immediate and specific needs? 
Has it changed in the 1980s? what prompted the changes and what was 
their impact on HR practices? 
- 8.2 How does this contribute to the retention of employees? Critical groups? 
Problem groups? Other employees? 
-8.3 Describe the career planning that takes place. I 
How is career planning linked to 
training & development? 
appraisals? 
job assignments? 
task assignments? 
8.4 What flexibility exists in career planning? How did this come about? 
8.5 What changes have taken place in career planning in the 1980s? What 
prompted them and how did they take place? 
8.6 What career paths are currently available (Technical/Professional and 
Managerial)? 
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8.7 What path changes took place in the 1980s? How did these changes come 
about (restructuring, retrenchment/growth, changes in products/services, 
new employee values)? 
Impact on employees (critical groups, problem groups, other employees)? 
8.8 How do employees define career success? Have any changes taken place in 
the 1980s? What HRM changes took place as a consequence? 
8.9 Does succession planning take place? Describe. How did it come about? 
9.0 AUNAGEMIENT STYLE 
.I 
9.1 How would you describe the style of senior management? Is there a 
particular philosophy or approach to HRM? 
9.2 How does management view innovative professionals and their managers? 
Risk taking and errors/failure? 
9.3 How does senior management communicate its approach to middle and 
lower levels of management? 
9.4 How are innovative employees expected to behave? High achievers? 
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10.0 PROJECT AUNAGEMENT (Pertinent to R&D, contract bidding, 
and team approach) 
10.1 How are groups formed and managed? How are specific work 
assignments made? How long do they last? 
10.2 How do you retain your talented people? Have you ever lost someone? 
What happened? 
10.3 What is your involvement with the career planning program? How do they 
fit in with the department and project requirements? 
11.0 NETWORK MANAGEMENT (Keeping skills and strengthening 
partners) 
11.1 Which networks are considered strategic for business success? Explain. 
11.2 How important is continuity of working relationships with suppliers, 
customers, business and academic partners? 
11.3 How would you characterise the network: 
developing/growing/shrinking, stabletchanging boundaries, 
stable/changing participants? 
12.0 QUESTIONS FOR KEY/PROBLEM EMPLOYEES 
12.1 What motivates you to stay with the company? What makes you doubtful 
about staying? 
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12.2 What do you think motivates your colleagues to stay? What has prompted 
some of them to leave? 
13.0 GENERAL QUESTIONS 
13.1 Can you describe an example in recent years where the company has faced 
a major change in the skills or sort of people it needed, or where it has 
made a significant change in management of your people? How did this 
come about? What happened? 
Has this had any permanent influence on the company and what it does in 
managing its human resources? 
13.2 Can you give any examples where the departure of an employee was 
viewed as a loss to the firin? Was any action taken? Explain. 
13.3 Can you give any examples where the firm succeeded in averting the 
departure of a key employee? How did this take place. 
13.4 Am I missing something? 
NOTE BENE 
N. B. 1 For each section, ask interviewees to identify documents where detailed 
information can be found. When such documents eidst, the interview can focus on 
general and broad questions (What, why, how). Broad questions will often have 
to do. 
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N. B. 2 Learn your script, then throw it away in order that the interview can 
become more like a conversation. Also decide ahead of time to whom you wish to 
ask sets of questions. 
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